I pause here to point out that Justice Allen’s judgment is a simple one-paragraph judgment for payment of money. The judgment does not direct an accounting or order a tracing of the funds invested . I foreshadow to say that in my opinion part of the reason why the judgment debtor process in this case has gone awry
Deloitte & Touche (“Deloitte”) was the auditor for Livent and its predecessor from 1989 through to 1998, when the fraud was discovered. It issued clean audited financial statements throughout this period. In this action, Livent – through a Special Receiver appointed in the insolvency proceedings for various purposes, including bringing this claim – sues Deloitte for damages in contract and negligence arising out of Deloitte’s failure to follow generally accepted auditing standards (“GAAS”) and thereby discover material misstatements in Livent’s books, records and financial reporting attributable to the Drabinsky and Gottlieb fraud.
Special rules govern discharge hearings in income tax-driven personal bankruptcies. Should the assessed amounts of personal income tax that were under appeal at the time of his discharge hearing be included? For the reasons set out below, I conclude the answer is “no”, An excellent reference case with relevant law well explained by the court.
OPNP is an immigration program offered through the Ontario Ministry of Citizenship, Immigration and International Trade (“MCII”) whereby Ontario nominates individuals and their families’ for permanent resident status based on certain criteria including amount of investment, approximately $5.9 million in payments from 11 OPNP investors deposited into Ontario-based bank accounts held by Future Solar and Cenith Energy between May 2012 and August 2014. None of the Corporate Respondents are reporting issuers in Ontario. Further, between January 1, 2011 and at least December 8, 2014, the Respondents were not registered with the Commission and no prospectus was filed
Neither counsel expressed a position on the nature of the court’s appellate jurisdiction .. I have assumed that the court has the right to make findings of fact based on the agreed facts..The parties agree that the modern rule of statutory interpretation in the tax context requires that the words of statute be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense, harmoniously with the scheme of the act, the object of the act, and the intention of the Legislature. The appellant argued that if a business is open “from Monday to Friday” it is open both Monday and Friday. I wish to express my appreciation to counsel for both parties. The matter was one of first impression with little assistance available from case law, texts, or legislative history.
The agreement of purchase and sale set the closing date for Saturday, July 30, 2011 and time was of the essence. The transaction did not close. The appellants sought return of the $75,000 deposit. The trial judge found that the appellants had repudiated the agreement and were not entitled to return of the deposit. The trial judge correctly noted that in order to obtain relief from forfeiture the appellants were required to establish that i) the forfeited sum was out of proportion to the damages suffered; and ii) it would be unconscionable for the vendor to retain the money. Although the respondent did not suffer damages, the trial judge determined that it was not unconscionable for him to retain the deposit.
On appeal from the order of Justice James A.S. Wilcox of the Superior Court of Justice. The appeal is allowed. The judge erred in considering the purpose of bankruptcy, which is to give a debtor a fresh start free from former financial obligations, and observed that the onus is on the creditor to establish that the debt survived bankruptcy. The judge failed to apply the s.178(1) (a.1)(i) exception in the Act.
For the reasons that follow, I conclude that, when considered cumulatively, the trial judge Justice P. Theodore Matlow of the Superior Court of Justice’s conduct of the trial creates an appearance that he prejudged Faraci’s conduct and credibility and aligned himself with the respondents on the issue of mid-trial production in a manner that rendered the trial unfair.
An action for damages and other relief: Justice Edwards invoked his inherent jurisdiction rather than his jurisdiction pursuant to rule 59.06 (2)(a) and conducted the hearing of the motion before him on a wrong basis. The order in appeal was made in an action commenced on March 15, 2007, by the late Henry Goldentuler (“Goldentuler”), a lawyer who employed the defendant, Koskie, as a lawyer and employed the other personal defendants in other capacities. When a dispute developed between Goldentuler and the personal defendants, the latter left their employ with Goldentuler, taking with them, without his knowledge, files that they had been working on and formed a new association in a new law firm:
Title Insurance only covers the risk that the appellant’s title was unmarketable, allowing another person to “refuse to perform a contract to purchase, to lease or to make a mortgage loan”. The motion judge found the previous use of the property as a marijuana “grow op” was not a title defect.
The trial judge awarded damages to the respondents for their losses arising out of unauthorized investment trading by the appellants. The appellants argue that the action was barred by the limitation period under s. 5(1) of the Limitations Act, 2002, S.O. 2002, c. 24, Sched. B.
The case concerns an incident of alleged food poisoning when the plaintiffs ate at Prego Restaurant in the Guangzhou Westin Hotel in China....there is no jurisdiction in Ontario. For the reasons that follow the motion is granted and the action is dismissed with costs.
Canadian common law in relation to good faith performance of contracts is piecemeal, unsettled and unclear. Two incremental steps are in order to make the common law more coherent and more just. The first step is to acknowledge that good faith contractual performance is a general organizing principle of the common law of contract which underpins and informs the various rules in which the common law, in various situations and types of relationships, recognizes obligations of good faith contractual performance. The second step is to recognize, as a further manifestation of this organizing principle of good faith, that there is a common law duty which applies to all contracts to act honestly in the performance of contractual obligations.