Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, Is a sponsor liable? This action involves the plaintiff’s claim in respect of his sponsorship of his wife, as a permanent resident under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.O. 2001, c.27. The plaintiff signed a sponsorship agreement which, among other things, included the following as part of the plaintiff’s undertaking: I understand that, pursuant to section 135 of the Regulations to the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, if I breach any of my sponsorship obligations I will be in default. I also understand that I will be in default if a government makes a payment that I have promised to repay in this undertaking. For example, I failed to provide for the basic requirements of the sponsored person and his or her family members and they receive social assistance during the validity period of the undertaking, I will be in default. I understand that I will continue to be in default until the amount of the benefits received are repaid in full or re-paid to the satisfaction of the government concerned. I understand that all social assistance paid to the sponsored person or his or her family members becomes a debt owed by me to Her Majesty in Right of Canada and Her Majesty in Right of the province concerned. As a result, the Minister and the province concerned have a right to take enforcement action against me (as sponsor or co-signer) alone, or against both of us.
The figures suggested for this case leave me to wonder who has lost all bearing? Is it the parties who are so fueled with vitriolic intent for their now departed former partner? Is it the lawyers being oblivious to the clear disproportionality of fees to issues and the financial ruination of the overall family unit? These are the cases that cause me the most despair for the litigants and, more so, their child who will apparently be deprived of the several hundreds of thousands of dollars that these parents have chosen to invest in Superior Court file #34936/12 instead of their child’s future.
On March 25, 2012, a young Iranian couple were married in Ottawa. They separated in December 2013. It is the custom in Iranian culture and tradition for the groom or the groom’s family to provide a dowry or mahr to the bride on the occasion of the wedding. In this case the parents transferred a 50% interest in a house they owned by way of a Deed of Gift. Ex-wife brought a motion for summary judgment on the grounds that the transfer of the 50% interest in the property was an irrevocable and unconditional gift.
This is an appeal pursuant to s. 10 of the Estates Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. E.21 from the order of C. Brown J. (“the trial judge”) dated December 16, 2013. Following a five day trial on a contested passing of accounts, the trial judge held that Erna Schneider, as Estate Trustee and Attorney for Property (‘the respondent”), was entitled to compensation of $129,861.05.
It is clear and unambiguous with respect to the son’s obligation to make regular payments of $2,000.00 per month up to and including December 31, 2011, with a final lump sum payment of $20,000.00 also to be payable on December 31, 2011. He failed to honour that obligation [to his parents] . In 2012, the son sold the milk quota and the dairy herd for $1,110,000.00. There is no evidence that he made any effort to pay any of these funds to his parents,
Verolin Spence, requested the court set aside the last will and testament of her father, Rector Emanuel Spence, deceased. The respondent, BMO Trust Company, in its capacity as Estate Trustee with a Will, opposes the applicants’ request for relief. The will is set aside on the grounds that a provision of the will offended public policy. BMO points out that the courts have not looked at the intentions of the deceased in public policy cases and will do so only where the validity of the will is in issue, or if there is any ambiguity or uncertainty on the face of the will. None of those factors apply in this case. Judge Gilmore disagreed, BUT the Ontario Court of Appeal agreed, set aside judge Gilmore's decision and upheld the will.
The co-habitation "65" Rule: On appeal from the judgment of Justice Robert D. Reilly, the trial judge erred in determining that the spousal support award should be time limited to a period of six years. The Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines suggest that where the recipient’s age plus the duration of the relationship are greater than 65 – as in this case– an indefinite award is appropriate
Three issues arise on this appeal: (1)Is leave to appeal warranted in this case? (2) Did the trial judge err in fact by stating that the appellant sought equal division of the matrimonial home? (3) Did the trial judge err in fact and law by awarding the respondent party and party costs? Cohabitating during the fall of 2010 in a home owned exclusively by the respondent since 2002 (the matrimonial home). The appellant had also owned her own home since 1997, which the parties planned to renovate and use for rental income. The appellant and the respondent were married in mid-October 2010. They separated three months later, in January 2011, and the appellant returned to her home.
This is an appeal from an order for variation of child support to include provision for contribution to expenses for child. P.E.I. Supreme Court motion judge erred says Court of Appeal. .
An action for damages and other relief: Justice Edwards invoked his inherent jurisdiction rather than his jurisdiction pursuant to rule 59.06 (2)(a) and conducted the hearing of the motion before him on a wrong basis. The order in appeal was made in an action commenced on March 15, 2007, by the late Henry Goldentuler (“Goldentuler”), a lawyer who employed the defendant, Koskie, as a lawyer and employed the other personal defendants in other capacities. When a dispute developed between Goldentuler and the personal defendants, the latter left their employ with Goldentuler, taking with them, without his knowledge, files that they had been working on and formed a new association in a new law firm:
The fundamental issue on this appeal is whether the petitioner is deprived of an equal sharing of the respondent’s provincially regulated pension by reason of a prenuptial agreement whereby she waived her entitlement. It requires an assessment of the interplay between The Family Property Act, C.C.S.M., c. F25 (the FPA), and The Pension Benefits Act, C.C.S.M., c. P32 (the PBA).
They say Howard and Jeanette should be personally responsible for certain expenses said to represent improper waste or otherwise inappropriate payments already charged to the estate. Specifically, they say the estate should not have paid either of Mr Bishop’s accounts, as they relate to the provision of legal advice directed towards effective planning and concealment of a breach of fiduciary obligations by the estate trustees, the co-ordination of a defence in that regard once the breach of fiduciary duty had been raised by the other estate beneficiaries, and/or other efforts at damage control that would not have been necessary had the estate trustees acted properly. For similar reasons, Karen and Nancy say the second appraisal was completely unnecessary, and an exercise in self-interest by the estate trustees who were hoping, (unsuccessfully), to secure after-the-fact support for their sale of the farm at a price far lower than that suggested by the Farrell appraisal.