Boundaries-Adverse Possession -. #1.- Bailey v. Barbour, 2011 ONSC 4019.. #2- Bailey v. Barbour, 2012 ONCA 325 .....#3. -Bailey v. Barbour, 2013 ONSC 7397
– and –
GERALD HARRY BARBOUR
I. De Rijcke, for the Possessory Claimant
J. Streisfield, for the Objector
HEARD: November 26, 29; December1, 2, 3, 8, 9, 10, 13, 14, 17, 2010; February 28; March 1, 2, 3, 4, 15, 16; April 12, 2011
The text of the original decision has been corrected with text of corrigendum (released September 6, 2011) appended.
 Tiny Island is located a short distance off the shores of the Tiny Beaches area of Georgian Bay in northern Simcoe County. Depending upon the fluctuating levels of Nottawasaga Bay, it is partially or totally surrounded by the waters of Lake Huron. In that sense, Tiny Island is an anomaly. This has led to friction between the parties and a significant amount of litigation culminating in this trial de novo under Section 26 of the Land Titles Act, R.S.O. 1990, c.L.5 (the “Act”).
 Pursuant to the direction of Eberhard, L.A.J. dated May 11, 2010, Angelina Bailey, the registered owner of Tiny Island, has been designated Possessory Claimant (“Claimant”) in these proceedings and Gerald Harry Barbour, the registered owner of the mainland property sometimes opposite and sometimes abutting Tiny Island, has been designated Objector. These were the designations used at first instance before the Deputy Director of title, Carolyn Rosenstein (“DDL”) who rendered her decision on February 9, 2010. In that decision, the DDL allowed the application of the Claimant to be registered as owner of part of the Objector’s land with an absolute title pursuant to Section 46(2) of the Act. The parties are agreed that this part is more or less designated as Part 2 on the draft Reference Plan of John W. Hiley, O.L.S., dated July 17, 2066: see Exhibit 2. The reason why I use the term “more or less” is because of the ever-changing ambulatory nature of the two waters’ edge limits of that Part. Indeed, in times of high water when the isthmus between the island and the mainland such as occurred in the mid to late 1980s and late 1990s, those two limits collapsed and merged into a single limit boardering on a channel of varying widths forming part of Nottawasaga Bay which, in turn, is part of Georgian Bay in Lake Huron.
 Although the DDL permitted the Claimant to advance an alternative claim for a prescriptive easement over Part 2, she did not deal with that issue in light of the success on the claim for possessory title. Despite submissions to the contrary advanced on behalf of the Objector, I was satisfied that the DDL did not err in allowing this amendment to the claim and I permitted it to continue as part of this trial de novo: see s.2 of the Statutory Powers Procedure Act, R.S.O. 1990, c.S.22 and Rule 2.01 (1)(a). Given the commonality of principles that apply to the two issues, I was satisfied that the expansion of the basis for relief could proceed without prejudice to the Objector. Indeed, on the same authority, I was prepared to allow the Claimant to advance a further alternative claim for an implied easement. Accordingly, I would summarize the issues for consideration at this trial de novo as the following:
i. Has the Claimant established her claim of possessory title over Part 2:
ii. If not, has she established her claim of a prescriptive easement over Part 2?
iii. If not, has she established her claim of an implied easement over Part 2?
 Angelina Bailey received title to “all Tiny Island, Township of Tiny, County of Simcoe” from Rebecca K. Van Aller along with two permanent rights-of-way on the mainland by way of deed registered on December 15, 1988. Rebecca K. Van Aller had received title to “all of the island…known as ‘Tiny Island’ ” from the estate of her father, William G. Kynoch, by way of deed registered on October 5, 1971. He had died on July 16, 1966: see Tabs 55 and 56, Exhibit 1(b).
 William G. Kynoch had purportedly received title to three pieces of property associated with Tiny Island between 1943 and 1961. In 1943 he acquired the bulk of Tiny Island from two brothers, Emerie and Alexander Brunelle. They were local commercial fisherman from whom Mr. Kynoch had been seasonally renting the island since 1935. However, in addition to the bulk of Tiny Island, the Brunelle brothers purported to transfer additional land which I will refer to as the northerly party of what the Claimant calls the “tail of the whale”. This feature is depicted in the survey of E.L. Cavana, O.L.S., dated November 19, 1942: see Exhibit 3. This survey and deed also purport to create a mutual right-of-way across this “tail of the whale” and leading back across the mainland beach to a “cut” which provides eventual egress to the concession road. It is agreed that almost all of the “fluke” of the “tail of the whale” encroaches on the Part 2 property owned by the Objector. By 1961, Mr. Kynoch had purportedly been conveyed the balance of Tiny Island and all of the “tail of the whale”: see Tabs 51 to 54, Exhibit 1(b).
 It is agreed that Tiny Island as a separate entity from the rest of Part Lot 21, Concession 13 was created by way of a reservation to the conveyance from Emerie Brunelle to the Addison brothers in 1913: see Tab 48, Exhibit 1(b). That conveyance referred simply to “the parcel thereof detached from the Main Land, known locally as ‘Tiny Island’ ”. To further complicate matters, there is a separate Federal Crown grant to Emerie and Alexander Brunelle in 1936 of “Tiny Island”: see Tab 50, Exhibit 1(b). The parties agree that this conveyance was redundant and unnecessary. However, this instrument becomes important because this description becomes the foundation for all of the conveyances to William G. Kynoch flowing from the 1942 Cavana survey.
 Neither Rebecca K. Van Aller nor her successor in title, the Claimant, were ever conveyed anything more than “all of the island…known as Tiny Island”. Nothing in their deeds make any reference to “the tail of the whale” or the mutual right-of-way both referred to in the 1942 Cavana survey. However, the Claimant advanced her reliance on “colour of title” on the fact that the Agreement of Purchase and Sale that preceded her conveyance from Rebecca K. Van Aller contained a photocopy of part of the 1942 Cavana survey which referenced Tiny Island as including all of the “tail of the whale”: see Tab 3, Exhibit 1(a). The relevant term in the Agreement is clause (f) on p. 1:
The vendor agrees to provide purchaser with the original survey or copy from 1942 or thereabouts together with vendor’s statutory declaration that outlined in red on Schedule B attached hereto was, when above water, at all times occupied and possessed as part of the island property by her or her family since 1935. [my emphasis added]
 Although she denies ever seeing a copy of the complete 1942 Cavana survey until after the closing of the transaction in December, 1988, she insists that when she and her husband visited the island prior to signing the Agreement of Purchase and Sale, she was assured by Rebecca Van Aller that the property being sold included all of that depicted in the “tail of the whale”. She did not obtain a survey because her lawyer never urged her to do so. However, her lawyer did, upon closing, obtain a statutory declaration from Rebecca K. Van Aller dated December 12, 1988 which contained this same sketch of Tiny Island including the “tail of the whale” that had been incorporated into the Agreement of Purchase and Sale: see Exhibit 21. In this document, which I will refer to as the “short” version, at p. 2, the deponent declares:
4. My predecessors in title and I have occupied the said Tiny Island being more particularly shown outlined in red continuously for more than 40 years. The land to which my statutory declaration of possession (dated the date hereof) relates is the parcel more particularly shown outlined in red on the sketch attached as Exhibit “A”.
5. Although part of the said Island is under water, depending upon the level of the Georgian Bay, from time to time, my family has occupied that part of Tiny Island above the water level entirely and continuously for more than 40 years. [my emphasis added]
 Mr. Barbour is 94 years old. He served in the Canadian Navy during the Second World War. After he was demobilized, he began to look to purchase a “little piece of Canada”. Through word of mouth he learned that Peter Addison was prepared to sell him the southernmost lot of the family subdivision being Lot 10. He confirmed with the vendor’s wife, Ottelyn Addison, that the westerly limit of the property was the water’s edge of Nottawasaga Bay. He has always understood this to be the case and denies that it was something that came to his attention as a result of a court decision in 1994 involving Rowntree Beach which is located a concession south of his property. Although he paid $1,200 for the purchase, his deed was not registered until the mid-1950s when he and his wife were going through a divorce. This deed confirms title to the water’s edge: see Exhibit 6.
 Assuming that, at the time of his purchase in 1949 the Objector was disentitled to obtain a conveyance to the water’s edge because the bed of Lake Huron was deemed to come up to the “high-water mark” according to the Beds of Navigable Waters Act, R.S.O. 1937, c.44 as amended by the Statute Law Amendment Act, 1940, that limitation lapsed in 1951 when the amendment was appealed. This resulted in the conveyance to the water’s edge then becoming effective. This state of affairs was confirmed by Deputy Director of Titles J. Keat following the Boundaries Act hearing held between the same parties and conducted in 2003: see Exhibit 53.
The Law of Accretion
 As I indicated to counsel during this lengthy trial de novo, I am of the view that these principles are critical to a resolution of the issues before me. They are stated in Anger and Honsberger: Law of Real Property, 3rd edition, Canada Law Book, V. 2, at pp. 19-9 and 19-10:
The owner of land bounded by a body of water is entitled to any extension of land on the side of the water arising by accretion, whether arising from the gradual and imperceptible recession of the waters to a lower level or from the gradual and imperceptible deposit of aluvium on the banks of a riparian owner’s land. Correspondingly, the gradual erosion of the land or the encroachment of the water upon it will vest the ownership of the land thus covered with water in the owner of the bed.
To give rise to an accretion or an erosion, the change must take place gradually and imperceptibly. Thus avulsions or irruptions, or the sudden changing of the course of a river as a result of a flood or freshet or the breaking of a dam or other violent changes, do not change the ownership of the land. Land swallowed up, even by the sea, continues to belong to the owner who may take steps to reclaim it.
 The Boundaries Act tribunal applied those principles in apportioning the accretion between the then (and now) physically merged two parcels of land in 2003: see Exhibit 23, in particular the copy of the Hiley survey and pp. 23-4 of the Reasons for Decision of Jack Keat, O.L.S. contained therein.
 Although that decision was appealed to the Divisional Court, it was eventually dismissed for want of prosecution by the Claimant herein. In my view, the Claimant is disentitled to re-litigate those issues determined by the Boundaries Act tribunal on application of the principles of issue estoppel: see Toronto (City) v. Canadian Union of Public Employees (C.U.P.E.), Local 79 2003 SCC 63 (CanLII),  3 S.C.R. 77 at para. 23. The issues of accretion, including apportionment thereof between the Claimant and the Objector, are identical; the ruling became final upon dismissal of the appeal by the Divisional court; and the parties are the same.
 Three well-qualified surveyors testified before me, two for the Claimant and one for the Objector. John Hiley, O.L.S., prepared the survey that formed the basis of the successful claim which is the subject matter of this trial de novo: see Exhibit 2. In that document, Part 2 represents the portion of the Objector’s property that the title to which was found to have been extinguished by the adverse possession of the Claimant and her predecessors in title. As noted earlier, this survey duplicates the line of division of accrued apportionment of accreted lands referable to the two parties as defined by the Objector’s surveyor but reflecting the additional accretion taking place between 2004 and 2006. Unfortunately, no one had the foresight to include in any survey a feature that has been referred to as “Gull Rock” and is evident in much of the photographic record before me. There was at least one attempt to “guesstimate” its location on Exhibit 2.
 Mr. Hiley attempted to interpret and explain the 1942 Cavana survey. He did concede during cross-examination that he had “some doubts” about this work and that he did not know to what Cavana was surveying. He acknowledged that this retainer was the first time he had analyzed water levels and that, for that purpose, he had relied upon much of the data generated by the Objector’s surveyor, Mr. Stewart. He agreed with many of his conclusions and accepted that there was never a continuous ten-year period where the Claimant could establish no water separation between Tiny Island and the Part 2 property of the Objector.
 Chester Stanton, O.L.S., testified on behalf of the Claimant. He is successor to Mr. Cavana and is the custodian of all of his field notes, files and survey plans. He was specifically retained to provide an opinion on the 1942 Cavana survey which appears to be the genesis of the “tail of the whale”, a partial copy of which made its way into the Van Aller-Bailey Agreement of Purchase and Sale in 1988. He disagrees with the opinion of Mr. Stewart and the finding of the Boundaries Act tribunal that this survey “makes no sense”. In particular, he was of the view that the entire “whale” was what Cavana had in mind as the Tiny Island property owned by the brothers Brunelle when they began the series of conveyances of Tiny Island to Dr. Kynoch in 1943: see Exhibit 1(b), Tab 51. Based upon this deduction, he suggests that it was entirely reasonable for the subsequent owners of “Tiny Island”, which includes the Claimant, to assume that they were being conveyed title to the “tail of the whale” as well.
 Ronald Stewart, O.L.S., testified on behalf of the Objector. As I have already noted, his testimony was accepted by, and formed the basis of the decision of, the Boundaries Act tribunal in 2003. In my view, his testimony was much more fulsome than either Mr. Hiley and Mr. Stanton because he had much more experience in mandates involving water boundaries. As well, he had a decided advantage over them as a result of his appreciation of the dynamics of the fluctuating levels of Lake Huron and resultant influence on the ambulatory water’s edge boundaries of the subject properties: I must say that, despite the vigorous challenge to his methodology and conclusions by Mr. De Rijcke, I found his testimony to be very clear and compelling. Neither Mr. Hiley nor Mr. Stanton disagreed with him in any substantial sense on issues that I find dispositive in this litigation.
 The most instructive documents that Mr. Stewart presented to the court were Exhibits 56 and 69. The first of these is a topographical map of the subject properties showing a large channel of water between Tiny Island and the mainland property of the Objector as of May 11, 1988 being the spring before the Claimant purchased from Ms. Van Aller. This representation was based on aerial photography taken on that date along with concurrent survey data. In addition to depicting water in this channel, Mr. Stewart was able to superimpose portions of the 1942 Cavana survey, the 1960 O’Dale survey as well as the 2006 Hiley survey. This exercise would suggest that on that date, May 11, 1988, the “tail of the whale” both in its original 1942 form and as expanded by the process of accretion as of 2006, would have been totally submerged by the waters of Nottawasaga Bay.
 This conclusion is confirmed by Exhibit 69 which is a table of Lakes Michigan-Huron water levels for the years 1918 to 2001 as provided by the Canadian Hydrographic Service. The entry for May, 1988 is 176.70 metres which is 0.20 metres above Mr. Stewart’s benchmark of 176.50 metres. All of the months in this chart that are above this benchmark have been “boxed” by Mr. Stewart. The entry for November, 1942 when Mr. Cavana did his surveying is 176.33 metres. Given Mr. Stewart’s margin of error of 0.10 metres more or less, the 1942 Cavana survey would confirm the accuracy of these figures. As well, in my view, they would also be confirmed by the August, 1960 O’Dale survey showing a 37 foot channel between Tiny Island and the mainland property of the Objector: see Exhibit 15.
 I am also of the view that Mr. Stewart’s calculations are confirmed by the various pieces of family photographs that have been made available to the court. These include the Grant family photographs spanning the years 1951 to 1997: see Exhibit 36; the Objector’s photograph of Tiny Island in the summer of 1998: see Exhibit 37; and the Claimant’s 1998 summer wedding photograph: see Exhibit 1 (a), Tab 7.
 This chart shows an entry of 176.53 metres for August, 1992 which is a shade over his benchmark. Exhibit 36 (m) being a Grant family “canoe” photograph taken that same month shows a narrow isthmus to Tiny Island behind the three standing male figures. The Claimant’s SUV vehicle can be seen over the right shoulder of the middle of those figures. I am satisfied that the integrity of this chart is not compromised by this potential discrepancy for the reason that it is within the margin of error recognized by Mr. Stewart.
 Although the parties have many differences, they agree:
i. That the statutory period for a successful claim for adverse possession is 10 years; and
ii. Any claim following September 10, 2001 is defeated by the migration of the subject properties into Land Titles (see Section 51(1) of the Act which abolishes claims based on adverse possession).
However, any possessory title established before that date is “grandfathered” by the terms of Section 51(2) thereof.
 I find the statement of principles articulated by Perell, J. in Mueller v. Lee,  O.J. No. 2543 very helpful. At para. 12 he states:
The three requirements of an adverse possession claim are:
(1) The Claimant and or his predecessors must have actual possession for the statutory period;
(2) The Claimant’s possession must be with the intention of excluding the owner or person entitled to possession; i.e. the Claimant must have an animus possidendi; and
(3) The owners and any others entitled to possession must be out of possession (discontinuance of possession) for the statutory period.
In relation to these factors Perell, J. elaborates as follows:
The first requirement to establish a possessory title is that the claimant must have had actual possession. The acts of possession must be all of: open, notorious, peaceful, adverse, exclusive, actual and continuous having regard to the nature of the disputed property: Teis v. Ancaster, supra. This is the control or factum part of legal possession. (para. 14)
The second requirement to establish a possessory title is that the claimant must have the intention to exclude the true owner. This is the animus possidendi element of the requirements for legal possession. (para. 19)
In cases of mutual mistake, the intention to exclude requirement has a low threshold because where both the claimant and also the true owner mistakenly believe that the claimant owns the disputed land, the law acknowledges the settled expectations of the parties and infers that the claimant occupied the lands with the intention of excluding all others, including the true owners: Teis v. Ancaster, supra; Carozzi v. Guo 2002 CanLII 42513 (ON SC), 2002 CanLII 42513 (Ont. S.C.J.) (para. 21)
The third requirement for a possessory title is that the true owner be out of possession. Here it may be noted that the Court of Appeal in Madison Investments Ltd. v. Ham, supra, rephrased the third element of the test to speak of “effective exclusion” rather than discontinuance of possession. However phrased, the heart of the third element is that the true owner must be ousted or out of possession. (para. 24)
In some circumstances, a finding of unilateral mistake may also diminish the burden on a claimant seeking to obtain a possessory title. (par. 27)
 Applying those principles to the case before me, I first consider the Claimant’s argument that this is a case of mutual mistake. I will assume without deciding that she can claim to be an innocent adverse possessor because she was led to believe that the extent of her purchase in 1988 incorporated Cavana’s “tail of the whale” as that portion of his 1942 survey was a schedule to the Agreement of Purchase and Sale and she had oral assurances to that effect from the seller, Rebecca Van Aller. However, I am not prepared to accept the Claimant’s argument that the Objector did not believe he owned to the water’s edge when he physically received his deed from Ottelyn Addison in the summer of 1949. Nor do I accept that he only came to this realization following the release of the Rowntree Beach decision in 1994: see 17 O.R. (3d) 174. Not only has the Objector flatly denied any such suggestion, his insistence that he has always owned to the water’s edge is confirmed by the evidence of an independent witness, Charlene Lowes. Her testimony from the hearing below was filed on consent before me: see Exhibit IV, Tab 3, at pp.46 to 47. Accordingly, I am only prepared to find that this is a case of unilateral mistake on the part of the Claimant.
 In assessing these three elements described by Perell, J. above, the obvious first question to pose is: when did the limitation begin to run against the Objector or his predecessors in title, assuming it ever started? The Claimant asks me to go as far back as 1935 when Dr. Kynoch began to rent Tiny Island as a summer retreat from his obligations at the University of Michigan. His family would venture there every summer for the months of July and August like clockwork. This may have extended a couple weeks into September when his daughters started private school. However, this suggestion asks me to ignore those periods of time when Tiny Island was really an island because any connection to the main land disappeared under the waters of Nottawasaga Bay. Based upon the overwhelming evidence before me, I am satisfied that this was a “gradual and imperceptible” cyclical process over many years where some separation existed at least one-third of the time.
 When there was water between the island and the mainland, those waters formed part of Nottawasaga Bay. No one suggests that this body of water is not navigable. Indeed, I take judicial notice that if one wanted to, one could put a canoe or kayak into the water from this location and paddle all the way to the Gulf of St. Lawrence or , alternatively, to the Lakehead. The fact that one may not be able from time to time to paddle through the channel separating the two pieces of dry land matters not. As long as there is some water covering the bed, that is sufficient to make the Crown the owner thereof and to extinguish any private entitlements, save for the right of the members of the public to navigate: see R. v. Nikal, 1996 CanLII 245 (SCC),  1 S.C.R. 1013 at para. 73 citing with approval the following passage from p. 181 of Water Law in Canada – the Atlantic Provinces by Gérard V. Laforest, Ottawa: Information Canada, 1973:
Thus the whole of a river or lake may be regarded as navigable even though at some point navigation may be impossible or possible only for small craft by reason of rapids or shoals. [my emphasis added]
 Despite the vigorous cross-examination of Mr. Stewart, I am prepared to accept both his methodology and conclusions as to the lake levels as particularized in Exhibits 56 and 69. I am satisfied from these that on May 11, 1988, all of Part 2 of the Hiley survey, Exhibit 2, was covered by the waters of Nottawasaga Bay and that, in the result, any rights by way of adverse possession that may have been previously created thereon became extinguished in favour of the Crown. According to Exhibit 69, there was even higher water and, hence, more coverage, in the following months:
1993 – June to October;
1994 – June to October;
1996 – June to December;
1997 – January to December;
1998 – January to August.
The August 1997 level of 177.16 metres is confirmed by the Grant “canoe” photographs for the same month: see Exhibit 36 (o) and (p). These show a significantly wide channel of open water between the island and the main land despite the Claimant’s efforts to build up their access by having fieldstone dropped on it earlier in the decade: see Exhibit 1(a), Tabs 12 to 14. These levels, in my view, also allowed for navigation by way of a canoe or kayak through this channel: see Canoe Ontario v. Reed reflex, (1989), 69 O.R. (2d) 494 (H.C.J.).
 The Claimant has asked me to reject the Objector’s contention that intermittent incursions of water over the Part 2 lands are true encroachments resulting in a reversion of the title of the bed to the Crown: See Frank v. Harwich (Township) , O.J. No. 109, a decision of the Ontario High Court of Justice, Chancery Division (Divisional Court). In that case, the road in question, a common highway created by long public use, became inundated for brief periods each spring before it was “speedily filled up again with material as firm and compact as ever”: see para. 23. In my view, that case is of no assistance to the Claimant. First, it involves a public road, which for purposes of public policy, is exempt from claims of adverse possession. Second, and perhaps more important, the water incursions were far removed from the “gradual and imperceptible” relictions and encroachments that occurred regularly over the years to the subject properties. See as well Ontario (Attorney General) v. Shanks , O.J. No. 79 (C.A.) where the majority distinguished between a single violent storm event on the shore of Lake Erie and the “gradual and imperceptible” variations that are in play in the instant case.
 I also find the case of Creighton v. Nova Scotia (Attorney General), 2011 NSSC 131 (CanLII), 2011 NSSC 131 of no assistance as it involved a privately owned water lot that had been conveyed by the Crown in 1921. The instant case involves no such circumstance.
 In order to succeed in her claim as I view it, the Claimant bears the onus of establishing, on a balance of probabilities, that for a continuous period of 10 years she or her predecessors have adversely possessed the Objector’s Part 2 property prior to September 10, 2001. This she must do by providing evidence that is sufficiently clear, convincing and cogent: see F.H. v. McDougall 2008 SCC 53 (CanLII), , 3 S.C.R. 41 at para. 26. Given the implications of the effects of accretion and encroachment on that parcel as I have found them to have been, she has failed to do so. Each time the waters of Nottawasaga Bay submerged Part 2, any progress of the limitation period would stop and she would have to start again once the water receded. Even if any such claim had succeeded against the Objector or any of his predecessors in title over Part 2 prior to May 11, 1988, it would have been extinguished in favour of the Crown as of that date. Any subsequent recession of the water would create a renewed accretion in his favour because he remained the abutting owner entitled to the benefit of that process. As Mr. Streisfield has so aptly suggested, the Claimant could not “cut in” on the Crown in this three-cornered dance to accumulate sufficient time to succeed. At those times of high water submersion of the isthmus between Tiny Island and the mainland property of the Objector, she was physically unable to advance a claim that was adverse to him, exclusive of the Crown or continuous against either or both of them. Accordingly, I find she has available no continuous period of ten years from May, 1988 in order to accomplish her task. In my view, this is sufficient to dispose of the application based on adverse possession.
 The Claimant was permitted to expand her claim to include a remedy on the basis of a prescriptive easement or, in the alternative, an easement by way of implied reservation over the “driveway” depicted on Part 2 of the Hiley survey: see Exhibit 2.
(i) Prescriptive Easement
 The parties are agreed that the statutory period for this claim is 20 years and, like the claim for possessory title, it ceased to be available following September 10, 2001 subject to “grandfathering” of previously established claims. For the same reasons as those already articulated in relation to the claim for adverse possession, this claim must also fail. If ever established prior to May 11, 1988, it was extinguished as of that date in favour of the Crown and could not be re-established before the lands went into Land Titles as of September 10, 2001.
(ii) Implied Reservation
 The same comments apply to this claim. It could not be created at the time that Emerie Brunelle conveyed all of his property except for “the parcel thereof detached from the main land (sic), known locally as ‘Tiny Island’ ” [my emphasis added] (see Exhibit 1(b), Tab 48, p. 1) because the bed of the channel between it and the mainland at the time of that grant belonged to the Crown. In any event, being a reservation alleged to flow from this conveyance, it cannot allow the vendor, Brunelle, to derogate from his grant: see Anger and Honsberger: Law of Real Property, supra at p. 17-10. The fact there remained easy access by water from the island to the mainland refutes any suggestion of necessity: see Fitchett v. Mellow, 1897) 29 O.R. 6 (H.C.J.).
 In the result, the appeal is allowed and all claims are dismissed. I am prepared to consider the parties brief written submissions on costs, those of the Objector to be filed within 30 days of the release of these reasons and those of the Claimant, 15 days thereafter.
Released: September 6, 2011
C O R R I G E N D A
1. Page 2, paragraph 2, line 10 now reads: … Reference Plan of John W. Hiley, O.L.S., dated July 17, 2006:
2. Page 4, paragraph 10, line 5 now reads: … when the amendment was repealed.
3. Page 7, paragraph 17, line 7 now reads: … influence on the ambulatory water’s edge boundaries of the subject properties.
COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO
Juriansz, LaForme and Ducharme JJ.A.
Gerald Harry Barbour
Robert J. Fenn, Richard Rohmer (O.C.) Q.C., Izaak De Rijcke and Patrick M. Floyd, for the appellant
Jeffrey Streisfield, for the respondent
Heard: April 18, 2012
On appeal from the judgment of Justice John R. McIsaac of the Superior Court of Justice dated June 24, 2011, with reasons reported at 2011 ONSC 4019, 8 R.P.R. (5th) 76.
By the Court:
 The parties to this dispute have been battling for years over their respective rights to the waterfront properties they own on or near the shores of Georgian Bay in the township of Tiny in northern Simcoe County.
 The appeal to this court is from the decision and order of McIsaac J. released June 24, 2011. In that decision, the trial judge set aside the decision of Deputy Director of Titles Rosenstein, dated February 9, 2010, following an application by the appellant Mrs. Bailey pursuant to s. 46(2) of the Land Titles Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. L.5. In the proceeding under the Land Titles Act, the Deputy Director of Titles found that the objection filed by the respondent Mr. Barbour was not valid, and granted to Mrs. Bailey possessory title to a portion of the parcel claimed by Mr. Barbour, a narrow access route across the Barbour property to Mrs. Bailey’s property known as Tiny Island.
 Mr. Barbour’s appeal from the decision of the Deputy Director of Titles proceeded as a trial de novo before McIsaac J. and consumed 19 days. However, at its very outset, the trial judge alerted counsel to a potential conflict of interest and asked them to consider whether it caused either side any difficulty. Two short recesses followed, after each of which counsel for Mrs. Bailey respectfully asked the trial judge to recuse himself. The trial judge declined the request.
 On this appeal, the appellant raises eight issues, the first of which is whether it was appropriate and necessary in the interests of justice for the judge to recuse himself. We begin with that issue.
B. FACTS RELEVANT TO THE ISSUE OF REASONABLE APPREHENSION OF BIAS
 In raising the issue of possible conflict, the trial judge declared, among other things, that his wife is a real estate agent in Tiny Township where the properties of the parties are located, that she specializes in waterfront property, that she has a website titled “Shores of Tiny,” and that among the clients she has had are Heidi Lauridsen and Rebecca Kynoch-Rice. In the discussion with counsel that followed, the trial judge added that he and his wife also own waterfront property in Tiny Township, and have a cottage there.
 Ms. Lauridsen and Ms. Kynoch-Rice are daughters of the late Nancy Ann K. Rice, and nieces of the late Rebecca Van Aller, Mrs. Rice’s sister. Mrs. Rice was a neighbour of the parties and well known to them. She too owned waterfront property, which adjoined the northerly border of Mr. Barbour’s. In 2002, she joined Mrs. Bailey as an objector to Mr. Barbour’s application under the Boundaries Act,R.S.O. 1990, c. B.10, to confirm the true location of the northerly, westerly, and southerly boundaries of his property on the ground. Mrs. Bailey objected to the westerly border of Mr. Barbour’s property; Mrs. Rice objected to the northerly border.
 Mrs. Rice and Mrs. Van Aller were the daughters of the late Dr. William G. Kynoch. In 1971, the property now owned by Mrs. Bailey, Tiny Island, was conveyed to Mrs. Van Aller by her mother in her capacity as the Executrix of Dr. Kynoch’s estate. In 1988, Mrs. Van Aller sold Tiny Island to Mr. and Mrs. Bailey.
 Having disclosed his wife’s connection to Ms. Lauridsen and Ms. Kynoch-Rice and their connection in turn to the property owned by the estate of Mrs. Rice, the trial judge asked counsel if they wanted “a few minutes to discuss the matter.” Only counsel for Mrs. Bailey expressed concern. He said that he wished to speak to his clients. With that, the trial judge offered the following: “Okay. Well I’ll just give you the names of [my wife’s] two clients again for the record.”
 Even before consulting with his clients, however, counsel for Mrs. Bailey told the trial judge that he anticipated Ms. Lauridsen to be one of the witnesses in the trial. He added that he also anticipated statutory declarations of Mrs. Van Aller to be part of the record.
 According to the record, both Mrs. Van Aller and her sister were elderly when they died. At the time of the Boundaries Acthearing, Mrs. Van Aller was 81 years of age; her sister was 77. Mr. Barbour is himself today a man in his 90s. Through it all, what is clear is that one of the trial judge’s wife’s clients, Ms. Lauridsen, was directly involved in the action as an expected witness; the other client, Ms. Kynoch-Rice, Ms. Lauridsen’s sister, also had far more than a passing interest in how the dispute between Mrs. Bailey and Mr. Barbour might be decided. Their mother’s estate, after all, owns the neighbouring property and was and is apparently allied in interest with the appellant in this dispute.
 Counsel for Mrs. Bailey pressed his concerns to the trial judge about the reasonable apprehension of bias, citing what he referred to as the “multiplicity of involvements” if not of the trial judge, then at least of the trial judge’s wife. He said: “The apprehension on my client’s part is that it would be virtually impossible, especially in light of what you’ve now indicated that you also own property in this locale … to not have information prior to today about the specific set of circumstances, because Tiny Island stands out.”
 Although the trial judge indicated that he had “an understanding” with his wife not to discuss their business matters at home, he acknowledged that when he was assigned as the trial judge to this matter he brought up the “Tiny Island situation” with his wife, and asked her if there was “anything that, you know, I should know that you may be connected to this property.” Through that discussion, presumably, he learned of and disclosed to counsel his wife’s connection to Ms. Lauridsen and Ms. Kynoch-Rice.
 In the end, the trial judge decided, over the spirited objections of Mrs. Bailey’s counsel, that his wife’s involvement was merely an “attenuated connection” falling “well short of the threshold” justifying the request sought by Mrs. Bailey.
C. THE TRIAL JUDGE’S RULING ON THE RECUSAL REQUEST
 The trial judge’s ruling in its entirety was as follows:
I’d like to begin this ruling with reference to some general principles. A judge’s impartiality is presumed and a party seeking disqualification must establish that the circumstances justify a finding that the judge must be disqualified. The criterion of disqualification is the reasonable apprehension of bias.
The question is what would an informed, reasonable and right-minded person viewing the matter realistically and practically, and having thought the matter through, conclude. Would he or she think it is more likely than not that the judge, whether consciously or unconsciously, would not decide fairly? The standard refers to an apprehension based on serious grounds. These principles come from the judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada in Wewaykum Indian Band v. Canada,  2 S.C.R. 259.
At its highest, the applicant’s claim for disqualification is based on a general sense of unease because of the factors I announced earlier today in open court. In my view, this basis falls well short of the threshold that justifies the order sought. Accordingly, the application is dismissed. I reserve the right to expand upon these reasons.
 The trial judge did not expand upon his ruling, and made no further reference to it in his reasons for judgment.
D. THE APPLICABLE LAW
 The inquiry into whether a conflict exists sufficient to prompt a decision-maker to recuse him or herself must be fact-specific. As his short oral ruling demonstrates, the trial judge correctly identified the test to be applied for determining whether there exists a reasonable apprehension of bias: What would an informed, reasonable and right-minded person, viewing the matter realistically and practically, and having thought the matter through, conclude? Would he or she think it is more likely than not that the judge, whether consciously or unconsciously, would not decide fairly?
 This test was first articulated by Grandpré J. in his dissenting reasons in Committee for Justice and Liberty v. National Energy Board,  1 S.C.R. 369, at p. 394. Ever since, the Supreme Court of Canada has consistently endorsed the standard, including in the case referred to by the trial judge, Wewaykum Indian Band, although the court has also sought from time to time to clarify and develop it.
 Thus, for example, in his reasons in R. v. S. (R. D.),  3 S.C.R. 484, Cory J. explained, at para. 111, that the test set down by Grandpré J. contains a “two-fold objective element”: not only must the person considering the alleged bias be reasonable, but “the apprehension of bias itself must also be reasonable in the circumstances of the case.” Cory J. added, at para. 113, that:
[T]he threshold for a finding of real or perceived bias is high. It is a finding that must be carefully considered since it calls into question an element of judicial integrity. Indeed an allegation of reasonable apprehension of bias calls into question not simply the personal integrity of the judge, but the integrity of the entire administration of justice.
 In addition to this “high” threshold set out by Cory J., the Supreme Court has made clear that, in those cases where a party seeks the recusal or disqualification of a judge, allegations of judicial bias will have to overcome the strong presumption of judicial impartiality. Moreover, “in any case where the impartiality of the judge is in question, the appearance of the matter is just as important as the reality”: R. v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate and others, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No. 2),  1 All E.R. 577 (H.L.), at p. 592.
 In Metropolitan Properties Co. (F.G.C.) Ltd. v. Lannon,  3 All E.R. 304 (C.A.), at p. 310, Lord Denning M. R. stressed the importance of the appearance of judicial impartiality. He put the matter this way:
[I]n considering whether there was a real likelihood of bias, the court does not look at the mind of the justice himself.... It does not look to see if there was a real likelihood that he would, or did, in fact favour one side at the expense of the other. The court looks at the impression which would be given to other people. Even if he was as impartial as could be, nevertheless, if right-minded persons would think that, in the circumstances, there was a real likelihood of bias on his part, then he should not sit. And if he does sit, his decision cannot stand.
 This passage from Lord Denning M. R. in Metropolitan Properties Co. was cited with approval by Major J. in his dissenting reasons in S. (R. D.), at para. 11, and by this court in Benedict v. Ontario (2000), 51 O.R. (3d) 147 (C.A.). In Benedict, the court also noted, at para. 20, that while Lord Denning M. R. used the phrase “real likelihood”, variations in the expression such as “reasonable apprehension”, “reasonable likelihood”, and “reasonable suspicion” should not be regarded as involving any substantive difference in the approach to be taken, and indeed amount to the same standard.
 In this case, no one has suggested any actual bias on the part of the trial judge. However, as the Supreme Court pointed out inWeywakum Indian Band, at para. 66, “where disqualification is argued, the relevant inquiry is not whether there was in fact either conscious or unconscious bias on the part of the judge, but whether a reasonable person properly informed would apprehend that there was” (emphasis in original).
 Would a reasonable person properly informed apprehend that there was an appearance of bias overhanging this trial? In our view, the question cannot be answered without taking account of all relevant factors, including, notably, the trial judge’s wife’s connections to the people and to the properties at the heart of the dispute. Among these connections were the following:
(a) one of the trial judge’s wife’s clients, Ms. Lauridsen, was expected to be a witness in the trial;
(b) another of the wife’s clients, Ms. Kynoch-Rice, is Ms. Lauridsen’s sister;
(c) the sisters are the daughters of the late Mrs. Rice, whose estate owns the property abutting the northerly border of the respondent’s property;
(d) Mrs. Rice joined the appellant as an objector to the respondent’s Boundaries Act application in 2002, and testified on the appellant’s behalf;
(e) in the proceeding under the Land Titles Act, relevant evidence admitted by Deputy Director of Titles Rosenstein included statutory declarations of Mrs. Rice and Mrs. Van Aller, by then both deceased, and a sworn affidavit of Ms. Lauridsen.
 Given these facts and circumstances, there can be no doubt that the trial judge’s wife’s clients have a great deal of knowledge about the parties to the dispute, and an obvious ongoing interest in the litigation and its result. In this context, it bears emphasis too that the trial judge spoke to his wife about, as he put it, the “Tiny Island situation”, and asked her if there was anything he should know about her connection to the property. Whatever her answer might have been, a reasonable person properly informed would only conclude that her connection to the property is deep and current and multi-layered.
 Whenever a party takes the position that a reasonable apprehension of bias exists, the judge must weigh the submission carefully and contextually, taking account of all relevant circumstances. The trial judge did not follow that course in this case. Had he done so, he would have given greater consideration to his wife’s involvement in the narrative, and he would not have concluded that the appellant’s claim for disqualification was based only on “a general sense of unease” falling “well short of the threshold that justifies the order sought.”
 In our view, the appellant has met the high threshold necessary to establish a reasonable apprehension of bias. The circumstances created a reasonable apprehension of bias, necessitating a new trial before a different judge of the court.
 For the foregoing reasons, the appeal is allowed. In the light of this determination, it would be inappropriate to comment on the other issues raised in the appeal.
 The order of the trial judge is set aside and a new trial ordered. The costs of the trial in the court below are in the cause. The costs of this appeal are to the appellant in the all-inclusive sum of $25,000.
Released: May 16, 2012 “RGJ”
“R.G. Juriansz J.A.”
“H.S. LaForme J.A.”
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE - ONTARIO
RE: ANGELINA BAILEY, Possessory Claimant
GERALD HARRY BARBOUR, Objector
BEFORE: THE HON. MADAM JUSTICE S.E. HEALEY
COUNSEL: I. de Rijcke and S. Fairley, Counsel for the Possessory Claimant
J.E. Streisfield, Counsel, for the Objector
HEARD: March 4-8, May 13-14, 17, 24, 27, June 26-27, July 10, 2013
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Nature of the Proceeding
 This is an appeal by Mr. Gerald Barbour pursuant to s. 26 of the Land Titles Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. L.5, from the Decision and Order of the Deputy Director of Titles Rosenstein dated February 9, 2010. In that proceeding, the Deputy Director of Titles granted possessory title to Mrs. Angelina Bailey of certain lands located on the shore of Nottawasaga Bay in the Township of Tiny, lands to which Mr. Barbour holds paper title pursuant to an earlier order made under the Boundaries Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. B.10.
 This is the second such appeal hearing, the first having been determined in 2011 (the “first trial”) and successfully appealed in 2012. The Court of Appeal set aside the order of the trial judge and ordered a new trial (2012 ONCA 325 (CanLII)).
 As directed by the order from the Court of Appeal, this is also the rehearing of an Application commenced by Mrs. Bailey as Barrie Court File No. 10-1309.[i] In that Application Mrs. Bailey seeks, as an alternative to possessory title, an interest over the lands in question, or any part thereof, in the nature of a prescriptive easement or right of way arising from and as a result of implication, necessity, doctrine of lost modern grant, or proprietary estoppel.[ii]
 Both the appeal and the Application were heard over a protracted period, with several mid-trial rulings being required on issues of evidence and procedure.
 From the commencement of the Boundaries Act application, this trial has been eleven years in the making.
Description of the Disputed Land
 Tiny Island is located a short distance off the shores of the Tiny Beaches area of Georgian Bay in northern Simcoe County. Depending upon the fluctuating levels of Nottawasaga Bay, which is a part of Georgian Bay in Lake Huron, Tiny Island has historically been partially, or totally, surrounded by the waters of Georgian Bay.
 Mrs. Bailey is the registered owner of Tiny Island, which is shown as Part 1 on the draft Reference Plan of John W. Hiley, O.L.S., dated July 17, 2006 (the “Hiley Plan”)[iii].
 Mr. Barbour is the registered owner of the mainland property opposite Tiny Island (the “Barbour property”). His land is designated as Lot 10, shown on an unregistered plan of subdivision prepared by W.E. McMullen, O.L.S. on January 15, 1914 of Lot 21, Concession 13, Township of Tiny (the “McMullen Plan”)[iv]. Mr. Barbour’s lot is the southernmost lot on the McMullen Plan. The McMullen Plan divides Lot 21 into 10 lots bordering beachfront known locally as Addison Beach.
 The Application under the Land Titles Act is for a determination of Mrs. Bailey’s rights relating to ownership to or access over the part of the Barbour property designated more or less as the Part 2 lands shown on the Hiley Plan. This consists generally of a portion of the beachfront in front of Mr. Barbour’s mainland property, and to the east of Mrs. Bailey’s Tiny Island, including part of an isthmus that joins Tiny Island to the mainland when it is above water. The parties agree that the term “more or less” is apt because of the ever-changing ambulatory nature of the two water’s edge limits of Part 2. Indeed, in times of high water when the isthmus between the island and the mainland is under water, such as occurred in the mid to late 1980s and late 1990s, those two limits collapsed and merged into a single limit bordering on a channel of varying widths, forming part of Nottawasaga Bay that separated Tiny Island from the mainland. When above water, this area of land connecting Tiny Island to the mainland is referred to throughout these Reasons as “the isthmus”.
 Immediately to the north of Mr. Barbour’s property is Lot 9 on the McMullen Plan, which was formerly owned by Nancy Rice, now deceased (the “Rice property”). A strip of land running east-west at the north end of Lot 9 is shown as Part 6 on the Hiley Plan, referred to locally and by the parties as the “Cut”. The Cut leads to the Woods Road, from which the concession road is accessed. Part 6 is subject to rights of way providing access to Nottawasaga Bay, including a right of way in favour of Mrs. Bailey.
 Mrs. Bailey also has a registered legal right of way from Part 6 and leading to, but not crossing, Part 2 on the dry mainland, designated as Part 5 on the Hiley Plan. Mrs. Bailey also owns Part 8, which is a parking spot behind the Rice property. She has a right of way over Part 7 to pass from the parking spot through a gate, and is the deeded owner of Part 4, and also has a deeded right of way over Part 3.
 For the purpose of a visual overview, the Hiley Plan is attached to this ruling as Schedule A.
 In this trial witnesses have referred to the area to the south of the isthmus as the “south beach”, to distinguish it from the beach on the north side of the isthmus, which is noted to be the more desirable area for swimming due to soft sand on both beach and lake bottom. The south beach has been described as more rocky, with dark, gritty sand.
 Situated to the south of the Barbour property is another subdivision. This subdivision is known as Pennorth, and some of its landowners are members of the Pennorth Beach Association. Mr. Barbour belongs to the Pennorth Beach Association, as opposed to the Addision Beach Association formed by his neighbours to the north. His nearest neighbour to the south is Charlene Lowes.
 Both Tiny Island and the Barbour property were converted to the Land Titles system on September 10, 2001.
 Also, throughout this ruling reference is made to Exhibit 6, which is an enlarged version of the Hiley Plan, superimposed on a Google map of the relevant land.[v] Another survey completed by E.L. Cavana, O.L.S.[vi], which is referred to extensively throughout these Reasons, is also superimposed on Exhibit 6. The Cavana survey in its proportions resembles the shape of a whale, with roughly the front half of the whale encompassing Tiny Island. In this proceeding, what has been referred to as the “tail of the whale” includes a portion of Part 2. The parties are in agreement that almost all of the fluke of the “tail of the whale” encroaches on the Part 2 area. The Cavana survey is also outlined on Schedule A.
Decisions of the Tribunals Below
The Boundaries Act Hearing, 2002-2003
 The formalities of the parties’ dispute began with an application by Mr. Barbour under the Boundaries Act for the purpose of determining the true locations of the northerly, westerly and southerly boundaries of PIN 58409-0016 (LT) in the Land Registry Office for Land Titles Division of Simcoe (No. 51), being part of Lot 21, Concession 13 in the Township of Tiny, County of Simcoe, of which he is the registered owner. In that proceeding, Mrs. Bailey objected to the westerly boundary under application, which is the boundary that abuts Tiny Island, being PIN 58409-0288 (LT).
 Deputy Director of Titles Jack Keat released his decision and order in August 2003 (the “Boundaries Act Decision”), denying Mrs. Bailey’s objection and confirming that the true location on the ground of the westerly boundary of Mr. Barbour’s land would be as set out in the draftBoundaries Act plan dated May 3, 2002 and signed by R.J. Stewart, O.L.S. This plan of survey was registered on October 15, 2004 as Plan BA-2608[vii]. This Boundaries Act Plan (the “BA Plan”) contains a note which says, “The ambulatory water’s edge of Lake Huron constitutes the natural boundary subject hereon”.
 The Boundaries Act Decision confirmed that Mr. Barbour holds paper title to Part 2, with the west and south boundaries being ambulatory and changing with the water’s edge of Nottawasaga Bay.
 The Boundaries Act Decision also confirmed a boundary that crosses the isthmus as illustrated on the BA Plan and Schedule A. It is agreed that Mrs. Bailey has fee simple title to any dry lands on the Tiny Island side of that boundary, and Mr. Barbour has fee simple title to any dry lands on the mainland side of that boundary, including the Part 2 lands.
 It is the position of Mr. Barbour that the Boundaries Act Decision and the BA Plan are final and binding with respect to all matters pertaining to boundaries, ambulatory or otherwise, water’s edge, and accretion.
Land Titles Act Proceeding, 2004-2010
 In 2004 Mrs. Bailey initiated her proceeding under the Land Titles Act, in which she claimed possessory title to Part 2, or, in the alternative, a prescriptive easement over Part 2. Deputy Director of Titles Rosenstein conducted an eight-day hearing, and found on the evidence and the law that Mrs. Bailey had successfully established possessory title to Part 2 (the “Land Titles Decision”).
Trial de Novo
 Section 26 of the Land Titles Act provides for an appeal of a decision or order of the Director of Titles to the court, and that the appeal shall be by way of new trial. "Court" is defined in the Land Titles Act as the Superior Court of Justice. As explained more thoroughly in this court’s endorsement released June 27, 2013 (2013 ONSC 4451 (CanLII)), the Rules of Civil Procedure apply to this appeal and to the Application, and the evidence taken during the trial is applicable to each.
 As a new trial, it is not for this court to consider the applicable standard of review regarding findings of fact or determinations of law as set out in the Land Titles Decision. Although Mr. Barbour’s Notice of Appeal sets out multiple alleged errors of fact and/or law on the part of Deputy Director Rosenstein, and Mr. Streisfield has submitted during the course of the trial that this court “stands in the shoes of the Deputy Director”, the plain meaning of s. 26 of the Land Titles Act is that this court’s jurisdiction is to approach Mrs. Bailey’s claim, and Mr. Barbour’s objection, by way of a completely fresh hearing.
 Except as set out in my procedural order made on January 17, 2013, which made specific provision for the acceptance of prior evidence of expert and deceased witnesses, the trial has proceeded as a “trial de novo”, or new trial.
 Two of the issues raised by the parties are as follows, which I choose to deal with from the outset of these Reasons:
1. Are findings of fact and the application of law made by Deputy Director of Titles Keat arising from the Boundaries Act hearing binding on this court, and if so, are there any such determinations that would affect the findings to be made in this case?
2. Are findings of fact and the application of law made by Deputy Director of Titles Rosenstein arising from the Land Titles Act hearing binding on this court, and if so, are there any such determinations that would affect the findings to be made in this case?
Findings of Fact and Law in the Hearings Below
3(1) Where doubt exists as to the true location on the ground of any boundary of a parcel, an application, in the prescribed form, may be made to the Director to confirm the true location of the boundary on the ground.
9. (1) Upon the hearing convened under section 8, the Director may dispose of any objection in such manner as he or she considers just and equitable under the circumstances and may, by order, confirm the location of the boundary or boundaries as shown on the plan of survey, or, if he or she thinks proper to do so, may order that the survey and plan be amended in such manner as he or she may direct, in which case he or she may confirm the location of the boundary or boundaries as shown on the plan as so amended.
 In accordance with the governing legislation, the Boundaries Act Decision clarified the location of Part 2 and its position within PIN 58409-0016 (LT), with the ultimate result being the BA Plan. That decision accomplished the purpose of a hearing under the Boundaries Act. It confirmed the true location on the ground of the boundaries of Part 2 which, as a result of the parties’ dispute, were in doubt.
 Mr. Streisfield submits that certain findings made by Deputy Director Keat are binding on this court, including a statement in the Reasons that “(t)he evidence that was presented concerning user was not consistent with ownership of the land shown on the Cavana survey but only with ingress and egress to the island itself…”.
 I disagree with this submission. There is nothing in the Boundaries Act that permits the Director to determine the location of boundaries between parcels of land that may have been established as a result of adverse possession or prescription. The purpose in hearing evidence regarding use during that proceeding was to shed light on the location of the boundary of Tiny Island relative to the boundary of the Barbour property. Given that it was not within the jurisdiction of the Director under the Boundaries Act to consider or determine possessory or prescriptive claims, any findings of fact made concerning the evidence given in that proceeding cannot give rise to an issue estoppel, as argued by Mr. Streisfield. The jurisdiction of the Director in a Boundaries Act hearing was confirmed in Nicholson v. Halliday (2005), 74 O.R. (3d) 81, 2005 CanLII 259 (ON CA), 2005 CanLII 259 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 70, where Lang J.A. noted that the “Director was alive to his obligation to set a boundary, not to determine a case of adverse possession”. At para. 71 of Nicholson the significance of evidence of possession in a Boundaries Act hearing was discussed:
Possessory evidence is relevant to set the boundary. Only once the boundary is set can any issue arise about adverse possession. Moreover, possessory evidence is a specific component of the surveyor's third indicator of boundary in the hierarchy of evidence. As Stortini D.C.J. said in Thelland at 2:
If no original monumentation is in existence, the next acceptable evidence is evidence regarding the original positions of the monumentation or evidence regarding the original running of the line, including possessory evidence. The first establishment of the line need not have been done by a surveyor. Evidence of possession which relates back to the first survey or first establishment of the line would be the best evidence of where the line was originally located.
 As a result of the Boundaries Act Decision, the northerly boundary between Lot 20 and 21 extends to the water’s edge of Nottawasaga Bay, and the westerly boundary of Part 2 is likewise the water’s edge. The Decision also determined that the boundary between Part 1 and Part 2 is as created in 1913 by a conveyance involving predecessors in title, when Tiny Island was an island in fact and the natural boundary of both it and the mainland was the water’s edge. The Boundaries Act Decision determined that, with the water levels lowering or receding and the isthmus emerging, the fairest way of apportioning the additional accreted lands was to determine the lowest or first point of contact between the two portions of land and to locate a line perpendicular to the shoreline that passes through the above point of contact on the isthmus.
 In this proceeding, Mrs. Bailey does not challenge the location of the boundary between Part 2 and Tiny Island as determined by the Boundaries Act Decision. Nor does she contest the fact that Parts 1 and 2 are riparian parcels, the boundaries of which alter over time. She also does not contest the fact that since the Boundaries Act Decision and registration of the BA Plan, there is more land above water than was the case as of May 3, 2002; Parts 1 and 2 have effectively “grown”.
 Mr. Streisfield also argues that Deputy Director Keat found that the changes in water level have been slow and imperceptible, thus making the law of accretion applicable. I have read the Boundaries Act Decision carefully and cannot agree that such a finding was made. Deputy Director Keat wrote, at page 24 of his Decision “I agree with the submissions of Mr. Streisfield and the methods of OLS Stewart on the establishment of the low point of the isthmus and the apportionment of the accreted lands” (emphasis added). However, at the top of page 24 of his decision, he notes that Mr. de Rijcke had not argued the contrary point, being that the law of accretion was not applicable. At no point does Deputy Director Keat review evidence that could lead him to make a finding that the changes in water level have been slow and imperceptible, and in fact refers to the natural state of the peninsula having been altered by the placement of fill. Although he refers to the “accreted lands” at several points in his Reasons, it appears to have been an unsubstantiated conclusion that he simply adopted. I reach this determination even being aware that Deputy Director Rosenstein’s Reasons also refer to the “finding” of Deputy Director Keat that fluctuations in the water level in the Bay were slow and imperceptible, thus making the law of accretion applicable.
 Accordingly, I reach the conclusion that there are no aspects of the Boundaries Act Decision that are binding upon this court, other than the determination of the boundaries of the land in question, and that Mr. Barbour currently holds registered title to Part 2 on the Hiley Plan. Thus, this is not a case that attracts the principle of issue estoppel as urged upon this court by Mr. Streisfield.
 With respect to the Land Titles Decision, there are no aspects of Deputy Director Rosenstein’s evidentiary rulings, her findings of fact, or her interpretation and application of law that are binding on this court. Whether or not this court ultimately agrees or disagrees with the Land TitlesDecision, it does a disservice to the parties to adopt any aspect of it without independent analysis of the evidence presented in this trial, and would negate the statutory requirement that a new trial be held.
The Evidentiary Record for this Trial
 One pre-trial order and another mid-trial order were made concerning the evidence to be taken during this trial. Because of the extensive history of this matter, for the sake of clarity I will outline what was, and what was not, allowed to be entered into evidence for my consideration in this proceeding.
 By consent order dated January 17, 2013:
(i) All documents that were admitted into evidence in the Boundaries Act hearing, the Land Titles Act hearing, and at the previous trial in the Superior Court of Justice were admissible, with the parties being entitled to make submissions as to weight;
(ii) The evidence of three expert witnesses from prior hearings would be tendered by way of admission of transcripts from those hearings and the filing of the expert reports, with the parties being entitled to make submissions as to weight. These experts were: Chester Stanton, O.L.S.; John Hiley, O.L.S., and Ronald Stewart, O.L.S. The parties were allowed to have these experts provide additional viva voceevidence in relation to matters not covered in a prior proceeding, subject to limitations set out in the order;
(iii) The evidence of Neil Lackie would be tendered by filing transcripts from prior hearings, as he was deceased by the time of this trial;
(iv) Chris Van Aller and Heidi Lauridsen, whose affidavits are included in the documents referenced in paragraph 1(a), would be made available for viva voce evidence and cross examination at trial.
 Neil Lackie testified in the Land Titles Act proceeding. The affidavits of Chris Van Aller and Heidi Lauridsen were statutory declarations that were provided for the Land Titles Act proceeding because those two witnesses reside in the United States and were not available at that time to travel to Canada, and for the reasons explained by Deputy Director Rosenstein, their declarations were permitted to be taken as evidence in that proceeding and marked as exhibits. During their oral testimony given by Skype at this trial, they affirmed the contents of those affidavits.
 In a subsequent ruling made by this court on May 14, 2013 (Bailey v. Barbour, 2013 ONSC 2828 (CanLII)), for the reasons explained therein, this court excluded from its prior order the transcripts of evidence taken at the hearing under the Land Titles Act. Unbeknownst to this court at the time it made its January 17, 2013 order, those transcripts had been marked as exhibits during the previous trial in the Superior Court. The ruling of May 14, 2013 also provided that the evidence of all lay witnesses, including the parties themselves, was to be given by oral testimony during this trial. As set out in the reasons, this formal order followed a directive given by me on January 17, 2013, but not made part of the formal order at that time, that I wanted to hear all of the evidence of lay witnesses by oral testimony.
 The May 14, 2013 ruling also provided that:
(i) Transcripts of a witness’ evidence from a prior proceeding could only be used to impeach credibility;
(ii) Other than transcripts, the January 17 order continued such that all exhibits marked at a former hearing would be made exhibits at this trial without formal proof;
(iii) Former testimony given in a prior proceeding by a now deceased witness could be tendered by filing transcripts;
(iv) Affidavits or statutory declarations from witnesses now deceased would be given the weight deemed appropriate by this court, giving due consideration to all the facts, including whether there had ever been opportunity to cross-examine the deponent.
 With respect to (iii) above, the only person to whom this applies is Nancy Anne Rice, who has passed away since the Land Titles Act hearing, and Neil Lackie, as previously stated.
 With respect to (iv) above, this applies to statutory declarations given by Rebecca Van Aller, Nancy Rice and John Harvey.
 As a result of the above rulings, there are several documents that were not considered by this court that are contained in the Book of Documents filed on consent in this trial.[viii] These include: all transcripts of evidence of Gerald Barbour and Charlene Lowes, and affidavits of W. Miller, Judith Skelton Grant, Gerald Barbour, and Angelina Bailey.
Issues to be Determined
 The parties agree that the following issues are to be determined by this court:
1. What weight, if any, should be given to the evidence provided by Mr. Ron Stewart, O.L.S., or should his evidence be deemed inadmissible?
2. Has Mrs. Bailey met and satisfied the test of adverse possession in respect of claiming ownership to all or part of Part 2, the title to which is riparian and the natural boundary of which ambulates?
3. In the alternative, do the uses of Mrs. Bailey and her predecessors in title give rise to a prescriptive claim to an easement over all or part of the disputed lands, the title to which is riparian and the natural boundary of which ambulates?
4. In the further alternative, does an easement exist over all or part of Part 2 in favour of Mrs. Bailey by reason of necessity, implication, the doctrine of lost modern grant, and/or proprietary estoppel, again, given the nature of the lands?
5. What effect, if any, has the amendment to the Bed of Navigable Waters Act, R.S.O. 1937, c.44 from 1940 to 1951 had on Mr. Barbour’s ownership and Mrs. Bailey’s claim?
6. Can a possessory or prescriptive claim succeed in relation to lands that are covered by water from time to time by virtue of the riparian nature of the property?
7. Are any or all of Mrs. Bailey’s claims statute barred or otherwise barred by reason of the equitable doctrine of estoppel and/or laches?
Burden of Proof
 With respect to all claims advanced by Mrs. Bailey in CV-10-0249 and 10-1309, she bears the onus of proof on a civil standard. As confirmed by the Supreme Court of Canada in F.H. v. McDougall, 2008 SCC 53 (CanLII), at para. 49, in all civil cases the trial judge must scrutinize the relevant evidence with care to determine whether it is more likely than not that an alleged event occurred. At para. 46, that Court stated:
Similarly, evidence must always be sufficiently clear, convincing and cogent to satisfy the balance of probabilities test. But again, there is no objective standard to measure sufficiency…
 During this trial and my subsequent deliberations I have fully and carefully reviewed and considered all of the available evidence, both oral and documentary, in order to reach my decisions.
Title History of Barbour Property, Tiny Island, and Rice Property
1. 1911 – Lot 21 was owned by George Carriveau – described as 20 acres more or less
2. 1912 – Carriveau transferred the south 200 feet of Lot 21 to Emery Brunelle
3. 1913 – Carriveau transferred to Peter Addison Lot 21, described as 20 acres more or less, except the part sold to Brunelle
4. 1913 – Emery Brunelle transferred to Peter and William Addison the south 200 feet of Lot 21 except the parcel detached from the mainland known as Tiny Island
5. 1914 – The McMullen Plan was prepared dividing Lot 21 into 10 lots, the total acreage of which is 20 acres more or less
6. 1915 – Original grant of Tiny Island to Emery and Alexander Brunelle, being registered instrument No. 189, which describes the land as:
"all that Parcel or Tract of Land, situate, lying and being in the Georgian Bay, in the Township of Tiny, in the County of Simcoe, in the Province of Ontario, in our Dominion of Canada, containing about Two acres be the same more or less, composed of Tiny Island Situate to the South of a peninsular in the Southerly part of Lot Twenty-one (21), Concession Thirteen (13) of the aforesaid Township of Tiny".
7. 1935 to 1943 – William Kynoch rented Tiny Island from the Brunelle brothers for summer cottage use, excluding the area on the lower side occupied by the Brunelle brothers for a commercial fishing operation
8. 1940 – Bed of Navigable Waters Act[ix] (Ontario) was amended , such that boundaries of lots fronting on navigable waters were deemed to have always been the high water mark
9. 1942 – Survey of Tiny Island prepared by E.L. Cavana, O.L.S. showing separate high water marks for Tiny Island and for the mainland parcel; showed Tiny Island parcel as including the isthmus attaching it to the mainland and part of the mainland beach (including where Part 2 is located); showing mutual right of way crossing the beach and connecting to the Cut
10. 1943 – Emery and Alexander Brunelle transferred Tiny Island to William Kynoch except the part occupied by the Brunelle brothers for their fishing operation on the south-east side of the island, which was described with a metes and bounds description written from the Cavana Plan
11. 1949 – Addison conveyed Lot 10 on the McMullen Plan to Mr. Barbour; the land conveyed was described with a metes and bounds description that included the water’s edge as the west boundary and as containing 1.15 acres more or less; it also referred to the land being “distinguished as Parcel 10”, which could only be a reference to the Subdivision Plan. In 1949 Mr. Barbour could not own the beach beyond the high water mark; as a result of the Bed of Navigable Waters Act it was then owned by the Province
12. 1951 – 1940 amendment to Beds of Navigable Waters Act repealed
13. 1956 – Alexander Brunelle transfers his interest in Tiny Island to Alderic Brunelle
14. 1958 – Alderic Brunelle transferred his interest in Tiny Island to William Kynoch by description that was written from the Cavana Plan
15. 1958 – Addison transferred Lot 9 on McMullen Plan to Kynoch
16. 1961 – Interest of Alderic Brunelle in Tiny Island transferred to Kynoch by reference to the Cavana Plan. Upon completion of this transfer, William Kynoch owned all of Tiny Island
17. 1966 – William Kynoch died
18. 1969 – Kynoch estate transferred Lot 9 to Nancy Rice, daughter of William Kynoch
19. 1971 – Kynoch estate transferred Tiny Island to Rebecca Van Aller, daughter of William Kynoch; referred to in the deed as “all of the island...known as ‘Tiny Island’”
20. 1976 – Mr. Barbour built his home and became a permanent resident
21. 1988 – Rebecca Van Aller transferred all of Tiny Island to Angelina Bailey, together with a right of way over the Cut and over a road leading from the Cut to the concession road; Ms. Van Aller provided a statutory declaration that the land shown on the 1942 Cavana survey, when above water, was used and possessed by her family as part of the island property since 1943
22. 1990 – Nancy Rice transferred to Angelina Bailey an easement permitting parking of vehicles on part of her land
 As set out in the above title history, it is agreed that Tiny Island as a separate entity from the rest of Lot 21, Concession 13, was created by way of an exception to the conveyance from Emery Brunelle to the Addison brothers in 1913[x]. That conveyance referred simply to “the parcel thereof detached from the Main Land, known locally as ‘Tiny Island’”, although there is a separate Federal Crown grant to Emery and Alexander Brunelle in 1916 of “Tiny Island”.[xi] This Federal Crown conveyance was redundant and unnecessary. However, the description in this grant became the foundation for all of the conveyances to William Kynoch flowing from the survey of E.L. Cavana, O.L.S., dated November 19, 1942 (the “Cavana Plan”).[xii] As set out above, the Crown grant described the parcel as being about 2 acres, situated to the south of a peninsula in the southerly part of lot 21.
 The history shows that Dr. William Kynoch purportedly received title to three pieces of property associated with Tiny Island between 1943 and 1961. In 1943 he acquired the bulk of Tiny Island from the two brothers, Emery and Alexander Brunelle. They were local commercial fisherman from whom Dr. Kynoch had been seasonally renting the island since 1935. The 1943 deed includes, as an attachment, a copy of the 1942 Cavana Plan. In addition to the bulk of Tiny Island, the Brunelle brothers purported to transfer additional land as depicted in the Cavana Plan. The Cavana Plan and deed purport to create a mutual right-of-way across this land, a feature referred to by the parties as the “tail of the whale”, and leading back across the mainland beach to the Cut, which provides eventual egress to the concession road. While the parties have agreed to the facts in this and the preceding paragraph, this final fact is confirmed by the 1943 deed from the Brunelles to Dr. Kynoch, which includes a clear easement or right-of-way specifically described as
"together with the right-of-way over the above excerpted portion of Tiny Island as colored in yellow on the survey hereunto attached".
 Furthermore, the description continues with the language,
"and subject to a right-of-way over that portion of Tiny Island herein conveyed as colored in yellow on the survey hereunto attached: the said two rights-of-way to form a mutual right-of-way for the use of the owners and occupants from time to time, of the hereinbefore described proportions [sic], their servants and agents, at such times when ingress and egress to the respective properties is rendered impossible by reason of high water".
 This right-of-way colored in yellow is labelled on the Cavana Plan as "Mutual R.O.W. Road”, and corresponds to a pathway labelled as a “track” on the BA Plan. This appears to have been an express grant of a right-of-way as contemplated in 1943, which included the “tail of the whale” lands that extend over what is now Part 2. As on the Cavana Plan, the roadway on Exhibit 6 is marked in yellow and is referred to hereafter as “the yellow roadway”.
 This 1943 deed was registered on title as Instrument 231 in 1943. Instrument 231 and the right-of-way referred to above is specifically referenced in the subsequent conveyance in 1956 by Alexander Brunelle to Alderic Brunelle to an undivided one half interest in portions of Tiny Island, excepting that part conveyed to Dr. Kynoch by Instrument No. 231. This conveyance left Dr. Kynoch, together with Alderic Brunelle, as the owners of complementary halves of Tiny Island.
 Two years later, Alderic Brunelle conveyed by deed dated September 16, 1958 his half of Tiny Island to Dr. Kynoch by deed registered as Instrument 89619. The final portion of Tiny Island was ultimately conveyed to Dr. Kynoch by Instrument 137551, being a deed dated July 27, 1961. Therefore, by 1961, Dr. Kynoch had purportedly been conveyed the balance of Tiny Island and all of the “tail of the whale”. The metes and bounds description contained in the deed registered as Instrument 137551 is noteworthy in two respects:
i) the deed makes specific reference to the Cavana survey plan attached to Instrument No. 231, being the original conveyance of a portion of Tiny Island to Dr. Kynoch;
ii) the metes and bounds description no longer makes any specific reference to the "mutual right-of-way" as a "together with" or a "subject to" as in previous conveyances.
 The reason that there is no longer a reference to a right-of-way, it is submitted by Mr. de Rijcke and this court accepts, is because one cannot have a right-of-way over one's own land. Dr. Kynoch now owning the entirety of Tiny Island including the tail of the whale over which the right-of-way had originally traversed, by reason of merger the right-of-way ceased to exist.
 Therefore, between 1943 and 1961 Dr. Kynoch had a deeded right-of-way to Tiny Island, and thereafter was deeded title to the land over which it had crossed.
 Following the death of Dr. Kynoch in 1966, title to Tiny Island came to be vested in his daughter, Rebecca (“Betty”) Van Aller, by deed registered as Instrument No. 371332 in October 1971. She subsequently conveyed to Mrs. Bailey.
 Mrs. Bailey’s Agreement of Purchase and Sale that preceded her conveyance from Betty Van Aller contained a photocopy of part of the 1942 Cavana Plan, which referenced Tiny Island as including all of the “tail of the whale”. The relevant term in the Agreement of Purchase and Sale is clause (f) on page 1:
The vendor agrees to provide purchaser with the original survey or copy from 1942 or thereabouts together with vendor’s statutory declaration that outlined in red on Schedule B attached hereto was, when above water, at all times occupied and possessed as part of the island property by her or her family since 1935.
 Although Mrs. Bailey agrees that she did not see a copy of the full version of the Cavana Plan until after the closing of the transaction in December, 1988, she testified that when she and Mr. Bailey visited the island prior to signing the Agreement of Purchase and Sale, she was assured by Betty Van Aller that the property being sold included all of that depicted in the “tail of the whale”. In fact, Ms. Van Aller’s reference to the size of the land led Mr. and Mrs. Bailey to believe that the land included in the Cavana survey extended all the way east over the beach to the treeline.
 Mrs. Bailey did not obtain a survey because her lawyer had not urged her to do so. However, upon closing her lawyer did obtain a statutory declaration from Betty Van Aller dated December 12, 1988, which contained the same sketch of Tiny Island including the “tail of the whale” that had been incorporated into the Agreement of Purchase and Sale. In this document she declared:
4. My predecessors in title and I have occupied the said Tiny Island being more particularly shown outlined in red continuously for more than 40 years. The land to which my statutory declaration of possession (dated the date hereof) relates is the parcel more particularly shown outlined in red on the sketch attached as Exhibit “A”.
5. Although part of the said Island is under water, depending upon the level of the Georgian Bay, from time to time, my family has occupied that part of Tiny Island above the water level entirely and continuously for more than 40 years.
 Prior to closing the purchase transaction for Tiny Island, Mrs. Bailey had a copy of Mr. Barbour’s “water’s edge” deed. Mr. Barbour’s deed describes the lands conveyed as being composed of part of Lot 21 together with a description of the parcel extending to the water’s edge, “containing one acre and one hundred and fifty-five thousands of an acre more or less and distinguished as Parcel Ten”.
 Between 1940 and 1951, any vested interest that Mr. Barbour may have attempted to assert in Part 2 was affected by the legislation then in effect, namely the Bed of Navigable Waters Act, R.S.O. 1937, c.44 as amended by the Statute Law Amendment Act, S.O. 1940 c.28. That statute had the effect of deeming the boundaries of lands on navigable waters to have always been the high water mark. The legislation was repealed in 1951. However, as a result of that statute, between 1940 and 1951 the provincial Crown owned all of the land between the water’s edge of Georgian Bay and the high water mark, which includes Part 2. At the time when he obtained his deed in 1949, Mr. Barbour could not have owned Part 2, despite the legal description in his deed. He owned only as far west as the high water mark on the westerly edge of Lot 10.
 The parties have agreed that, if it is assumed that at the time of his purchase in 1949 Mr. Barbour was disentitled to obtain a conveyance to the water’s edge because the bed of Lake Huron was deemed to come up to the “high-water mark” according to the Bed of Navigable Waters Act, that limitation lapsed in 1951 when the amendment was appealed. This resulted in the conveyance to the water’s edge then becoming effective.
 This state of affairs was confirmed by the Boundaries Act decision, which as previously described, confirmed a boundary that crosses the isthmus as illustrated on the BA Plan. Again, as a consequence of the Boundaries Act ruling, the parties agree that Mrs. Bailey has fee simple title to any dry lands on the Tiny Island side of that boundary, and Mr. Barbour has fee simple title to any dry lands on the mainland side of that boundary, including the Part 2 lands.
 Excluding the Cavana Plan for the moment, the surveys that were prepared prior to the Boundaries Act hearing contain noteworthy aspects in relation to the right-of-way and Tiny Island.
McMullen Survey, 1914[xiii]
 As earlier referred to, this is the unregistered plan of subdivision of Lot 21, Concession 13, owned at the time by the Addisons. There are no available field notes. No roadway appears along the beach in front of what eventually became the Rice or Barbour properties.
Erwin Survey, 1939[xiv]
 No roadway appears on the plan, and his field notes do not refer to one.
O’Dale Survey, 1960[xv]
 Entitled “Plan of Survey showing Right of Way as Used on Part of Tiny Island in Georgian Bay", the survey prepared by C.P. O’Dale, O.L.S. indicates the location of the right-of-way on part of Tiny Island. The survey shows that the island is separated from the mainland by a channel. The used right-of-way indicated on the survey stops at the northeast side of the island at the water's edge, and is not shown to continue on the mainland on the other side of the water.
Harvey Survey, 1982[xvi]
 John Harvey, O.L.S. surveyed the right of way over the strip of land lying to the north of Nancy Rice’s property, designated as Part 1 on Reference Plan 51R-11640 (the Cut) and extending to the high water mark. His field notes do not show any markings of a roadway or path extending beyond the Cut. In his statutory declaration sworn October 31, 1991 he refers to the Cut as being used by the owners of Tiny Island for more than 30 years. Despite having personal knowledge of this access, he does not reference any roadway leading to the island beyond the Cut.
Evidence of the Witnesses
 Mrs. Bailey's primary residence is in Toronto, where she resides with her husband Stephen Bailey. They have five children now ranging in age from 28 to 41.
 Before purchasing Tiny Island, the Baileys were owners of a cottage at Balm Beach in Tiny Township, which they owned from 1983 to 1988. When they decided to relocate to a new cottage, their realtor, Marguerite Rideout, helped them search for a suitable cottage. There were certain criteria that the Baileys required be met: due to a personal security issue that had arisen regarding one of their daughters, they wanted security and privacy; they wanted to be able to access and use it in all seasons; and it had to have vehicular access, as Mrs. Bailey is terrified of water and boats.
 It took three years to locate the Tiny Island property. Mrs. Bailey was not familiar with the property before learning that it was for sale.
 Ms. Rideout arranged for the Baileys to view the property, which they did in May or early June of 1988. They parked Ms. Rideout's vehicle in the woods by the Rice Property, and Mrs. Bailey described in her testimony how they walked along the Cut. They then walked along what is shown on the Hiley Plan as Part 5, and walked across the beach over Part 2, following the yellow roadway shown on Exhibit 6. On cross-examination she indicated that they seemed to follow a natural, delineated path, but that was not what she was focused on at the time, but rather on her conversation with Ms. Rideout. She could not recall whether she noted tire tracks on the pathway. She described that the route that they walked was sandy and hard-packed and rubbley. Where the curve in the yellow roadway begins as shown on Exhibit 6, the ground was rocky and the sand was wet. She does not recall walking in water and recalls that she kept her shoes on during the walk. The Baileys’ initial impression was that the property met some of their needs as it was elevated, private, secluded, and had a sandy beach and shallow lake bottom. Yet it was not winterized and the main cottage, being an old, rustic log cabin, had to be upgraded. On this first occasion they met Betty Van Aller, but no discussion was had with respect to price or the size of the property.
 The Baileys arranged through Ms. Rideout to view the property on a second occasion. On this visit they again parked in the woods and walked along the same route as on the previous occasion, which they identified as the yellow roadway, including crossing Part 2. Mrs. Bailey described this route as the "path of least resistance", as there was no soft sand or dunes and the surface was hard-packed. The sand was once again wet, and she noted some puddling.
 On this occasion, Betty Van Aller described how her father, Dr. William Kynoch, had owned an International Scout four-wheel-drive vehicle, by which he drove to the island. They also learned that Betty Van Aller’s mother was an artist who held painting classes on the island. They also learned that Betty had a four-by-four vehicle, that her daughter owned a Jeep and that her nieces all had four-wheel-drive vehicles that they used to drive to the cottage. Mrs. Bailey understood from that conversation that there was no impediment to driving to the island, and that it was possible to drive right up to the stairs leading to the cottage. On cross-examination she conceded that she did not see a vehicle on either of her initial two trips to the island.
 In terms of the scope of the land, Betty Van Aller “expansively described” it to the Baileys, and they understood as a result of where she was pointing that the land extended back over Part 2 as far as the tree line at the back of the beach, and over to an ancient fence post marked by red, which they understood to mark the southerly boundary of the Rice Property.
 Mr. Bailey then met with Marguerite Rideout to put together an offer to purchase Tiny Island. The price that they offered took into consideration the fact that they would have to buy a four-by-four vehicle for driving across the beach. Appended to the Agreement of Purchase and Sale as Schedule "B" was a reduced copy of the Cavana Plan, which depicted Tiny Island as well as the isthmus, a portion of the beach adjacent to the island, and the travelled path that the Baileys identified as the yellow roadway. Mrs. Bailey saw this document for the first time sometime prior to closing when Mr. Bailey brought it home one day. She did not see the full-sized Cavana Plan itself until after the closing, but understood that they were purchasing the island and the adjacent beach to the tree line along the front of the Rice and Barbour properties. She later realized through the surveys and litigation process that the Cavana Plan did not extend to the tree line, and accordingly, that what she believed to be her property ended to the west of the treeline.
 The Baileys took possession of the property in November 1988. They went there that first winter, travelling the same route as taken in the summer, as they found that the prevailing winds blew the snow off of the beach and roadway. They moved some furniture to the island by truck in the spring of 1989. They purchased an Isuzu Trooper four-wheel-drive vehicle and drove to the island, parking at the base of the stairs leading up to the cottage. This vehicle was replaced in 1993 by a Suburban.
 Once the Baileys took possession of Tiny Island they undertook improvements. It was Mrs. Bailey's evidence that all of the contractors, delivery, and service vehicles drove directly to the island, travelling the same route as depicted by the yellow roadway on Exhibit 6. These improvements included electrical upgrades, phone installation, and the installation of a replacement transformer that was delivered by a flatbed hydro truck. A concrete base had to be built for the transformer, which involved bags of concrete being brought to the island, and underground wires installed. They purchased a new washing machine, dryer and stove and bedroom and living room furniture. They re-plumbed, rewired and insulated the lower cabin, along with installing a new roof and maple floors. They dug out the basement, installed forced air electric heating and a UV septic water filtration system and large water heater. The refurbishment included an entire new kitchen, a new deck and sliding doors on three sides of the cottage. They installed over forty limestone steps leading to the main cottage. Granite countertops and new windows were installed, as well as a new cedar roof on the main cottage. Much of this work was undertaken during the first winter that they owned the cottage. The contractor used trucks and a tractor to clear the road of snow through the woods. She and her husband checked on progress at the cottage regularly, and noted that the service vehicles parked all over the lower island by the stairs. Mrs. Bailey estimated that they spent just over $300,000 on improvements in their first year of ownership, and subsequently at least another $200,000.
 Mrs. Bailey was clear in her evidence that they would not have purchased Tiny Island or improved it without having access across the beach.
 At no time while any of this work was going on did they receive objections from any of their neighbours. Mr. Barbour did not object to them, or the service and contractor’s vehicles, driving over Part 2. Additionally, a septic service truck has attended every two years for service.
 Included in the improvements was work done on the isthmus, which required work permits from the Ministry of Natural Resources. The first such permit was issued on October 27, 1992, permitting clean rocks to be placed in the water as shown in the schedule to the permit.[xvii] The schedule is a copy of the Cavana Plan with particulars of the work to be conducted. The schedule indicates that water had broken through at the narrowest point of the isthmus, and washed out sand and gravel, and that rocks were also to be placed in approximately the middle of the “tail of the whale” on Part 2. Mrs. Bailey testified that they undertook this work because they found in the spring of 1992 that the road was damaged by either snow or waves and was unstable.
 Another application for a work permit was made on October 7, 1993, requesting permission for a dump truck and backhoe to raise a concrete well casing, and to back fill and repair the roadway in areas depicted on the schedule to that application[xviii]. Again, the schedule to the application is a copy of the Cavana Plan, on which the work to be undertaken is described, including repairing the roadway with clean washed fieldstone on at least one, if not two, locations on Part 2. This work was completed between October 18, 1993 and November 30, 1993 in accordance with the permit. The concrete well casing was also brought in along the yellow roadway across Part 2.
 On both of these occasions in 1992 and 1993, Mr. Barbour did not complain of the work being undertaken or the travel over Part 2.
 Ten photographs were purportedly taken of the work being done under the second work permit, suspected to be taken in 1993 because they show the delivery of the well casing.[xix] These were introduced into evidence by Mr. Streisfield on cross-examination, and Mrs. Bailey identified them as depicting Tiny Island, where that piece of land is shown in a given picture. However the photographer is unknown, and there is no direct evidence of the time, date or weather conditions when these photographs were taken, whether they were taken by Mr. Barbour, or whether he was aware of the work being done as depicted in the photographs. More will be said about photographs later in these reasons.
 Starting in June 1989, it was the Bailey's routine to take their children out of school two weeks early, and to start living at the cottage from June 15 onward, remaining until the week after Labour Day. During the other months of the year, the Baileys used the island on weekends and over Christmas. Although all of their children have now moved away from home, Mr. and Mrs. Bailey still continue with this schedule, which has not altered over the years.
 Mrs. Bailey testified that occasionally there would be some ponding of water in the middle of Part 2, which would sometimes freeze over in the winter. In the winter they had the Woods Road and the Cut ploughed, as well as the entire yellow roadway.
 In terms of other uses made of the property, the Baileys would entertain guests and family. Their two older children wind surfed from the beach off of Part 2. They would also swim from the beach located on Part 2, because it is the sandiest spot. They would sit on Part 2 to watch the sunset, and left their deck chairs on the beach on Part 2 for the entirety of the summer. On the May long weekend they set off fireworks from the beach on the Part 2 lands. In the summer the children rode their bikes, practiced golf, had bonfires and played ballgames on the hard-packed sandy area of Part 2. They placed a shade tent on Part 2 for two seasons. During the winter they cross-country skied across the beach and into the woods, snow shoed, and skated where the water pooled and froze on Part 2.
 When guests come, they are encouraged by the Baileys to park in the designated spot behind Nancy Rice’s cottage. However, the Baileys usually drive to the island because they typically have groceries, baggage, and like to have a vehicle close for emergencies and for picking up guests. They still hire someone to keep the roadway to Tiny Island, including that which extends over Part 2, ploughed during the winter.
 Photographs taken by Stephen Bailey show both their Trooper and their Suburban parked on Part 1, and Mrs. Bailey testified that some depict the yellow roadway travelled to cross Part 2. A photo that she identified to have been taken in 1989 shows Mrs. Bailey and her two daughters on the beach at the west end of the Cut, showing the Trooper parked in the distance on the isthmus. Another photo that she identified as being taken in 1993 or later, shows the Suburban parked in front of the steps to the cottage. She recalled that the Suburban replaced the Trooper in 1993 because that was the year the Bailey’s oldest son was in an accident with the Trooper. She identified in the photographs metal stakes with fluorescent paint on top that she and her husband placed on Part 2 at the time that they obtained the permit to do the work on the road. Her evidence is that they placed the stakes to mark the roadway because they once almost drove into the Bay in the dark. The stakes have never been moved and remain there today. These photos, where they are oriented toward Part 2, show a relatively flat, sandy area of land riddled with rocks and grasses to the east toward south beach and approaching or on Part 1. Some reveal a very obvious roadway, which Mrs. Bailey identified as the road travelled by them to access their cottage from the Cut. One of the photographs shows an aluminum boat that came with the cottage; there were originally two but one blew away. She testified that she does not know what Betty Van Aller used the boats for, and that the Bailey family has never used those boats to access the island.
 Further photographs show that Mr. Barbour had birdhouses in the area of his tree line to the east of the Part 2 lands. Photographs also depict sandbags, as well as a shade tent placed in the area of the tree line in front of Mr. Barbour's house on the mainland. Mrs. Bailey testified that she assumed that Mr. Barbour had chosen to locate those items where he did because that was his property. Another photo shows a shade tent erected by the Baileys, which Mrs. Bailey indicated they had for a few years until it blew down, but when erected, was located on the sandy part of Part 2. Another photo indicates deck chairs, which she identified as being placed on Part 2. Throughout these photos, either Mrs. Bailey or members of her immediate or extended family are shown in various locations over Part 2.
 Additional photographs were provided of the Bailey's eldest daughter's wedding in 1998. Mrs. Bailey testified that at that time there was water throughout Part 2, and a rental Jeep was used to drive people from the Woods Road. She described that the water could have been 3 to 4 inches deep, coming up a bit over the bottom of the vehicles’ tires. Pictures from that event show that there was still a sufficient amount of land in front of the cottage stairs to park a vehicle without it standing in water.
 Mrs. Bailey testified that she did not see Mr. Barbour using the Part 2 lands other than on one occasion after the legal proceedings had begun. On that occasion he placed a chair on the north beach on the Part 2 lands, which was the only time that she had ever seen him sit there. She saw him swim a couple of times, but when he did so it was on the south side of the isthmus, on south beach.
 At one point the Baileys erected a “no trespassing” sign, when the Addison Beach Association recommended that owners install one. She testified that the sign was in the middle of what they thought was their property on the “lower island”, which she now understands to be on Part 2. This sign was knocked down one night and never re-erected. They put up the sign so that they could have something to point to, if a trespasser remarked that there was no posted sign. Occasionally they asked people to move along when they came on to the beach, if it appeared that they planned to stay, and Mrs. Bailey had a particular recollection of a large group having a fire and barbeque on the Part 2 lands, and asking them to leave. Another time they had to contact the police for assistance.
 Mrs. Bailey testified that the year that the water was the highest was 1998, the year of her daughter’s wedding, and the only time that water made access “awkward”. She has noted fluctuations in the water levels, with highs and lows in certain seasons. She testified that even when there is water over the isthmus, it has never been so high as to deny them access to the island by vehicle. On cross-examination she confirmed the same testimony: in the early years she had to walk or drive through some water in early spring, but could not recall the last time that she had to drive through water; that prior to closing she did not walk through water, although it was wet and rocky and had puddles; that the following year they put a small plank down but she could not recall walking through water; and she believes that 1998, the spring of her daughter’s wedding, was the last time that they had to walk or drive through water. She confirmed that there was some water separating the island from the mainland at that time. It was deep enough that it came up to “an inch or two over the tires”.
 Mrs. Bailey testified that if the island had been surrounded with water as appears to be depicted by an ariel photograph dated May 1988[xx], she would not have been comfortable buying it. She said that she has never seen all of Part 2 under water. Her evidence was that the water was the highest in 1998, and that sometime around 1993-1994 it was also high. Photographs from that era, when the Trooper was still owned, show water in and around the area of the isthmus, but also show the Trooper parked by the island, indicating that it was still accessible. Referencing one photo in particular, taken, she thought in 1993[xxi], Mrs. Bailey testified that the water in that photograph was higher than when they first viewed the island. It shows children playing in water on the northeast side of the isthmus on what is likely Part 2, or possibly south beach.
 She testified that the Bay’s water level fluctuates constantly, and she recalls calling Mr. Barbour once when a huge storm blew in and the beach was covered in water to the tree line. Mr. Barbour told her not to worry, that that was the nature of the Bay. She described it being like a “surge”, coming on suddenly, and that Mr. Barbour told her that in the next hour it was gone.
 As previously stated, at the time of closing Mrs. Bailey’s lawyer obtained a statutory declaration and a declaration of possession from Betty Van Aller, both dated December 15, 1988.[xxii] These were deposited on title. The declaration of possession attached the Cavana Plan, and Betty Van Aller declared that the lands to which her statutory declaration of possession related was outlined in red on the attached Cavana sketch. In the declaration of possession, Rebecca Van Aller declared that her family had owned Tiny Island for more than 40 years, and that she had personally occupied Tiny Island for part of each year for more than 40 years. She indicated that her predecessors in title and she had occupied Tiny Island entirely and continuously for more than 40 years, although part of the island was under water depending upon the level of Georgian Bay from time to time.
 In the statutory declaration, Betty Van Aller declared that she was the absolute owner in fee simple in possession of that land and that she had personal knowledge of the use and possession of the lands by herself or her father from the time that her father first acquired an interest in Tiny Island in 1943, that the mutual right-of-way shown on the Cavana Plan is an extension to and along the water’s edge of the right-of-way granted to her by Nancy Rice over the Cut, that the mutual right-of-way was used by her and her family for 40 years prior to her declaration for both pedestrian and vehicular access to Tiny Island, that for more than 20 years prior to her declaration her family and her seasonally, continuously, openly without objection placed a dock on the mainland opposite the island for the purpose of boat access to the island, and that to the best of her knowledge there is no dispute as to the boundaries of the lands, and she had never heard of any claim or easement affecting the lands.
 Betty Van Aller's sister, Nancy Rice, also provided a statutory declaration dated December 1, 1988, in which she declared that the northerly 15 feet of her land lying between the high water mark and the water's edge of Georgian Bay had been used as a right-of-way by her sister, and by her predecessors in title in ownership of Tiny Island for more than 40 years.
 Another statutory declaration was secured from Nancy Rice on October 10, 1991. Mrs. Bailey explained that the lawyer who acted for her on the purchase of Tiny Island was very thorough, and this was an undertaking that she had obtained through the lawyer acting for Betty Van Aller. In that declaration, to paraphrase, Nancy Rice stated that she has been familiar with the ownership, use and access to Tiny Island since 1943, and that for more than 50 years, access to Tiny Island by the owners of Tiny Island from time to time has been gained by travelling westerly along the Cut, and "travelling southerly along the beach to Tiny Island". Last, she indicated that the owners from time to time of Tiny Island had been driving from the right-of-way designated as Part 1, Plan 51R-11640 (the Cut) to Tiny Island across the beach adjacent to Georgian Bay. Prior to World War II ordinary passenger vehicles were used to drive across the beach because the beach was wide and consisted of very hard packed sand. Since World War II four-wheel-drive vehicles had been used to drive across the beach. Attached as exhibit A to her affidavit is what is noted to be a plan made from the McMullen Plan, on which is drawn a winding roadway across the Cut and over Part 2 leading to Tiny Island.
 The Baileys first became aware that Mr. Barbour was making a claim to the Part 2 lands when he posted a note to their door on or around September 15, 1995. In that letter, Mr. Barbour indicated that he had instructed a local lawyer to draw up the necessary papers that would protect his interest in, and allow the Bailey's passage over, the strip of beach from a line drawn from the fence between Nancy Rice and his property to the water’s edge and continuing to the island. The letter went on to state that the annual fee for such use would be one dollar per year. He indicated that the papers would be ready for signature in two weeks' time. Mrs. Bailey's reaction was to telephone Mr. Barbour that very night, and to tell him that she had a survey indicating that she was the owner of the land, referring to the Cavana Plan. Ultimately Mrs. Bailey provided a copy of the Cavana Plan to the lawyer acting for Mr. Barbour sometime in 1996, following which there was no follow-up from Mr. Barbour's lawyer or objection from Mr. Barbour for another four years. The Baileys did not change their use of the land, and Mr. Barbour was silent with respect to this issue until the year 2000.
 In the summer of 2000 there was another exchange of letters between Mr. Bailey and Mr. Barbour's lawyers, but that exchange of letters did not resolve the issues and accordingly Mr. Barbour proceeded with his Boundaries Act proceeding.
 The only time that the Baileys have altered their access to Tiny Island is after the release of the decision following the first trial. They now pass over Part 4 on the Hiley Plan and walk to the island on the south side of Part 2, on what Mrs. Bailey described as the west side of the roadway, although she could not accurately say where on Part 2 they are now crossing.
 Her property assessment notice issued by Municipal Property Assessment Corporation (“MPAC”) indicates that she is being taxed on 4 acres of land. In contrast, Mr. Barbour’s MPAC assessment shows that his tax assessment is based on an area consisting of 1.15 acres.
 Stephen Bailey confirmed that Mrs. Bailey would not have considered a cottage on an island having only boat access. He confirmed her evidence that they wanted something more private than their cottage at Balm Beach, and Mr. Bailey was looking for a property that he could renovate. Marguerite Rideout was the person who first told him about Tiny Island, and piqued his interest by saying that it was an island to which one could drive.
 The first time that he and Mrs. Bailey saw the cottage was from the end of the 14th Concession road, approximately 1,500 feet away from the island, and he testified that he could see a level flat area going to the island.
 On their first visit to view the cottage and Tiny Island, he confirmed that Ms. Rideout drove and parked behind Nancy Rice's lot. He stated that Ms. Rideout was driving a car, as opposed to a four-wheel-drive vehicle.
 They walked to the island, following the route shown in yellow on Exhibit 6. The walk took approximately ten minutes. He noted that the yellow roadway turns to avoid the sand dunes, and that he and his wife just followed Ms. Rideout.
 When asked whether they walked through water, his response was that it was a little wet in the middle, and there were puddles to the west of the roadway.
 He testified that they met Betty Van Aller on that first visit, who spoke about her family's use of the island. He came to understand from her that her parents, the Kynochs, had used the island and cottage since Betty was a girl. They did not obtain any documents on the first visit, or discuss the size of the property, and he noted that there was no vehicle parked at the island. Mr. Bailey confirmed that Betty Van Aller kept a rowboat on her property, which was there when they arrived. He did not ask her what use she made of the boat.
 On the second visit taken by he and Mrs. Bailey, they parked in the same spot and walked along the same route. He described it as being a well-worn path with the turns being “natural". He described the water level as being much the same as during the initial visit, with puddles here and there. He did not see a vehicle parked by the island on the second visit, and stated that they did not discuss the extent of the land that was for sale. However, by the end of the second visit he had no concerns as to whether they could drive to the island.
 Mr. Bailey testified that Mrs. Bailey had initially formed the impression that they would have to walk to the island, and so was initially not in favour of its purchase. However, he confirmed with Marguerite Rideout that they could drive to the island, who told him that Betty Van Aller drove there, and her parents before that.
 On further consideration, Mr. Bailey had a third meeting with Betty Van Aller, for the express purpose of speaking to her to confirm the access. They were the only two individuals at that meeting, which again occurred at the island. He testified that Betty told him that she always came by car even as a child, and that she had a four-by-four vehicle which she used to drive to the cottage. He understood from her that she travelled over the yellow roadway on Exhibit 6. She talked about her father travelling to the island in the International Scout, and that he had owned several over the years, and that she had a four-wheel-drive vehicle also.
 Mrs. Van Aller took Mr. Bailey to the top of the steps leading to the cottage, which he estimates to be a rise of forty feet, and pointed to where her land started in front of her sister's property and across to Mr. Barbour's residence. They walked to the bottom of the stairs and she pointed to an electric utility pole in front of Nancy Rice's property and said that her property extended to the far shore. She described it as being 4 acres in size. Mr. Bailey explained that at that time there was less beach existing than is shown on Exhibit 6, however, he pointed out on that exhibit that he understood that the land extended as far north as the top of Part 4, in line with a telephone pole, and then crossed in front of Mr. Barbour's property. He indicated that he was surprised to learn that it was 4 acres in size, not initially thinking that the property was that large. At the end of that third meeting he was satisfied with access, as Betty Van Aller had been very clear that she accessed the island with her vehicle.
 Betty Van Aller told him that she had a property survey, but it was with her lawyer, Mr. Hacker. Marguerite Rideout obtained a copy of the survey from Mr. Hacker, after which she met Mr. Bailey to review it. Mr. Bailey went to Ms. Rideout's office, where he saw a copy of the Cavana Plan.
 The agreement of purchase and sale that was submitted by the Baileys contained the following provision:
The vendor agrees to provide purchaser with the original survey or copy from 1942 or thereabouts together with vendor's statutory declaration that outlined in red on schedule B attached hereto was, when above water, at all times occupied and possessed as part of the island property by her or her family since 1935.
 Schedule B, referenced in that clause to be from 1942 or thereabouts, is the Cavana Plan. Mr. Bailey described the purpose of requiring the statutory declaration as being to ensure that the use was as described by Betty Van Aller. The purchase price for the Tiny Island property was $350,000, which Mr. Bailey described as their limit, because they knew that they needed to make extensive renovations.
 The copy of the Cavana Plan that was attached to the agreement of purchase and sale, being the same copy that Mr. Bailey had seen prior to submitting the agreement of purchase and sale, has the words “INST. #189. TINY ISLAND. 2.1 AC.” written on that portion of the Plan on which the island itself is located. Mr. Bailey confirmed on cross-examination that this is the only document that he had seen prior to closing that described the lands being purchased. Mr. Bailey testified that his lawyer did not recommend that they obtain an updated survey. The original Cavana Plan was given to Mr. Bailey by Ms. Rideout on the date of closing.
 Mr. Bailey described that he went back to the island three times after the offer was submitted but before the transaction closed. On the first occasion he took a copy of the Cavana Plan that Marguerite Rideout had given to him, and found that it was impossible to decide where the property started and stopped. The second time he took his children to show them the property, and the third time he went to measure the main cabin to do a design layout for the renovations. He does not recall crossing through water to reach the island on any of those occasions. On cross-examination he indicated that he never got his feet wet, as there was enough sand and rocks to step on to avoid any water.
 Mr. Bailey was cross examined with respect to his testimony in a prior proceeding with respect to evidence given of water levels at the time that they first viewed the cottage. The transcript reads as follows:
Q. … Now, our information is that this aerial photograph was taken in May of 1988, and that there was, according to this photograph, water in the channel between the mainland and island. Does that accord with your recollection?
A. It could well be. The only, the only thing is when you say water in the channel, does that mean, do you know what depth that water is? Because water in the channel was there when I was there but it was only an inch or so, so the sand was quite high, just under the surface of the water.
Q. But you had to get your feet wet in order to get to the island.
A. When we first viewed it we did, yes.
Q. And in 1988?
A. No, because I think somebody had put a plank across and you could just walk across.
Q. So other than if you hadn't, if the plank hadn't been there you would have had to have gotten your feet wet.
A. You would have had to jump from rock to rock, yeah.
Q. And if you hadn't jumped from rock to rock you would have gotten your feet wet?
 Mr. Bailey confirmed that these answers were truthful when given, although clarified that he had never seen the property prior to 1998, and that any suggestion in the prior proceeding that he had done so is as a result of him being not good with dates.
 Mr. Bailey was asked on cross-examination whether he took any photographs on the six occasions that he saw the property before closing, and he confirmed that he did not.
 He confirmed that they purchased an Izusu Trooper in 1988 for the purpose of driving to the island. Photographs entered into evidence show both that vehicle and subsequent vehicles owned by the Baileys parked close to the stairs leading to the cottage, on what they described as the Part 1 lands. Mr. Bailey identified these photographs as being taken by him from 1989 onward.
 He recalls seeing the statutory declarations and declarations of possession that were prepared in 1988 at the time of closing, and was satisfied with their contents. He was unable to say why the statutory declaration of Nancy Rice that was sworn on October 10, 1991 was provided, but, like Mrs. Bailey, confirmed that he was not aware of any challenge to the access in 1991.
 Mr. Bailey described the same recreational use of the property by the family in the years after its acquisition. Because Mr. Bailey was operating a business in Toronto, he was typically there on weekends and for two weeks during the summer. During the first winter, when the main cottage was being extensively renovated, he came up every weekend to make sure that the contractors were doing their jobs. He hired an individual to plough the snow, who cleared it from the end of the 14th concession, beside Nancy Rice's property, and down the yellow roadway right to the steps going up to the cottage.
 With respect to the photographs showing the heavy equipment[xxiii], Mr. Bailey confirmed that they show the work being done on the roadway and the property in 1993. He was not present when the work was being performed. He stated that he could not recall driving through water in that time period. In response to Mr. Streisfield’s questioning, he indicated that the nature of this property is that "one day you're driving through water, the next day, sand". He confirmed that he has driven through water many times since buying his first four-by-four vehicle.
 Mr. Bailey described the same extensive renovations to the lower cabin and main cottage that were described by Mrs. Bailey, and estimated the cost of the improvements to be between $500,000 and $600,000. During this time no one objected to the work that was being done or the fact that contractors were driving on the roadway across the beach to the cottage, including the large flatbed to deliver the new transformer. Mr. Bailey also described the work done to the roadway requiring the Ministry permits in 1992 and 1993, confirming that fill and clean rocks were placed on the lower part of Part 2.
 Mr. Bailey estimated that Mr. Barbour's house is between 1,000 to 1,200 feet away from the main cottage on the island.
 Mr. Bailey's evidence was that it was an unwritten rule that anyone could walk across the beach. However from time to time they had to ask people to leave, and he described that Mrs. Bailey became polished about asking them to move on, particularly if it was a larger group. Fencing the land was never a consideration for him.
 He described the use made of Part 2: driving over it; walking over it; bike riding on it; windsurfing from it; skating on it; making campfires on it; swimming from it. The family came up every year for Christmas, and made use of it on weekends throughout the winter.
 Mr. Bailey observed Mr. Barbour using Part 2 on only one occasion, when he brought over his deck chair and umbrella to north beach and the two of them had a verbal altercation. He believed that this occurred after the Boundaries Act decision. He testified that any other time, Mr. Barbour used the waterfront on the south beach in front of his own residence. He observed Mr. Barbour doing this in the first 10 to 15 years after they purchased Tiny Island, but as he aged, he was not seen to go out as often. He testified that Mr. Barbour had his water pipeline to the Bay drawn from the south beach, to the south east of Part 2.
 Mr. Bailey confirmed that prior to receiving Mr. Barbour's letter in 1995, they had never received a complaint from him about being on Part 2. The weekend before the letter was posted, the Baileys had socialized with him under Mr. Barbour's white canopy, and he had not mentioned the topic. The day after they found the letter, Mr. Barbour responded to Mrs. Bailey's late-night telephone call by coming over in the morning, but he did not have a survey with him and left quickly, explaining that he could not discuss the matter at the time because he had a golf game scheduled.
 Mr. Bailey testified that nothing occurred after the exchange of correspondence in 1996, until Mr. Bailey wrote a letter to Mr. Barbour on July 31, 2000. He testified that he did so because he and Mrs. Bailey did not like the fact that the dispute was unresolved. Nothing changed in their use of the property between 1996 and 2000. He testified that nothing has changed about any of their use between the time of acquisition and the time of trial, although on one occasion after the first trial they did not follow the road on Part 2. However, they still had to cross Part 2 closer to the water to access the cottage.
 On cross-examination, he indicated that it was not possible to drive along the water's edge to the island from Part 3, as it is all rocky shore to the north of the island. The safest route is to across the Part 2 lands, and he feels the road is needed for emergencies.
 Mr. Bailey also described fluctuating water levels. He noted one incident in particular where he watched the water level drop one and a half feet in one minute. It was his understanding that this was due to wind conditions. He has also seen the water "come in" very quickly. He believes that storms have a big effect, but finds that wind seems to be the number one factor in altering the water level. He has seen it rise and fall within an hour to an hour and a half. His testimony was that there was never an occasion that they have not been able to access the island because of the height of the water. He has never seen all of Part 2 under water, testifying that there was always land visible on the east side of Part 2.
 He stated that the beach area is now much bigger than it was in 1988.
 Like Mrs. Bailey, he confirmed that they would not have bought the property if they could not drive to the island.
 Natasha Bailey is Stephen and Angela’s daughter, now 29 years old, and therefore was 4 years of age when the island was purchased in 1988. She has been going to the cottage continuously since she was 5 years old.
 Like her father, Natasha is a graphic designer, and was involved in the creation of Exhibit 6. She confirmed that no lines were altered and nothing distorted when the images were superimposed.
 She also testified that her family drove to the island along the yellow roadway shown in Exhibit 6, and that the only time that they did not was when snow made it impassable. She spent every summer there from June to August while she was growing up, and the family went up every weekend, including during winters.
 Natasha described that the activities of she and her siblings took them all over Part 2 and beyond, to the forest and as far south as a large rock referred to as “Gull rock”. She was close to Nancy Rice and her two granddaughters, and the activities of the three girls were carried out on Part 2, and Natasha walked or rode her bike to go between the Bailey and the Rice cottages.
 Natasha has observed changes in the water level of the Bay, testifying that there can be noticeable changes depending on the weather. When there are storms, typically a surge occurs and water is sucked out of the Bay. She recalled finding it novel to run out on the sandy area that was usually covered with water. When a storm would be coming inland, she would notice a surge with heavy winds and waves and the water level would rise noticeably. She described this change is being perceptible over a matter of hours. Natasha indicated that the waves could push the water as far as the dune area by a tree that sits on the east side of Part 2.
 Natasha recounted her sister Santhos’ wedding, at which time she would have been 14 years old. She described that the guests walked or her brother Jeremy picked them up in a four-by-four that had been rented especially for the occasion, travelling along the entirety of the yellow pathway on Exhibit 6. When asked whether she recalled whether there was water between the mainland and Tiny Island when the wedding occurred, she indicated that she believed there was, but it did not prevent the guests from coming to the island.
 Natasha recalled that there was a rowboat at the property. She believed that it has been under sand now for years, and was not ever used by anyone in the family.
 She described that the shorelines are different on either side of the isthmus, with the south beach having gravelly sand on it, and a rocky beach, and the north side having a sandy beach and bottom. She learned to swim from the north beach.
 She confirmed that when members of the public try to come to the beach, her family sometimes asks them to leave to use the public beach, and she herself has asked people to move on.
 She spoke about the birdhouses, identifying them to be Mr. Barbour's, and testifying that she believed them to be positioned on the edge of his lot line. She also confirmed that she has seen a black pipe leading from Mr. Barbour's property to the water outside the southeast corner of Part 2.
 She was never asked by anyone to leave the beach, and does not recall ever seeing members of her family being asked to leave the beach. She grew up knowing that the entire beach behind Tiny Island belonged to her family.
 She recalls having seen someone paddle a canoe between the island and the mainland sometime over 10 years ago. She has never seen anyone else paddle or drive a boat between the island and the mainland since then. She testified that she has seen water higher from one year to the next, but not for a long time. She was unable to say for sure whether there was water separating the island from the mainland in more than a single year.
 With the consent of Mr. Streisfield, Heidi Lauridsen gave her evidence remotely from New Hampshire via Skype.
 Heidi Lauridsen is the daughter of Nancy Rice and the niece of Betty Van Aller. Her grandfather was Dr. Kynoch, who rented and then purchased Tiny Island from the Brunelles. Ms. Lauridsen was born in 1950 and spent her entire summers on Tiny Island until the time that she turned 16. Thereafter she was unable to spend the whole summer, but would come for a week or more from 1966 onward. After her mother built her own cottage on Lot 9 in 1969, she spent her time at her mother's cottage.
 When asked how she would get to the island before her mother's cottage was built, she indicated that most of the time they walked. If they had a load of items, which they often did when they first arrived, they would drive over in her mother's Jeep Wagoneer, which she purchased in the mid-60s specifically for the purpose of being able to drive to the island. When they walked, they would park in the woods behind where the Rice cottage is now, and would travel down the private beach road, across the beach in front of that cottage and over to the island. When they drove, they would drive up as close as they could get to the base of the island; it was only a short walk to the steps of the island once they parked the car. Ms. Lauridsen confirmed that the route travelled was the same yellow roadway shown on Exhibit 6 that has been identified by the Baileys. On cross-examination she indicated that the driving was done on a path that had been used for quite some time, and did not necessarily occur next to the water's edge.
 When asked whether there was ever water that prevented her from getting to the island, she indicated that on occasion there was water that impacted their travel. On those occasions they would wade or walk through the water. In explaining the situation, she stated:
A. I think probably my mother was not, was somewhat worried that we might get stuck and just didn't want to risk it, even though it may not have been something that she should have worried about, she probably did worry about it.
 She has never heard of any objections from Mr. Barbour or anyone else about the route travelled to the island.
 She recalled that there was one occasion, which she thought might have been around 1985, when it was simply impossible to get to the island because of the height of the water. On cross-examination she was unable to recall whether there was water separating the island from the mainland in August 1988.
 Ms. Lauridsen has also observed fluctuations in the water level such as in 1985 when the water was high, and she has seen it recede to points where it is now, which she described as being quite far out. She does not remember either of those conditions lasting a long time.
 Ms. Lauridsen had the opportunity to observe other family members carrying out activities in and around the island. She described that they would generally swim, sail and fish, and just enjoy the environment, typically down at the bottom of the stairs at the island, and "on the beach there in the front". When asked whether they used any other areas around Tiny Island, her response was "no".
 A statutory declaration sworn by Ms. Lauridsen on March 6, 2008, the contents of which she confirmed to be true, contains the following information: she recalls her aunt, Rebecca Van Aller, having ownership of a four-wheel-drive vehicle, such as an International Harvester Scout, which she used to reach Tiny Island from the mainland over the years from the early 1960s until the 1980s; sometimes her aunt would drive her vehicle to Tiny Island and leave the vehicle there for short periods before returning it to the mainland and parking in the woods behind her mother's property; her mother, Nancy Rice, also owned a number of Jeep Cherokees or Wagoneers, four-wheel-drive vehicles purchased specifically so that she would be able to drive them to Tiny Island when she and her family visited her aunt and grandparents on Tiny Island; delivery people, service people and other visitors or guests of her aunt and her grandparents would also use vehicles to reach Tiny Island from the mainland by driving along the beach out to Tiny Island; she does not recall anyone objecting to or raising an obstruction for such vehicular traffic reaching Tiny Island during the years 1950 to the 1980s.
 On cross-examination Ms. Lauridsen indicated that by 1985 her aunt would get to the island by walking down to the beach as far as she could go, and that she put her belongings in a small boat and walked them over to the island, pulling rather than rowing the boat.
 As between herself and her cousin, Chris Van Aller, she stated that he spent more time at the island than she did.
Christopher Van Aller
 With the consent of Mr. Streisfield, Christopher Van Aller gave his evidence remotely from South Carolina via Skype.
 Dr. Van Aller is the son of Betty Van Aller, and was born in 1956. He confirmed that his mother inherited the island from her father, Dr. Kynoch, and that she vacationed there basically most of her adult life. He also swore a declaration dated March 6, 2008, and confirmed that the statements made in the declaration remain true. In that declaration he stated: he would travel with his parents on a regular basis to Tiny Island during the summertime; they used different devices to carry groceries from the car in the woods out to the island, but from 1966, which is when his mother bought an International Scout, his parents would drive right out to Tiny Island and park there; this was the first of three Scouts that the family bought for this purpose; when his family lived in Toronto and Barrie, they would also visit the island in the fall and in the spring, parking on the island during their time there; that the water goes up and down in Georgian Bay; his mother was somewhat timid and avoided driving the Scout through the water which, at most, was relatively shallow between the island and the mainland; whenever the isthmus was clear of water, she would drive the vehicle over; and that the Scout as well as other vehicles like trucks were used to bring heavy appliances out to Tiny Island, including the kitchen refrigerator.
 Dr. Van Aller testified that he, his sister and his mother would live at the cottage every summer for the months of July and August. They engaged in beach activities such as sailing, being on the beach, water skiing, and reading, which they would do on the island as well as on the adjoining shore. He explained that for most of his youth the island was connected to the shore by a sand isthmus, and that isthmus was very much a part of their fun. He indicated from the time that he was a small child until university level, a period of almost 20 years, he remembers the isthmus being visible. After Dr. Van Aller went to university and graduate school in the 70s and 80s, he went to the island for periods of two weeks to a month at a time during the summer. His mother and sister Lisa basically lived at the island every summer until it was sold.
 He indicated that they drove their vehicle on the beach to deliver items such as groceries because it is about a 300 yard walk from where they would park their vehicles to the cottage kitchen. His first recollection of driving to the island was about 1966, because that was when his mother bought her International Scout. He recalls very distinctly the occasion where his mother went to the dealership and said that she was buying the Scout to drive to her island.
 In describing the route of the travel that would be taken, he indicated that one would travel on the Woods Road to the back of his aunt's cottage, and then, if one had a four-wheel-drive, would continue down that road onto the beach, crossing in front of the Rice cottage, crossing the isthmus and parking on the island. They would park their vehicle as close as they could to the bottom of the stairs leading up to the cottage. They would travel this route to get to the island about once every other day. He indicated that because his father was absent, it was important to his mother to have the International Scout to bring things across because she was the only adult to do that chore.
 After the purchase of the Scout in 1966, Dr. Van Aller's evidence was that it was not necessary to drive through water to reach the island. He indicated that all through the 1960s and early 70s he recalled playing constantly on the "big" isthmus, and that it was not until sometime in the 1970s that water covered the isthmus. He indicated that when it was above water, the isthmus was a low-lying, sandy piece of land on which one could not drive a regular car without getting stuck. With the Great Lakes going up and down, sometimes the isthmus would even get washed away in storms, but it would always re-form when the Bay was low. He estimated that the isthmus disappeared in about 1974 when the water became quite high, and then remained under water until the mid-1980s when he believes that it formed again. When the water was high he built a dock off the lower cabin, which he estimated occurred in 1976 or so.
 Water levels would change on an hour-to-hour or day-to-day basis as a result of a big storm. He indicated that it was not a question of the water level changing, but sometimes a big storm would push the waves right through the isthmus. It would always re-form as long as the water was low enough.
 His family continued to go to the cottage during the periods of high water, through a combination of both the Scout or boat. They would drive their Scout or one of his aunt’s vehicles down the beach to a boat, which they kept for that purpose, and would unload groceries and supplies and bring the boat over to the island. They would row it or pull it, even through the deepest water. The water never went over about 5 feet. They would come diagonally from his aunt’s cottage, and avoiding the rocks on the shoreline and isthmus, would bring the boat into a sandy area right in front of the lower cabin on the island. He testified that his family was famous for going to the island in all kinds of weather, and after his mother moved to Canada full-time in 1986, they sometimes went to the island in the wintertime as well as summer. They never took a boat from anywhere else to reach the island, such as a marina or any other location.
 Once the water receded in the mid-1980s they again used the Scout to access the island. He testified that by then his mother's health was not very good and she was a little more timid about driving on the beach. However, other family members continued to drive on the beach, and anyone with a four-wheel-drive vehicle would use the route on the beach.
 Dr. Van Aller was never aware of any objection to the route being travelled the way that he described.
 Dr. Van Aller recalled that Mr. Barbour would also walk around the isthmus. He recalled seeing canoeists go between the island and the mainland when the water was high. He also recalled seeing someone drive a motor boat between the island and the mainland on a couple of occasions when the water was really high. He believes that he saw someone water-ski between the island and the mainland once.
 He also saw Mr. Barbour swimming from the isthmus and testified that he swam either on “his" side of the isthmus or “our" side of the isthmus. To the best of his knowledge no one asked Mr. Barbour not to access the water from either of those locations.
 Mr. Maurice has resided in Tiny Township for 50 years, and was born in 1951. He is not related to any member of the Bailey family, and has no particular interest in this proceeding. Although he has been paid by the Baileys to provide snow removal services to the island, this happened on only four occasions, approximately three years ago.
 Mr. Maurice was familiar with the area of Tiny Island before meeting the Baileys. He testified that his father owned property by Concession 14, and his uncle owned another nearby parcel. Mr. Maurice’s father and uncle operated a sawmill in the area. During the summers he went swimming and had picnics with his family in the area of Tiny Island. He testified that they would park on the beach in the area of Part 6, and play on Part 2, and would swim up to the island. He believes that these activities were carried on primarily throughout the 1960s.
 When Mr. Maurice performed the snow removal for the Baileys, he indicated that he was already familiar with the roadway across the beach. He was able to identify that route by pointing along the yellow roadway on Exhibit 6. He has also performed work on that road, by taking away a foot of sand in the area of the beach.
 He had been on Tiny Island when it was owned by the Kynochs, and saw them drive their jeep to the island. He could not recall what year this occurred, but stated that he was there very often in the 60s and recalls seeing Mrs. Kynoch drive through water to get to the island at that time. His testimony was that they travelled along the same route that he had indicated as the yellow roadway on Exhibit 6. His brothers used to deliver firewood to the island, driving it there. He also observed guests of the Kynochs parking at the island end of the roadway. He testified that he always assumed that the owners of the island could drive there.
 It was his evidence that the water was higher in the 60s and 70s than it is now. He testified that he has seen the water levels rise and fall, and that Tiny Island used to be an island, but it has been connected to the mainland for the past 20 years. It was his observation that the water level goes up and down. He recalled that at one time when the water level was high, there was water between the beach and the island, and the Kynochs waded through the water during that time. Under cross-examination he drew a line in red on Exhibit 6 where he observed that the water level would be when the water was high. The red line drawn by him does not extend as high as the tree line or come anywhere near to indicating that the water would have inundated all of Part 2. He testified that he had no occasion to go Tiny Island from the mid-70s onward.
Nancy Ann Rice
 Nancy Rice is now deceased; portions of her transcript from the Boundaries Act hearing were read in as evidence at this trial. During that proceeding she confirmed that her declarations sworn on December 1, 1988 and October 10, 1991 were accurate and true. She testified that she had been going to Tiny Island since 1935, when she was 10 years of age, her parents first renting seasonally and then acquiring the land. She was there every summer from that point on. When her father bought the island in 1942, it was her understanding that that comprised everything but the Brunelle’s fishing cabin, and a right-of-way for them to drive over to reach their cabin. The Kynoch family accessed the island by parking in the woods behind a little gate, and then walking along the beach, carrying their belongings with them. In getting to the island in 1935 for the first time that summer, they did not walk through water to reach the island, but just along the beach. In 1942, when she was 17 years old and her father bought the property, there was no water between the island and the mainland. Between 1935 and 1942 the Brunelle brothers continued to come to the island a couple of times a week to fish, and accessed the island across the beach. She also testified that in that seven year period from 1935 to 1942, the neighbouring farmer Joe Mayo came across the beach in a wagon with his horse to deliver milk.
 After her marriage in 1949, Mrs. Rice moved to Massachusetts and came back to the island for a month in the summer, up until 1958. Within the period of 1949 to 1958, she recalled that water separated the island from the mainland on only one occasion, lasting for a few years. During that period, she indicated that the water was very shallow and they waded across, or rowed over in a rowboat or canoe. On cross-examination she explained that after 1976, she began to stay at her cottage, which she built in 1969, for between two to five months each summer. During the entirety of the time that she had been coming up to the area, she could recall seeing Tiny Island fully surrounded by water only twice. During those periods, occasionally she would see a rowboat or a sailboat go through the space between the island and the mainland.
 During her testimony she confirmed that after World War II ended she and her sister began getting four-wheel-drive vehicles, so by the early 50s they drove across the beach and left the vehicle near the lower cabin on the island. Sometimes they would unload their vehicle and return to park in the woods. Mr. Barbour did not raise any objection to them driving to the island.
 Mrs. Rice testified that the affidavit sworn on December 1, 1988 was prepared for the purpose of the sale of the island to Angelina Bailey, and because she would need to have a right-of-way across the Cut to get to the beach, just as Mrs. Rice had provided access to her sister Betty following their father’s death.
 In accordance with the order of January 17, 2013, the evidence of Neil Lackie was adopted as being that of his prior testimony given in the Land Titles Act hearing. He testified on March 20, 2008.
 Neil Lackie described himself as Mr. Barbour’s friend. Mr. Lackie was born in 1944 and spent all of the summers of his childhood at his family’s cottage, which was located to the south of Charlene Lowe’s property, part of the Pennorth subdivision. At age 16 he obtained a summer job, so spent less time there than he had previously, but was still there on summer weekends. During the 1950s he would be over at the island every couple of days and spent time with Mrs. Kynoch, from whom he took painting lessons, or spent time with the Kynoch’s grandchildren and their babysitters. He recalled using the Kynoch’s rowboat, and repairing and painting it for them on one occasion.
 He indicated that the Kynochs accessed the island by wading across to it, or by row boat. The Kynochs parked their vehicles in the woods and walked down to the row boat, which they would use to access the island. When walking, they would walk along the shoreline on the dry land side of the water. He also observed Betty Van Aller walking to the island. He was unaware of whether Betty Van Aller owned a vehicle.
 He testified that he spent time swimming on the north beach, where Mrs. Barbour taught him to swim, and in the sandy areas off of Part 2. At times there was a large group of young people swimming from the beach area on Part 2. They swam in that area because the water was shallower, and therefore warmer, than in the beach area in front of his cottage. He also used to canoe around the entirety of the island, and occasionally would take his little motor boat around the island. He explained that there were a lot of rocks between the island and the point in front of Mr. Barbour’s cottage, so he did not go through there very often. He once saw his brother water ski between the island and the mainland.
 He observed Mr. Barbour golfing on the beach “up on his point”, and also down in front of the Lackie cottage.
 He testified that he has seen the island separated from the mainland by water. He believed this was in the 1950s, because that is when the Kynochs would wade over to the island. He testified that even in the ‘60s there was some water between the island and the point.
 He was not aware of anybody driving to the island in the ‘50s or ‘60s, although agreed that that could have occurred when he was not looking. He did not recall anything like a pathway leading to the steps going up to the Kynoch cottage, and testified that it was very rocky in that area. It was his evidence that the Baileys removed those rocks in order to be able to drive a vehicle in that area. The first people who he saw driving to the island were the Baileys, and he described it as being a novelty, and that the water would be up to the running boards of their truck.
 Mr. Lackie was living out of the province in the 1980s, but would return to Ontario once a month in the summer, spending those return visits at his family’s cottage.
 Mr. Lackie was referred to two photographs[xxiv], which could have been taken by him, although he was not sure. He placed them as having been taken in the 1990s, when he testified that the water was high. In the first, taken close to his cottage, he noted that sandbags had been put by his cottage to protect against the possibility of a storm washing sand away from the beach. Referring to the second photograph, which shows sandbags in a line placed against the grass line located on the mainland in front of the trees, he testified that the water never came up to the sandbags, but the action of the waves did. Another photograph[xxv], which he identified as being of the island taken from the perspective the deck of his cottage, but which he could not date, showed the island to be separated from the mainland by water. Another photograph[xxvi], identified by Mr. Lackie to have been taken in the 1990s and showing a birdhouse that he erected, was used by him to show that a rock shown to be sticking above the water in the photo, was, at the time of his testimony, wholly out of the water. Another photograph[xxvii] showed the island at sunset, which he believed to have been taken in the late 1980s because it showed his neighbours’ sailboat, which he recalled being purchased in the time period. In relation to that photo, he testified that it showed the island separated from the mainland by water. The only photograph that Mr. Lackie testified that he was certain that he took was one taken of the lower cabin on the island, which he recalls taking during the year when the water was the highest that he had ever seen[xxviii]. The photo appears to show the water coming right up to the deck of that cabin. He said the deck structure washed away when the water was rough. He did not know what year the photograph was taken, but stated that it could have been the early 1980s. Another photograph, which he identified as having again been taken from his deck, he testified as showing extremely high water, as high as he had ever seen it. The island appears to be separated by water from the mainland.
 Mr. Lackie testified that he had suggested to Dr. Kynoch the possibility of building a suspension bridge from the island, as he and his father had been involved in building one in the past at a boy scouts camp. This conversation occurred in 1959, or even earlier, and nothing came of it other than a passing reference with his father.
 It was his evidence that the amount of sand in the 50s and 60s was considerably different than the amount that was there at the time that he was testifying, as the sand has been building up over time. In the area of part 2, the gradient of sand is very gradual from the beach area. Mr. Lackie agreed on cross-examination that that feature is what made the water warm, and why big waves would develop, and why everyone would gravitate to the north beach for swimming.
 If the water dropped a foot in that area by the island, it was his evidence that the water’s edge could recede “a long way out”, which he said could be 30 to 40 feet.
 He agreed that from the 50s to the 90s all of the local residents would walk up and down the beach without any concern or challenge. Water sports that were engaged in – swimming, boating, skiing – were typical for those that shared the beach. It was in the 1990s that awareness increased of liability problems related to others walking on property, which in part he attributed to the “Rowntree Beach” decision (Ontario (Attorney General) v. Rowntree Beach Assn. (1994), 17 O.R. (3d) 174, 1994 CanLII 7228 (ON SC), 1994 CanLII 7228 (Ont. Ct. Gen. Div.) [“Rowntree Beach”]).
 Mr. Barbour did not express concern to him about either the Kynochs or the Van Allers walking along the beach to get to their island. Mr. Barbour likewise did not say anything to him about the Baileys using the beach area to get to their island.
 Ms. Lowes was the only living lay witness called by Mr. Barbour to give evidence. Ms. Lowes resides to the south of Mr. Barbour, but does not have deeded access to the water. Mr. Barbour owns the beach between her property and the water’s edge, and he allows her to use it.
 Ms. Lowes has been a cottager in the same location all of her life, beginning in 1947. This included spending July and August of every summer, and weekends throughout the remainder of the year. She explained that when the plan of subdivision was registered for Pennorth, her father severed property and built a cottage in 1973, which they used until 2002. She explained that she has now built on to that family cottage, and has lived there full-time since 2002.
 From the location of her cottage, the island is not visible because the view is obscured by trees, but she explained that there were not as many trees blocking the view, and that it was a good view, when she was a young person and teenager.
 She indicated that she “lived” on the beach as a young person and teenager, and her favourite place to swim was on the north side of the island. It was, and remains, common knowledge that that is the best place to swim. She has done that on countless occasions, and the last time that she used that area of the beach was last summer.
 Ms. Lowes knew Betty Van Aller and the Kynochs. It was her evidence that she never saw the Kynochs drive to the island, but also does not remember a lot about how the Kynochs gained access to the island. She explained that in the 1960s there was a peninsula between the island and the mainland, and after that they used a rowboat. She did not recall when Betty Van Aller inherited the island. She recalled seeing Betty walk down to the shoreline and walk along the shore, or recalled her putting things in a boat and walking along the sand bar pulling the boat behind her. She also recalled seeing Betty drive her four-wheel-drive vehicle once or twice in order to unload it, but could not recall this occurring more than one or two times. On cross-examination, she conceded that it was possible that someone drove to the island but she did not see it happen. She indicated that as a teenager she had a part-time job working 20 to 24 hours a week at a local grocery store. She also agreed on cross-examination that just because she saw Betty Van Aller drive to the island on only one or two occasions, does not mean it did not occur more frequently.
 It was her evidence that Betty Van Aller did not use the area at the end on the "tail of the whale", and she cannot recall the Kynochs using that area either.
 Ms. Lowes testified that Betty Van Aller's access was different than the Baileys', in that she went along the water's edge to the far side of the island. In contrast, the Baileys come down the same Cut, but come to the deep sand and access along what she described as "our" side of the island. It is her evidence that the roadway that now leads to the island was not there before Mrs. Bailey purchased the land. There was no sign of the travelled path from Part 6, and no visible signs of tracks when it was purchased by the Baileys. On cross-examination she agreed that those who travelled to the island would be in a better position to talk about the route they took to get there than she would be, and agreed that Betty Van Aller would still have been on Part 2 land even if walking on the water's edge. She agreed that if Betty Van Aller said that she accessed the island by vehicle and parked there, she would be in a better position to know that than herself. She agreed that there was no reason for her to think that Betty Van Aller was not telling the truth. Ms. Lowes also knows Heidi Laurisden, and confirmed that Ms. Laurisden would be in a better position to know about access than she was.
 She agreed that if the Baileys were not allowed to cross Part 2, that would be a difference compared to how she has seen people access the island over the years. On cross-examination she confirmed that it was her understanding that service vehicles travel overland to reach the island, and she confirmed that there are no marinas close by the area from which the island could be accessed by boat.
 From the location of either her childhood cottage, which was set back a couple of feet beyond her current residence, and from her present residence, she agreed that she did not have a view around the bend to the beach where the yellow roadway was said to be accessed; there is only a view of the isthmus and the island.
 She described that the Baileys have used the property as much more of a year-round residence than its former owner. The latter used it during the summer months, although Ms. Lowes stated that when Betty Van Aller lived locally, she may have been there more frequently. She confirmed that she did not know Betty Van Aller well. To the best of her knowledge it was not a road access cottage initially, but stated that the Baileys turned it into a road access cottage by bringing in dump trucks of rock. It was her evidence that they were all amazed when they saw the Baileys drive to the island because they were going through deep sand, and even when the water was deep they would drive right through the water to the island. She testified that the route shown in yellow on Exhibit 6 is through heavy deep sand that no one wants to walk in. It was her evidence that there were times when the water was coming halfway up the doors of their vehicles. She had not seen a vehicle parked at the island before the Baileys started to do so.
 It is her evidence that over the years she saw Mr. Barbour sitting on the beach and that he walked the beach two times each day, to the south. He also boated off the beach and used to golf all over the beach in front of his cottage in the 1970s and 1980s.
 She testified that all of the local property owners allowed others to walk along the beach, and the property owners would swim anywhere. Occasionally the beaches were also used by members of the public. She testified that the birdhouses and trees that Mr. Barbour planted were close to his tree line. She testified that Mr. Barbour kept his boats on the south beach, as well as a shade tent.
 Speaking to the water levels, Ms. Lowes indicated that Tiny Island was completely an island up until sometime in the mid-60s, and then the isthmus filled in. She has never seen as much sand in the location of the isthmus as now exists. She indicated that she took a Hobicat sailboat between the island and the mainland in around 1981 or 1982. She believes that 1987 or 1988 was the highest water level. She recalled that it was very windy for a whole weekend and watched the waves go halfway up the lower cabin on the island, which had a deck on it, and the deck came off as a result of that storm. She also recalled periods of high water that did not involve the storm event. It was her evidence that most of the time the water has been higher than it is now. As a result of looking at a photograph which she was able to identify as depicting a boat bought by her family in 1984, it was her testimony that in 1984 the island was an island in fact. It was her evidence that when the water is high, no rocks can be seen in the water between the island and the mainland. Sandbags had been placed in front of Mr. Barbour's residence in the late 1980s when the water was very high. She agreed that she has seen the water fluctuate, and that one of the pictures shown to her revealed the water as being abnormally high. She observed that situations like that would not last long. When water levels were high, Tiny Island was still used by the occupants.
 She and Mr. Barbour are both members of the Pennorth Beach Association, and she has always been on the board of directors. She is familiar withRowntree Beach, and confirmed that it was a "hot topic" for property owners in Tiny Township. It was her understanding that Rowntree Beachconfirmed that property owners own to the water's edge. She and Mr. Barbour discussed the decision, and were pleased because it meant that their beaches could be private. After that decision was published, she testified that some people started deterring the general public off their beaches. It was her evidence that she only saw the Baileys move members of the public from using of Part 2 after the dispute began with Mr. Barbour, and she only noticed them put chairs on the beach after the dispute started. Ms. Lowes confirmed that Mr. Barbour would have had a view of the island from his property. She testified that she had understood that the Baileys had renovated, and she saw the trucks coming and going. She understands that they have invested a lot of money into their property.
 Ms. Lowes attended Santhos Bailey’s wedding and was aware that their guests parked in the woods, and guests were forayed across the beach to the island in four-wheel-drive vehicles.
 Mr. Barbour told her that he was concerned that the Baileys were crossing his land, but did not say when such a concern was voiced to her.
 Gerald Barbour did not testify in this proceeding, although was present in the courtroom every day of the trial. Before the court was informed that he would not be testifying, his counsel was invited to alert the court to any accommodation that might assist in making him more comfortable during his testimony, given that he was using a walker and appeared to have some difficulty with mobility. No impediments to him testifying were brought to the court’s attention at that time, and therefore I infer that it was by choice, rather than circumstance, that he did not testify.
 The limited evidence provided by him was contained in the parties’ Agreed Statement of Facts.[xxix] There is no evidence from him with respect to his understanding of the extent of the lands owned by him at any point in time, his use of the lands in question, or his knowledge of the use made by the Baileys or their invitees of the Part 2 lands, or by their predecessors in title.
 Mr. Barbour is now 96 years old. After he was demobilized from the Canadian Navy after the Second World War, he began to look to purchase a “little piece of Canada”. Through word of mouth he learned that Peter Addison was prepared to sell him the southernmost lot of the family subdivision, being Lot 10. He confirmed with the vendor’s wife, Ottelyn Addison, that the westerly limit of the property was the water’s edge of Nottawasaga Bay. He has always understood this to be the case and denies that it was something that came to his attention as a result of Rowntree Beach, which is located a concession south of his property. Although he paid $1,200 for the purchase in 1949, his deed was not registered until the mid-1950s when he and his wife were divorcing. The registered deed confirms Mr. Barbour’s title to the water’s edge.
 At the time of his testimony in the first trial, Mr. Hiley had been commissioned as an Ontario Land Surveyor for 31 years. Since 1979 he has been involved in completing boundary surveys in the Muskoka area, topographical surveys and water boundaries on the inland lakes. The bulk of his work involves surveying seasonal residential properties, carrying on business from a firm located in Bracebridge, Ontario.
 He was qualified to give opinion evidence on surveys, boundaries, and the scope of work done by land surveyors. As earlier indicated, Mr. Hiley has authored the Hiley Plan in support of Mrs. Bailey’s application for absolute title to Part 2, together with a survey report.[xxx]
 Mr. Hiley reviewed all of the conveyances beginning with the 1911 conveyance to Carriveau, and came to the opinion that, by the time of the 1961 conveyance from Alderic Brunelle to Dr. Kynoch, the land mass entity being transferred was all of the lands shown in heavy outline on the Cavana Plan.[xxxi] This is referred to as Tiny Island on the Cavana Plan, and referenced an area of 2.1 acres. Rebecca Van Aller then received “all of an island in front of Lot 21 Concession 13 known as Tiny Island”. This, along with the two rights-of-way, being Parts 6 and 9 on the Hiley Plan, was exactly what was transferred to Angelina Bailey. All of these deeds were registered in the registry office.
 It was his view that when McMullen prepared his subdivision plan, he surveyed lot 10, not to the water’s edge, but to a feature such as the bottom of the bank. He was able to conclude such by relating some of the measurements on the McMullen survey to measurements on other survey plans, such as the Nicholson survey. It was his opinion that in surveying Tiny Island in 1942, Cavana was surveying to the high water mark, and that Cavana’s easterly boundary of the island on the mainland portion corresponded to what he believed to be the high water mark identified by McMullen, which marked the westerly limit of the subdivision lots. Mr. Hiley suggested that Cavana surveyed a portion of the “tail of the whale” along a line that could be identified by a change in the character of the sand, presumed to be created by the action of the water. Ultimately, Mr. Hiley opined that “based on what we see today at the property, it appears that Cavana used what he considered to be the legislated “high water mark” for the boundary of Lot 10 and generally illustrated the same; however, “we can only surmise that his rear limit of the tail of the whale was set using some change in elevation evident at the time, which allowed him to enclose the approximate acreage to which Brunelle likely felt that he was entitled”. The acreage referred to was the 2.0 acres referred to in the Crown patent.
 On cross-examination he agreed that Mr. Cavana was inconsistent in his application of high water mark, and that his survey was confusing. Later in cross-examination he qualified this by stating that the Cavana Plan does not make sense based upon the conditions that he saw in 2004 when he was on location. On re-examination it was clarified that he felt it was not unusual in the situation where the island is joined topographically with a dry isthmus to have two high water marks.
 On cross-examination he agreed that at the time of the 1913 patent, Tiny Island was surrounded by water and its boundaries likely were the edge of the water. Similarly, at that time the boundary of the mainland parcel was the water’s edge. The Cavana Plan altered that boundary, bearing in mind that he was operating under a different legislative definition of boundary prescribed by the Bed of Navigable Waters Act. He agreed that he had no information from the survey notes or other documentation confirming that Cavana knew what legislation he had to apply, but his assumption was that, as a surveyor, Cavana would apply the legislation then in force.
 Mr. Hiley was referred to Mr. Barbour’s deed, where the description of his lands begins and ends at the water’s edge. The same was true for Addison’s 1917 deed that created parcel 10.
 He maintained that McMullen was not measuring to the water’s edge, but to the bottom of the bank, although he agreed that this was speculation. He agreed that the highest priority must be given to the natural boundary of the water’s edge, and with water’s edge fluctuating, the size and area of Mr. Barbour’s property would change.
 His evidence was that he believed that Cavana placed two stakes in the ground at the time of his work. One is shown on the Cavana survey as being at the northerly tip of the whale’s tale, and the second stake is at a midpoint across the fluke of the whale’s tale,[xxxii] based upon the figures on the plan which designate a survey post. He did not locate any posts in those locations during his own work.
 He referred to the fact that the description on Mr. Barbour’s deed, showing acreage of “one acre and 155/1000ths of an acre” was consistent with the McMullen survey plan. In the BA Plan prepared by Mr. Stewart, Mr. Barbour’s land is shown on the plan to be a total of 3.6 acres. The historical area of the parcels, until Mr. Stewart’s survey, has always documented the Bailey lands as twice the size of Mr. Barbour’s property. In his survey, Mr. Hiley’s measurements of the Part 2 lands, together with the acreage of Part 1, total 3.39 acres. He noted that Mrs. Bailey’s MPAC notice bases her taxes on 4.0 acres, whereas Mr. Barbour’s MPAC notice refers to an area of 1.15 acres.
 In his report Mr. Hiley referred to seven aerial photographs, which he found to assist in showing evidence of historical facts and change over time. He found it important to do so in this case because his background reading led him to an understanding that the local cottagers considered the Tiny Township beaches to be “dynamic beaches”. He agreed on cross-examination that the aerial photographs of May 1988 and June 1989 showed Tiny Island as an island in fact.
 He gave evidence about reviewing the historical water level data with a view to determining the number of years that water covered the isthmus, based on his theoretical calculations, between the years 1918 to 2001. He stated that he could not necessarily rely on the accuracy of those conclusions, however, because of the annual changing nature of the beach. Taken through the documentary evidence, he identified instances where it appeared that the island was an island in fact, including 7 aerial photographs and a shore damage survey from 1973. When asked to consider the evidence that he had seen as a whole, including the photographs shown to him [xxxiii], he agreed that there was no ten-year period where, at some point, there was not water between the island and the mainland “whether it be for five minutes or whatever”. Accordingly, he agreed that there was not a ten year period in which Mr. Barbour owned all of the Part 2 lands, as when under water Part 2 was owned by the Crown.
 On re-examination, he made clear that in respect of the photographs shown to him, while they appeared to show water between the island and the mainland, he could not say for certain. Nor could he say that the water shown in some of the pictures was not from wave action.
 When he visited the beach to prepare his survey, he was able to see an evident wheel track. It was his evidence that tracks could probably be blown over because of the light sand, but the terrain flows naturally such that the next person would take more or less the same route to get to the island. He did not overlay the yellow roadway shown on the Cavana survey onto his plan, but anticipated that the driveway is in much the same position. He agreed that there was no reference to a roadway on the Erwin survey, or in Mr. Cavana’s field notes.
 He agreed that the 1942 deed describes the right-of-way in such a way that it was known that the passage would be inaccessible at points in time by reason of water.
 He agreed that the additional areas shown on his plan that lie outside the tail from what is shown on the Cavana survey have come into existence through accretion.
 Mr. Stanton is an Ontario Land Surveyor, and a Canada Land Surveyor, who prepared a survey report dated September 20, 2010. He was commissioned as an Ontario Land Surveyor in 1984, having had 8 years of summer work in the field prior to that, and has worked with the firm of Dearden & Stanton in Orillia since 1984. His experience in matters of surveying is extensive, and he has been involved in doing surveys forBoundaries Act and Land Titles Act hearings. He has also appeared as an expert before a court on 15 to 20 occasions, including other proceedings involving waterfront property boundaries in Tiny Township. He estimated that 10 to 20% of his work is along waterfront of the Great Lakes.
 He was qualified at the first trial to give expert testimony on surveys, boundaries and what the survey plans depict.
 Dearden & Stanton Limited has been the custodian of the field notes of Mr. Cavana.
 Mr. Stanton was not involved in the two tribunal decisions. He was retained by Mrs. Bailey prior to the first trial to provide an opinion on Cavana’s survey work, and specifically what Mr. Cavana was tying in as he carried out his field work, and his usual practices.
 As part of his methodology, Mr. Stanton looked though the plans and field notes of Mr. Cavana and all the other surveyors that his firm carries the notes and records for, in relation to the properties involved. He attended on the site to see what it looked like, and compared it to the survey plans and records that he had. He had the plans that were prepared by McMullen, Nicholson and Hiley as well.
 Mr. Stanton gave evidence of Mr. Cavana’s methodology, which was to do initial work in the field, draft that on to the vellum, take a paper copy of that, and then go out to the site with that paper as a working copy, make further notes on that copy, then go back to the office and update the vellum. So at the end of the day there may be only one vellum, but there may be two or three paper prints that he marked up and kept in the file, which Mr. Stanton considered to be part of Cavana’s field notes.
 Referencing Cavana’s field notes, Mr. Stanton testified that Cavana conducted a registry office search. He noted that the field notes referenced instrument #189, being the Indian Land Sale Grant. The island was initially part of Lot 21, so was not considered an island in fact with respect to its registered entity at the registry office. The grant refers to it as composed of Tiny Island situate to the south of the peninsula in the southerly part of Lot 21, Concession 13, in the Township of Tiny.
 Cavana’s survey was the first survey of the island, other than the original survey of the Township. He testified that McMullen did not survey Tiny Island, because there is no information on the plan suggesting that he did surveying work, such as bearings and distances.
 It was his opinion that Cavana first attended the site sometime before November 19, 1942, as his first draft is signed on that date. He then went back to the location on November 21, 1942, and his final version of the plan was prepared from that field trip. Mr. Stanton noted that Cavana made notes on his first version about the position of the road right-of-way, which he adjusted on the final version. On cross-examination he agreed that there was no remark about the roadway in his field notes from Cavana’s first attendance. Cavana also indicated on the working copy that he planted a survey monument, which was an iron post. Mr. Stanton was of the view that Cavana’s recording of the roadway was his effort to tie in something that already existed, as opposed to laying out something that was proposed. It was his belief that it would make no sense for Cavana to attempt to tie in something that was not visible. The final Cavana Plan is a result then, of more than one trip to the field, with modifications being made in the recording of features that he identified as a result of his measurements and record-taking.
 In total, Cavana set seven monuments on the subject land in 1942. The round black dots on the Cavana Plan indicate monuments: there are two at the “nose” and “chin” of the whale; two by the cabin; one in the middle, east of the narrowest point of the whale’s tail; one at the north-most point of the whale’s tail; and one that appears to be exactly in the middle of the tail at the very east side. Cavana was not consistent in labelling his monuments, sometimes not doing it at all, so it is not known whether he used a wooden or iron post. However, he testified that it is a fact that the post he planted in the middle of the whale’s tail was an iron post, even though it does not say “IP” on the plan. On cross-examination, he confirmed that even though the field notes refer to only three of the seven monuments, that was not unusual in those days, and the fact that they were shown on the final survey was enough to satisfy Mr. Stanton that they had been placed, together with the fact that some were located by Mr. O’Dale and Mr. Nicholson.
 Mr. Stanton was aware that the Cavana survey was being prepared as part of the sale of the island to Dr. Kynoch in 1943, save the portion retained by the Brunelles. It is his opinion that Mr. Cavana wrote the legal description appearing on that deed, which was common practice for Mr. Cavana, and is supported by a notation made on his working copy of the plan. Barely visible on the plan, but still discernible, is the red outline placed by Cavana to delineate that portion of the lands that were retained by the Brunelles at the time of the transfer. The entity that he was surveying was the registered description for the property at the time, as found on instrument #189, being a peninsula of land in Lot 21 and its lands above the high water mark, being the entirety of the “whale”.
 It was Mr. Stanton’s opinion that Cavana was surveying the area of the island above the high water mark. In referencing the dashed line showing the high water mark to the east of the lands being surveyed, he did not find it unusual, but rather in accordance with Cavana’s practice, to show the high water mark as the limit of the property on surveys on Georgian Bay. At the time that he was creating this survey, the high water mark was the limit between the Crown land and private ownership. However, he did testify that it was unusual to have two high water marks such as these in close proximity, and that it would take a unique circumstance for that to be the case along the shores of Georgian Bay. In cross-examination he explained that this was such a unique situation, with a peninsula sticking out from the lot and concession, and Cavana was showing the high water mark for the peninsula. His opinion is that it was rational for Cavana to show two high water marks for the topography that he may have found to exist in 1942. He testified that Mr. Cavana did a lot of work not only on the Great Lakes, but on the inland lakes and rivers, and he would have a clear understanding of high water mark and what he was surveying to. It was his testimony that Mr. Cavana was an exceptionally good surveyor, and Mr. Stanton has had reason to retrace thousands of his surveys. It was typical of him to tie the high water mark into his surveys, which he did thousands of times throughout his surveys. Mr. Stanton himself has seen situations where there are two high water marks shown on a beach, in situations similar to this, where a portion of the land is dry at low water times, and separated when there is high water or some huge storm that separates them into two pieces of property, each with a high water mark.
 It is Mr. Stanton’s opinion that the Cavana Plan is the best evidence that we have to re-establish the boundaries of Tiny Island, since Cavana was the surveyor who was there to see the topographical features as they existed in 1942. He agrees that the Boundaries Act decision is final and binding, however, with respect to what are now the boundaries of Tiny Island.
 In May, 1947 Mr. Cavana returned to survey a piece of property for Mr. Lackie. His field notes dated May 12, 1947 show the peninsula as a topographical feature. His field notes from this period also show the fence that is just up from the high water mark on McMullen’s plan, on lot 9. This feature is also shown on the Erwin survey of 1939. He agrees that the Erwin survey only shows one high water mark, and farther back toward the timberline, Erwin labelled the timber line and top of bank.
 Cavana went back again in 1957 to survey the lands outlined in red on his 1942 survey, and excepted in the deed from Brunelle to Kynoch. At that time he found his monument in the middle of the whale’s tail, and added one monument. His field note makes a notation of the water’s edge as of 1957, and underneath wrote “all Sand in 1942”. This was done in the year prior to Brunelle transferring his excepted portion of the island to Kynoch, so Mr. Stanton assumed that Cavana was retained by either Brunelle or Kynoch or both. Mr. Stanton’s opinion was that Cavana did not produce a different plan in 1957 because he must have felt that the previous one was still a correct depiction of the property, even though he had different information about the water’s edge in 1957. In all of his field notes he tied in both the water’s edge and the high water mark. Mr. Cavana had the McMullen Plan in his file, so Mr. Stanton believed that he would take that into consideration, and that he tied the high water mark from the McMullen survey, shown as a solid line running diagonally across the page along Nottawasaga Bay, to the high water mark for Tiny Island. He testified that the McMullen Plan and the Cavana Plan correlate in respect of the lot corner tie in the northeast corner of Lot 21 being shown on both, and the high water marks. Under cross-examination, he maintained his position that Cavana had knowledge of the McMullen subdivision plan, even though neither his field notes nor surveys referred to it, because a copy of it was found in the file created by Cavana. In terms of the feature that Cavana would typically use for the high water mark, Mr. Stanton testified that it could vary; sometimes it was where it changed from sand to vegetation, being grass or bush, or it could be a rise in the bank and he would tie in the top of the bank. In his field notes from 1942 he had 17 to 20 places where he had measured to and tied in the high water mark. Having been to the site, Mr. Stanton testified that there is nothing along the back of the whale’s tail today that would be discernible as what Mr. Cavana saw in 1942 as the feature showing the high water mark.
 Mr. Stanton also reviewed the plan and field notes from the 1960 O’Dale survey, which are also held in his firm’s custody. It was his opinion that O’Dale was commissioned for the purpose of showing the position of the travelled right-of-way on the lands, rather than as a full survey of all the property that Dr. Kynoch owned, based on the face of the plan. Mr. O’Dale found some of the Cavana survey posts, and specifically the one in the middle of the whale’s tail, which he found in water. This iron post was also found by Nicholson. It was his testimony that iron monuments sometimes have to be located under water, but anything over one foot below water makes it impractical. It is also his testimony that O’Dale found the iron posts planted by Cavana at the back of the whale’s tail, because he marks them on his survey even though he did not indicate in his field notes that they had been found. He believed that the O’Dale survey was commissioned to show the right-of-way as used, and was not meant to be a survey of the whole island. O’Dale showed two sections of the right-of-way, one starting by the steps on the island and running along in a sort of sweeping north-easterly direction until reaching water, and then east from the beach to the Cut. He noted that the portion of the roadway at the south end of the island is in a different spot from that found on the Cavana survey, but the portion to the north was the same. He opined that O’Dale was tying in something that was there on the ground, based on measurements in his field notes and the fact that the plan is titled ‘Showing Right-of-Way as Used”.
 Mr. Stanton agreed that Erwin and Harvey do not reference a roadway across the beach in front of the Rice property, travelling to the island. He noted that O’Dale’s survey shows it at one end and the other, being at the island and the Cut. His explanation is that the roadway is not always visible due to the season, spring run-off, wind, rain, flooding of the beach, and other natural factors. He agreed that it was likely that there were times when the road has been obliterated.
 It was Mr. Stanton’s opinion that a survey plan such as Cavana’s conveys to the landowner, by reference to survey monuments and other physical features, the extent of the property that they own. A person possessing the Cavana and O’Dale surveys would be able to orient themselves to the extent of their land through the iron monuments placed by Cavana, and by the fence shown on the Erwin survey. He had no evidence that anyone had ever seen the survey posts when they were placed, or thereafter, but it was his opinion that if someone was looking for them, they would find them.
 It was his opinion that the statutory declarations of Rebecca Van Aller and Nancy Rice were consistent with the Cavana and O’Dale surveys, and what he himself had seen at the site.
 Had an updated survey been done in 1988, it likely would have been done by one of the local surveyors who, at that time, were still surveying to the high water mark. As a result, he testified that such survey would have looked much like the Cavana survey. If Mr. Stanton had been asked to do it, he would not have been surveying to the high water mark at the time, but would have reconstructed Cavana’s survey from the measurements shown on that plan, with the end result looking much like the Hiley plan. Even if there was water between the island and the mainland, he would mark the same instrument number on both sides of the water, indicating that ownership was intact on both sides of the water.
 Mr. Stanton’s understanding is that when the property size increases with accretion that is natural, slow and imperceptible, then the area accreted is added to the legal geographic description, and a survey is not needed to validate it. Similarly when water levels go up and the size of the parcel changes, there is no need to resurvey the property.
 His testimony is that there was nothing that arose in cross-examination that would cause him to alter the opinions expressed in his report.[xxxiv]
 Mr. Stanton also gave evidence that Tiny Island was being dealt with through conveyance prior to the Indian patent.
 Mr. Brubacher is an Ontario Land Surveyor who is designated as a Geographic Information Manager. He defined that sub-specialty as involving surveyors who are conversant in managing, acquiring and analyzing spatial data. He identified the printed excerpt from the website of the Association of Ontario Land Surveyors, of which he is a member, which described Geographic Information Management as a specialized aspect of information management for geographic data involving geospatial technology. He is not a cadastral surveyor, like all of the other surveyors who testified.
 He has published in the journal created by the Association for Ontario Land Surveyors, and has been on the board of that governing body for six years, currently as past president.
 Mr. Brubacher’s expertise lies in collecting, managing and analyzing information within software systems. From 2010 to 2012, he was the senior information management specialist for a project that involved a massive amount of data pertaining to ground and surface water elevations, which involved building software to assist a team of water modellers. He has worked with data sets in the range of 250 million records. As part of his analysis, he is able to determine statistically significant outliers in the data. His formal education is not in statistics, but he has extensive experience with the variability found within large data sets. In the project where he worked with water modellers, the software that he helped to develop was tested by his peers, and he had to understand statistics to the extent that it could be embedded in the software. He testified that he does not have experience dealing with ambulatory water boundaries, but does have experience with respect to the behaviour of physical bodies of water and their shorelines.
 The purpose of his testimony was to assist the court in determining whether water level readings taken at gauges located at the Collingwood and Parry Sound water level stations in Georgian Bay are reliable predictors of water levels at Tiny Island. This evidence was needed for the purpose of helping the court to understand the evidence as it related to the inundation of Parts 1 and 2 by water from time to time, and whether changes in water level at Tiny Island can be considered slow, gradual and imperceptible.
 Mr. Brubacher was qualified by this court to provide expert testimony with respect to managing and performing calculations and analysis of geographical and spatial data as it relates to land, water topography and other physical attributes of land, including statistical sets of water level data, including their management, analysis, and evaluation. He was not permitted to provide evidence as to whether water level changes occurring or not occurring at Tiny Island may be perceptible on an individual level, as he has no particular expertise in the study of human perception or behaviour.
 Mr. Brubacher’s method was to first acquire the data regarding water levels from the two water level stations, which is maintained by the Canadian Hydrographic Service. He estimated that the stations are approximately 100 km apart and equidistant from Tiny Island, in a triangular fashion. He felt that it was important to determine whether there was a relationship between the data from the two stations. Using a software program, he was able to group the data on a daily, monthly and annual basis to determine the daily, monthly and annual minimum, maximum and average water levels, and then the standard deviation of that average.
 The results show that on an annual basis, from the years 1980 to 2012, the maximum and minimum water levels have changed only by a few centimetres in that 22 year period. 1986 is shown as the year of highest average water levels at both Collingwood and Parry Sound, and 2012 the lowest. Collingwood water levels appear to be marginally higher than Parry Sound levels, on an annual basis. On an annual basis, the standard deviation of the averaged data showed that there was no statistically significant “outlier” in either set of data. Mr. Brubacher performed a T-test analysis on the data from both stations, which is used to determine if two sets of data are significantly different from one another. The resulting percentage is an indicator of how statistically identical the data is; the higher the percentage the greater the degree of confidence that the data is comparable. In this case, the T-test performed on the annual average resulted in an 83% confidence that those averages came from identical data sets.
 The same exercise was repeated for monthly averages between the data collected from the two gauges. The result was to reveal short term volatility in the month-to-month water levels at both Collingwood and Parry Sound, which is not revealed in the annual averages. The resulting chart showed a great deal of movement in the vertical water level throughout the year when viewed on a monthly basis. In other words, the minimum and maximum water levels are such that the standard deviation found in the monthly averages is high. Not surprisingly, the T-test result showed a confidence of 49% that the minimum and maximum water levels have come from data with the same average; the average water levels at Parry Sound and Collingwood are not closely related.
 The same exercise was repeated for the daily data. The results show a significant daily variability between minimum and maximum water levels for the month of September, 2002. The T-test, with a result of .00397%, confirms that the daily minimum and maximum at these stations do not come from data with the same average. His evidence is that this shows that predicting water levels at Tiny Island is not possible by using the data from either of these two water stations.
 It is Mr. Brubacher’s testimony that these results reveal that changes in water level in Georgian Bay are not slow and imperceptible, nor able to be predicted by the recorded water levels at the two closest stations. In other words, what was occurring on a daily basis at the shoreline of Part 2 cannot be predicted from the data collected at another station.
 On cross-examination Mr. Brubacher confirmed that the highest water levels recorded between 1980 and 2012 occur in 1986, with average annual water levels appearing to be rising between 1982 and 1986. The averages then appear to drop after 1986 to 1990, and then increase to approximately 1993. In 1996/97 the average level is at its second highest in the 22 year period examined by Mr. Brubacher, and then drops thereafter, remaining low from the 1990s forward. In concrete terms, the water level after 2000 is about 2 ½ feet lower than in the 1980s. He again confirmed that because these are annual averages, they do not give an indication of what was occurring at Tiny Island in those years.
 Mr. Brubacher also plotted the daily data from Collingwood (on average the higher of the two stations) for the month of September, 2002, and the hourly data for September 10, 2002. The significance of this date is that it closely corresponds with the date of a topographical plan completed on September 9, 2002 by Mr. Nicholson, O.L.S. Mr. Brubacher plotted, using different coloured lines, the location of the minimum and maximum water levels found at Collingwood in September 2002, assuming that that data could be applied to the Tiny Island location. He testified that the plotting of the two water levels reveals a “movement in the shore” due to the slope of the beach as water rises and falls. Even at the highest level, the isthmus is shown to be revealed.
 This evidence was given to refute the opinion provided by Mr. Barbour’s expert, Mr. Stewart, O.L.S., in a report dated October 4, 2007. For the purposes of that report, Mr. Stewart used the same raw data collected by the Canadian Hydrographic Service. It was Mr. Stewart’s evidence that, using the same contour information shown on Mr. Nicholson’s survey, that Tiny Island was an island in fact almost constantly from 1991 to 1998, being separated from the mainland by a channel of water.
 Mr. Brubacher did not examine survey plans or aerial photographs because he was interested in examining vertical dimensions of water, not boundaries.
 Mr. Stewart was first contacted by Mr. Barbour in August 2001 for the purpose of requesting a survey of his property. The evidence shows that at that time, Mr. Barbour also alerted Mr. Stewart to the fact of a disagreement existing with neighbours. Mr. Barbour subsequently delivered correspondence to Mr. Stewart in which he outlined the history of his use of his property, and of his dispute with the Baileys. In a responding letter dated October 5, 2001, Mr. Stewart provided Mr. Barbour with the following opinion: “With regard to the owners of Tiny Island, I believe you are correct in saying that you have title to the beach”. Mr. Stewart’s evidence was unclear about how much investigative work he had done by that point to reach such a conclusion.
 Mr. Stewart testified at the Boundaries Act hearing for the purpose of delineating the boundary between Tiny Island and the mainland portion. As earlier indicated, Deputy Director of Titles Keat accepted Mr. Stewart’s methodology and opinion as to the location of the lowest point on the isthmus, being where the island parcel and the mainland parcel would first come into contact, and used that point of contact as the boundary between Parts 1 and 2 as now shown on the BA-Plan.
 At the Land Titles Act hearing, Mr. Stewart offered his opinion, as he does in this proceeding, that there was never a ten or twenty year period during which Part 2 was not covered with water. When covered by water, it is owned by the Crown pursuant to the Beds of Navigable Water Actand could not be subject to possession by Mrs. Bailey during those periods. Mr. Stewart prepared a report for that hearing, dated October 4, 2007, for the purpose of providing expert testimony as to what periods of time Tiny Island was separated from the mainland.
 As earlier indicted, Mr. Stewart’s opinion in that report is that Tiny Island was an island in fact “almost constantly” for the period 1991 to 1998. He reached this conclusion by using recorded water levels of Lake Huron, and determining the “maximum monthly mean” conditions for each of the eight years. What are then referred to as “annual maximum monthly means” were translated into contour lines placed on the Hiley Plan, using the contour information found in the Nicholson Plan. There is no indication that this evidence was accepted or rejected, but ultimately Deputy Director Rosenstein did not find evidence of water levels to be of great significance given the case law that she found applicable to the situation.
 A further report dated November 29, 2007 and indicated as being updated on March 1, 2011, became an exhibit at the first trial. It states that the area designated as Part 2 was completely or mostly covered by water for significant periods of time – sometimes for entire years – especially through the 1970s and 1980s, and at certain times in the 1990s. The statement is unsupported given that the rest of the statements in the report are crossed-out.[xxxv]
 Mr. Stewart prepared a further report dated January 10, 2008, indicated as being updated on March 1, 2011, which became an exhibit at the former trial. In that report he opines that the water’s edge boundaries of Mr. Barbour’s property and Tiny Island are subject to the doctrine of erosion and accretion. Accordingly, any land that was covered by water encroaching in a slow and imperceptible manner, whether by higher water levels or erosion of alluvium, belonged to the Crown and not Mr. Barbour or Mrs. Bailey.
 After the release of the Land Titles Act Decision, Mr. Stewart prepared a report dated November 12, 2010. This was a response to the Stanton report dated September 20, 2010. In that report, his penultimate conclusion is twofold: that Tiny Island was an island surrounded by water at the time of the 1913 conveyance from Brunelle to Addison, and that secondly, Tiny Island was detached or attached to the mainland as the water levels of Lake Huron rose and fell, respectively, over the years. Since neither of these are disputed facts, the report does not assist in this respect.
 His report goes on to conclude that it was unreasonable for a purchaser to rely on the 1942 Cavana Plan in completing a purchase in 1988. A new survey was required, he opines, because a) it is an important part of a real estate transaction; b) it is a well-known fact that water levels change significantly over time and so “things change on the ground over time”; and c) a purchaser would have been advised of the problems with the Cavana Plan, as were revealed in the Boundaries Act hearing. He prepared a five-page long file memo on November 22, 2010 to summarize his thoughts on why Mrs. Bailey should have obtained a new survey in 1988, entitled “ ‘Red Flags’ pointing to necessity of up-to-date-survey in 1988”.[xxxvi] On cross-examination, however, he conceded that any survey obtained in 1988 would likely have only shown the boundary of Mr. Barbour’s property as the high water mark, not the water’s edge, as surveyors in the locale of Tiny Township were still carrying on the practice of surveying waterfront properties to the high water mark in that period.
 Also of note from this report are two statements of importance to an issue that will be discussed later, which is that Mr. Stewart, although integrally involved in this proceeding, did not interview any neighbours or individuals who would have had knowledge of the history of these properties. In commenting on Mr. Stanton’s remark that the Cavana survey was “passed on from owner to owner up to and including the current owners”, Mr. Stewart wrote: “I do not know how he could know this”. He also comments that, with respect to the road shown on the Cavana Plan, which Mr. Stanton noted to be a travelled road, that “there is no evidence that a road existed across the beach at that time”.
 Similarly, in his report of January 10, 2008, Mr. Stewart comments that Mr. Hiley’s conclusion that Mrs. Bailey and her predecessors in title have used and treated Parts 1, 2, 3 and 4 as their own land is not supported by evidence.
 Subsequent to that report, Mr. Stewart delivered an e-mail to Mr. Streisfield dated November 18, 2010, relied upon by Mr. Barbour in this proceeding. In it he indicated that by the time of the 1958 and 1960 transfers to Dr. Kynoch, both a 1957 survey by Cavana and the 1960 O’Dale survey would have shown Dr. Kynoch “a completely different picture of Tiny Island”. He seems to be saying that the O’Dale Plan stood in marked contrast to the 1942 Cavana Plan, and so Dr. Kynoch should have known that he was not purchasing the land as depicted on the Cavana Plan. His opinion is thus even though both the 1958 and the 1960 conveyances were completed with reference to the Cavana Plan.
 In formulating his opinions, Mr. Stewart testified both in the first trial and before this court that he relies on aerial photography obtained from the National Air Photo Library.
 Mr. Stewart testified at the first trial that the BA Plan confirmed, but did not fix, the natural boundaries of Mr. Barbour’s land in position; rather, it confirmed the ambulatory nature of those boundaries. His evidence is that water’s edge boundary is a natural boundary which will ambulate or move horizontally from time to time, depending on two factors: one would be a change in water level which is slow and imperceptible; or accretion or erosion of the sand or the beach area which would also be slow and imperceptible. The water’s edge is in fact the monument identifying the boundary. As the water’s edge moves outward, the new dry land accretes to the upland and becomes part of the upland. As the water level drops sufficiently that the island is joined to the mainland, at that point the boundary is no longer ambulatory, but rather fixed in position. In his examination-in-chief he gave the opinion that the ambulatory boundary of Part 2 is probably moving on a daily basis, based upon water levels and accretion.
 Exhibit 69 in the first trial was a chart labelled by Mr. Stewart as the monthly mean water levels in Lakes Michigan and Huron from 1918 to 2001. The data was obtained from the Canadian Hydrographic Service’s public records. His evidence on cross-examination confirmed that the data contained therein is a compilation of data taken at various gauges in Lake Michigan and Lake Huron, from as far away as Sarnia and Little Current. Mr. Stewart testified that he determined that a water level of 176.50 metres was the level at which the two points of land became separated by water. Anything lower meant that the isthmus existed; anything higher meant that Tiny Island was surrounded by water. He depicted the latter situation by placing boxes in the chart around the months in which the water levels met or exceeded 176.50 metres. It was his evidence that his findings confirmed the evidence heard in this proceeding, such as what can be observed in photographs that have been referred to as the “Grant photos” or the “canoe photos”. These measurements, he opines, show that in May 1988 the isthmus did not exist, nor had it for several years prior. His findings include that from April 1969 to August 1988, with the exception of a few months, Tiny Island would have been surrounded with water, and again continuously for the period May 1996 to August 1998.
 Exhibit 70 from the first trial is a compilation prepared by Mr. Stewart that purports to show water levels during various months that correspond to various documents that he considers to be significant in forming his opinion: plans of survey, air photography, and photographs. In that exhibit he shows, to a tenth of a metre, the water levels during the month corresponding to the document in question. His evidence was the water levels shown on exhibit 70 might not remain at that same level throughout the day or month, but that it would be close. He testified that he was looking for a pattern. He agreed that he had not determined the standard deviation to investigate how much fluctuation takes place in the water level readings within a 30 day period.
 On cross-examination he also agreed that another important factor to consider in considering the impact of the 176.5 meter water level is the amount of sand on the isthmus, and the underlying rock stratum. The existence of rock, evident in many photographs taken in the area of the isthmus, was not mapped. His evidence is that even with a shift in sand due to high water levels or storm events, the change in elevation within the isthmus would only be three-tenths of a meter at most. He does not explain how he reached that number.
 He agreed that rising water encroaching on the area of the isthmus is not smooth and regular, and with retreating water, there are areas that dry before others, resulting in a ponding effect. He testified that a vertical change in water level of one foot would correspond with a horizontal displacement of the water’s edge by a factor of 30 or 40 because of the slope of the shore by Tiny Island. To this extent, his evidence accords with that of Neil Lackie, who testified that he observed that a drop of one foot vertically could result in a horizontal displacement of water away from the shoreline by as much as 30 or 40 feet.
 Mr. Stewart also prepared a report dated May 12, 2013, in response to Mr. Brubacher’s report.[xxxvii] Mr. Stewart expressed the opinion that he has more experience dealing with Lake Huron water levels than does Mr. Brubacher, and that based on his experience, he believes that the monthly water level data is useful in determining the position of where the water’s edge would be at any given time. He opined in his testimony that, particularly looking at the aerial photography and other evidence in the case, including photographs, that nothing in the water level data was inconsistent with the reality observed by others. He referred again to the chart of the Lake Michigan-Huron monthly mean water levels[xxxviii], noting that the monthly mean level for May 1988 corresponds to what is depicted in the aerial photograph from that same month, purporting to show water covering the isthmus. It was his belief that monthly means were the most appropriate data to use, as they will approximate the level at any location on the lake under normal weather conditions, and show a clear indication of historic trends. It is his evidence that the best evidence of water’s edge as of May 11, 1988 (the date of the aerial photograph) is the chart to which he referred. It remained his opinion that all of the Part 2 lands were covered by water and owned by the Crown on May 11, 1988, and that Angela Bailey had not provided any survey evidence to show the location of the water’s edge of the Part 2 lands or the Part 1 lands for any period of time prior to her purchase in December 1988.
 Just as he did in the former trial, Mr. Stewart testified with respect to a photogrammetric map[xxxix]. This was prepared by a photogrammetrist in his office of MMM Group by taking stereo images of aerial photography dated May 11, 1988. It was his evidence that he overlaid the 1942 Cavana Plan, and the 1960 O’Dale Plan on the photograph to find out how much of the Part 2 lands were covered by water at the time of the photography in 1988. The purpose of the exercise was to show that the tail of the whale was covered by water in May of 1988. It was his evidence that this photogrammetric map showed that all of Part 2 was under water. Again, this is at odds with the evidence of the Baileys when they walked the roadway on Part 2 in May, 1988. As a result, it was his opinion that Mr. Barbour did not own Part 2 in 1988, but nor did Mrs. Bailey. His thesis is that all of Part 2 was owned by the Crown in May 1988 because it was inundated with water. Matching this evidence with his evidence of the historic water levels, in May, 1988 the water level was 176.7 metres, only 2/10s of a metre higher than his 176.50 benchmark.
 In cross-examination it was revealed that the photogrammetric map was not prepared by Mr. Stewart, but rather by a technician in his office. He had never before prepared a photogrammetric drawing, and it was a photogrammetrist in his office that did the mapping involved. Mr. Stewart’s involvement was to look through the stereo plotter, and look at the images at the time the map was prepared. His evidence was that he has reviewed many such drawings in the past, and knows what to look for, and what they tell him. His evidence was that one could not tell from looking with the naked eye at the aerial photographs, from which the photogrammetric map was prepared, where the sand was wet or dry.
 In his cross-examination Mr. Stewart explained that the water level was likely even higher than 176.7 metres, even as deep as one foot over the isthmus instead of the 2/10 of a metre revealed by the May 1988 recorded water level. This would be so because there had just been a period of very high water levels in the 1980s, so most of the sand would probably be washed out. He agreed that he did not have any measurement of the bathymetry of Georgian Bay in this area, on which to base his opinion. He had available the topographical map prepared by Mr. Nicholson in 2002. He agreed that every year, due to the changing nature of the isthmus, that the elevations would differ, although the general configuration would be the same.
 In his testimony Mr. Stewart indicated that it was part of a surveyor’s mandate to look for evidence of possession in order to establish boundaries. His testimony at the first trial was that there was no evidence of possession on the sand beach. He testified that he did not see anything in the historical records indicating a “laneway”, and that he does not have a record of it crossing Mr. Barbour’s beach prior to 1988 or 1990 when the Baileys started using such a pathway. He noted that it was not on the aerial photography from May, 1988. Mr. Stewart was equivocal on that point during the first trial, acknowledging that there was contradictory evidence and that he was unable to say for sure whether the existence of the driveway pre-dated Mrs. Bailey’s ownership. He did note that a driveway was shown on the Cavana survey, stating that it “did show the driveway, or at least the proposed driveway, or maybe it was an existing driveway, I can’t say for sure.” He noted that there was nothing in the 1939 Irwin survey to indicate a road feature in this area, and that it was part of his job to identify any such physical features. With respect to the 1960 O’Dale plan, he surmised that the partial roadway shown, interrupted by the water between the island and mainland at the time, was to show the access route to get to Dr. Kynoch’s stairs, but on that point he stated that he was speculating.
 He confirmed that Rowntree Beach was a decision that was known to many of the local residents, and many beach associations were following it closely. He denied that it informed his conclusions in this matter from the outset of his initial opinion to Mr. Barbour.
 Mr. Stewart confirmed that easements that end at water’s edge do not require another deed to obtain ownership of land that emerges when waters recede and thereby elongate the end point of the easement. He agreed that whatever the characterization of the parcel’s ownership, it enlarges with accretion or reduces with reliction or inundation.
 He agreed that on the Cavana Plan, Mr. Cavana was attempting to represent to the Brunelle brothers that they owned the beach all the way up to what we now know to be the southern portion of the Rice property.
The Positions of the Parties
 Mrs. Bailey’s position is that Part 2 has always been occupied, used and enjoyed by her and her predecessors in title as their own property, including for access to Tiny Island, to the exclusion of Mr. Barbour.
 She always understood that she purchased all of the land shown on the Cavana Plan, together with an easement established by that part of the roadway leading to Part 2, which is consistent with the historical transfers of the property.
 Her counsel argued that she has established by a preponderance of evidence that she has established a claim of adverse possession, or alternatively, for an easement by prescription. The fact that the isthmus and some of Part 2 has been under water at various times does not defeat either her possessory or prescriptive claims; rather, the riparian character of the title and unique physical features of this waterfront property mean that a possessor only needs to possess and occupy in the same manner as would a person who owns the paper title.
 Further, Mrs. Bailey argues that Mr. Barbour has not insisted on his strict legal rights, and that permitting him now to do so, after years of silence, would result in an unconscionable outcome.
 Mr. Barbour’s position is that fundamentally, Mrs. Bailey’s claim fails because the boundary of Part 2 is ambulatory, and she was unable to establish a possessory interest until the boundaries of the land in question were established by survey, which did not occur until the Boundaries Acthearing. Also, it was unreasonable for Mrs. Bailey, and her predecessors in title, to rely upon the Cavana survey given all of the historic information registered on title and available for review, including Mr. Barbour’s deed.
 Further, Mr. Barbour has never been excluded from Part 2, and there is insufficient evidence to establish that he has been. There is also insufficient evidence of continued use and occupation for the prescribed periods, and that Mrs. Bailey is required to prove, in respect of her possessory claim, that all of Part 2 on the dry land side was used. There is no evidence of a period of 10 years, let alone 20 years, when all of Part 2 was above water. When any portion of Part 2 was covered in water, it was owned by the Crown pursuant to the Beds of Navigable Waters Act, which would interrupt any limitation period that was running against Mr. Barbour. The statutory time periods would have to begin anew each time Part 2 became dry land. It is argued that the statutory declarations deposited on title were documents manufactured to fuel a possessory claim. Mr. Barbour asserts that no roadway existed before Mrs. Bailey purchased the island.
 If a prescriptive period ever began running, it was interrupted in 1995 when Mr. Barbour put his note on the Baileys’ door.
 It is Mr. Barbour’s position that Mrs. Bailey has not discharged her burden of proof with respect to all of the elements of her claims.
Assessment of the Evidence
 This court accepts the veracity of the testimony provided by Angelina, Stephen and Natasha Bailey in all respects. They each provided their evidence in a straight-forward manner and without embellishment. They conceded reasonable points, and were careful to indicate when they had no knowledge of something, or were unable to remember. Strikingly, even though this was the fourth time that Angela and Stephen Bailey have testified regarding these matters, while they did appear understandably fatigued by eleven years of litigation, their evidence was presented in a candid and unrehearsed fashion. None of their testimony was undermined in cross-examination in any material respect. In addition to their extensive testimony of how they have used and enjoyed Part 2 over the years since taking occupation of the island, and their understanding from Betty Van Aller as to how the island had always been accessed, their testimony was pivotal in establishing how they arrived at an understanding of the scope of the land purchased by them in 1988. All testified as to rapid fluctuations in the water levels on the shoreline in the area of Part 2.
 Heidi Lauridsen and Christopher Van Aller were helpful witnesses to provide first-hand knowledge of events that they had personal experience with and knowledge of during the time that they were seasonal residents of Tiny Island and vicinity. Neither of these individuals has an apparent interest in this claim, and neither was shown to have any personal relationship with any of the Baileys. Conversely, there was no evidence to suggest that either would have a motive to fabricate evidence that would detract from Mr. Barbour’s position on the issues in question. They both had a good recall of events and neither was shown to have a faulty memory.
 Gerrard Maurice was an independent witness who has first-hand knowledge of, in particular, the use made of the roadway to the island in the 1960s era. His testimony was of assistance in developing a broader picture of the use of the roadway by those other than the owners of the island, or their family members and guests.
 Nancy Rice is an invaluable witness, as the person with the historically oldest testimony of the matters in question. Only certain portions of her evidence from the Boundaries Act hearing were read into the record for this trial. However, I reviewed the entirety of her evidence from that hearing, in order to assess her reliability overall. That review revealed her to be a witness who, despite her age of 77 at the time of testifying, had an excellent recall of the events to which she was testifying and was unshaken on cross-examination. Again, there was no evidence to suggest that she would have a motive to fabricate evidence to assist either party. She confirmed the accuracy of her two statutory declarations. Most importantly, she gave evidence of use of the roadway to access the island from as early as 1935, from her own personal observations and experience.
 Betty Van Aller was 81 years of age at the time of the Boundaries Act hearing and did not testify, and so her evidence comes by way of her statutory declaration made in 1988. I have no evidence as to why neither party called her to testify in the Boundaries Act proceeding, although her age suggests that health may have been a factor. As a result of her death, Mr. Streisfield has obviously been deprived of an opportunity to cross-examine on that evidence. Yet the content of Mrs. Van Aller’s statutory declaration is central to the issues in this litigation. This begs the question, then, as to why the only living person who might have knowledge of these same matters going back to 1949 did not testify, if there was contrary evidence to be given. The fact that Mr. Barbour did not do so leads me to infer that he did not have evidence that would refute the information provided by Mrs. Van Aller. It goes uncontested. Such an inference does not reverse the onus in this case; it simply acknowledges the burden upon any litigant who asks the court to reject the credibility and reliability of evidence, as Mr. Barbour is asking this court to do – if a litigant has a different version of events, he or she might wish to present it for consideration.
 The evidence of Neil Lackie and Charlene Lowes was also valuable, as residents who have or had lived in the vicinity of Tiny Island their entire lives. Yet where their evidence conflicts with that of the other witnesses in respect of the use made of Part 2, I prefer the evidence of the witnesses who have lived or do live at the island. These latter individuals would have more reason to recall the use made by them of the land in question, and the experiences of Mr. Lackie and Mrs. Lowes are limited only to what they themselves were able to participate in and observe. As their cottages are some distance from the island, it is common sense that they would not have always had an opportunity to observe what the occupants of the island were doing, and the time spent by each on the beach was somewhat curtailed by their jobs as teenagers. Their lack of direct knowledge was evident in their testimony about vehicles. Mr. Lackie was unaware of whether Betty Van Aller owned a vehicle, while the preponderance of evidence is that she did. Similarly, Ms. Lowes did not know Mrs. Van Aller well, and she could not recall how the Kynochs accessed the island.
 In contrast to any other witness, Ms. Lowes gave evidence of the Baileys driving through deep sand, on a route differing from the one used by prior owners. Again, this is contradicted by the preponderance of evidence, and defies common sense that the Baileys would choose a more cumbersome path. Her evidence that she never saw a vehicle parked at the island prior to the Baileys’ ownership also stands in marked contrast to that given by the prior occupants themselves, whose knowledge of such events would be more reliable. With respect to the issue of access from the Cut to the island, I prefer the testimony of those witnesses who had reason to use the roadway, over that of Mr. Lackie and Ms. Lowes, for the very reason that both conceded in their testimony – it was possible that people were using the roadway when they did not observe them doing so. Accordingly, where Mr. Lackie testified that he did not know of anyone driving to the island in the 1950s or 1960s, and where Ms. Lowes testified that she never saw the Kynochs drive to the island, and Betty Van Aller on only two occasions, I am unable to give that testimony any weight, as compared to the testimony of those having greater familiarity with access to the island. Further, their evidence that the Baileys added or removed rocks to “create” the roadway is not supported by the preponderance of evidence, nor their evidence that the Bailey family was the first to drive across the beach regularly.
 Mr. Stanton’s evidence was clear, careful and precise, and this court had no difficulty following his testimony or his reasoning. As the expert most familiar with Mr. Cavana’s work, he provided valuable insight into the 1942 Cavana survey, and field notes from which it was derived. This court agrees with his comment that, had Deputy Director Keat had the benefit of his testimony to explain Cavana’s methodology, a different conclusion may have been reached at the Boundaries Act hearing.
 The most important aspects Mr. Stanton’s evidence that I accept, which impact on the questions to be resolved by this court, are as follows:
i) that Cavana placed seven monuments during his 1942 survey, one of them being an iron pipe or post in the middle of the very east end of the “whale’s tail” and one being an iron post or pipe in approximately the middle of the back of the whale. I accept that Cavana found the latter monument when he went back in 1957. Further, O’Dale located at least four of these iron posts in 1960, one being that at the back of the whale’s tail. I accept that Nicholson located at least one of them in 2002, being the one in the middle of the tail. Based on his familiarity with Cavana’s work, and based upon the location of iron posts years later, which I find as a fact were originally set by Cavana, I accept the evidence of Mr. Stanton that the solid dots shown on the Cavana plan represent the placement by him of monumentation in those locations. Three of those monuments were placed on what is now shown as Part 2 on the Hiley plan;
ii) I agree with Mr. Stanton’s conjecture that Mr. Brunelle, Dr. Kynoch, or both, would have gone out to inspect the location of the iron bars at the time of, or shortly after, the surveying work was done. I agree with his common sense logic; if a landowner goes to the trouble of having a survey done, such individual will at least go out and inspect the results on the ground. This would be particularly true where the land is being surveyed for the first time, as I accept was the status of the Cavana survey. The fact that there is no information on the earlier McMullen plan suggesting that McMullen surveyed the island in any detail leads to the conclusion that McMullen was not surveying the island per se;
iii) I accept his opinion that a survey plan such as Cavana’s conveys to the landowner, by reference to survey monuments and other physical features, the extent of the property that they own. Even if the monuments themselves are no longer visible, the measurements from the Cavana survey, together with the total land area of 2.1 acres, would permit a landowner to recreate a close approximation of the boundaries first surveyed by Cavana;
iv) I adopt Mr. Stanton’s expert view, which accords with common sense, that Cavana’s depiction of the roadway was an effort to tie in a feature already existing on the ground, as there would be no reason for him to tie in something not visible. Also, the fact that he went to some trouble to change the location of the road between his first draft and final plan suggests that he turned his mind very specifically to the location of the roadway, and common sense suggests that this would have been unnecessary effort for a pathway that was mere speculation;
v) I also adopt Mr. Stanton’s view that O’Dale was commissioned for the express purpose of producing a survey of the roadway as it existed in 1960. Again, common sense suggests that a landowner would not trouble themselves to obtain a survey of something not in existence. I accept Mr. Stanton’s opinion that O’Dale was tying into his plan a feature that was there on the ground to see, based on measurements in his field notes and the very obvious fact that the he titled his plan “Plan of Survey showing right of way as used on part of Tiny Island”;
vi) I accept Mr. Stanton’s evidence that the entity that Cavana was surveying was the property described on instrument #189 as referenced in his field note, being “that parcel or tract of land, situate, lying and being in the Georgian Bay, in the Township of Tiny...containing about two acres be the same more or less, composed of Tiny Island Situate to the South of a peninsular in the southerly part of Lot Twenty-one...”. He was therefore surveying a peninsula of land in Lot 21 and its lands above the high water mark, being the entirety of the “whale”, comprised of approximately 2 acres;
vii) The evidence of Mr. Stanton leaves no doubt as to why Cavana showed two high water marks on his survey, and I accept that this occurred because of the unusual situation of this island frequently being joined to the mainland, and the need to show the high water mark for the peninsula given that it was Cavana’s practice, and in keeping with the legislation at the time, to show the high water mark as the limit between private ownership and Crown land on waterfront. At the time of his survey the island was attached to the mainland. He explained that the second high water mark to the east of the beach was to show the westerly limit of the lots in Concession 21. I agree that Cavana was in the best position to show the topographical features of the island as they existed in 1942, and accept that his high water mark at the back of the tail of the whale designated what he observed to be a physical feature that delineated a change in the topography of the beach. I also accept that it makes rational sense that Cavana had the McMullen Plan available to him at the time, since what was probably a hand-drawn copy was located in his file, and that he tied in the high water mark on the McMullen Plan with that on his own survey. None of this changes the boundaries of Part 1 and Part 2, but it does serve to explain why it may have been rational for Brunelle and Kynoch, and their successors in title, to accept and rely upon the Cavana survey.
 Mr. Hiley’s evidence was similar in many respects to Mr. Stanton’s, and to the extent that they do correspond, I find Mr. Hiley’s evidence useful. Like Mr. Stanton, his opinion was that Cavana’s easterly boundary of the island on the mainland portion corresponded to what he believed to be the high water mark identified by McMullen. His evidence was fair in stating that we can only surmise that his rear limit of the tail of the whale was set using some change in elevation that was evident at the time, which allowed him to enclose the approximate 2 acres set out in the Crown patent. Like Mr. Stanton, his opinion was that it was not unusual to have two high water marks in the situation where the island is joined topographically to the main land by an isthmus.
 In addition, I accept the following from his evidence:
i) That Cavana would apply the legislation in force at the time that he prepared the 1942 survey, especially since it was his practice, as testified to by Mr. Stanton, to survey to the high water mark, and he made consistent efforts to do so at the time of the 1942 survey;
ii) that the 1942 deed from Brunelle describes the right-of-way in such a way that it was known that ingress and egress to the island would be impeded at points in time by reason of water;
iii) the description on Mr. Barbour’s deed, showing acreage of “one acre and 155/1000ths of an acre” is consistent with the McMullen Plan.
 On cross-examination Mr. Hiley was led to make conclusions based upon photographs put to him, including aerial photographs. One such conclusion was that there was not a ten year period in which there was not water surrounding the entirety of the island, and therefore no ten year period when Mr. Barbour owned all of the Part 2 lands. He agreed that when under water the land is owned by the Crown.
 Because of the problems that I have identified with the photographic evidence in this case, I do not accept his opinion evidence in this regard. I also note that Mr. Hiley is not an expert with respect to how to interpret photographs, and asking him to express an opinion based on his interpretation of the photograph goes beyond the scope of his expertise.
 The evidence of Mr. Brubacher provides unique insight into a topic raised throughout this proceeding, which is the water levels of Georgian Bay and those periods of time in which Tiny Island may have been surrounded by water. His evidence provides a better understanding of why it might be that the observations of the witnesses regarding historic water levels often differs from the picture presented by the water level data collected. His evidence confirms why it may be that changes in water levels at Tiny Island have been observed to change dramatically and over the course of a few hours. In keeping with the limits of his expertise, he did not provide any evidence with respect to the location of a boundary on the ground.
 Mr. Brubacher was well qualified to provide this court with his findings as they relate to the analysis of the water level data. Cross-examination did not reveal any flaw in either his analysis or opinions. He presented his findings in a professional and methodical manner.
 From Mr. Brubacher’s testimony I accept the following as facts:
i) correlations between water levels measured at water gauges at Collingwood and Parry Sound become less demonstrable as one moves from annual to monthly to daily and to hourly data;
ii) The water level occurring on an annual, monthly or daily basis at the shoreline of Parts 1 and 2 cannot be predicted from the data collected at either the Collingwood or Parry Sound collection stations on Georgian Bay;
iii) Daily and hourly changes in water levels occurring at the two stations are unstable and poor predictors of what is occurring at the other;
iv) His results reveal that changes in water level in Georgian Bay are not slow and imperceptible, when data is examined in shorter intervals of time than annually.
 In his initial correspondence with Mr. Barbour dated August 14, 2001 and October 5, 2001, Mr. Stewart’s position within MMM Group is shown as being that of “Manager, Boundary Litigation Services”. The same is true for his reports of both November 29, 2007 and January 10, 2007.
 In his letter of August 14, 2001 to Mr. Barbour, Mr. Stewart wrote:
You should be aware that the role of a land surveyor, in retracing boundaries and related fact-finding activities, is not to advocate a client’s position. Our purpose is to collect and analyze evidence to find the true position of boundaries and unbiased conclusions with regard to related issues. In the event that you retain this firm to investigate the issues, or, if necessary, give evidence at any proceedings, it must be clear that we will not compromise our disinterest in the outcome of those proceedings, and there are no guarantees that any expressed opinion or final decision by a court or tribunal will be favourable to your position.
 Somewhere during the course of his involvement, Mr. Stewart deviated from those remarks.
 It was Mr. Streisfield who explained the Acknowledgement of Expert’s Duty to him in relation to his testimony and written reports. Mr Streisfield was not the one who brought it to his attention; he saw one attached to Mr. Stanton’s report and asked Mr. Streisfield what it was.
 I am not satisfied that Mr. Streisfield adequately explained such Acknowledgement to Mr. Stewart, or if he did, I am led to the regretful conclusion that Mr. Streisfield thereafter allowed Mr. Stewart to disregard that duty to the court. As more fully set out in my mid-trial ruling pertaining to email communication passing between Mr. Streisfield and Mr. Stewart while this trial was underway (2013 ONSC 4731 (CanLII)), Mr. Stewart has ultimately disregarded the caution to Mr. Barbour set out in his correspondence of August 14, 2001, and became an advocate for Mr. Barbour. The relevant sections of that ruling are as follows:
 During his cross-examination on May 27, Mr. Stewart confirmed that he had attended court for all ten of the trial days, except for a half day. He also estimated that he had had more than 50 and possibly a 100 or more email exchanges on this file with Mr. Streisfield since this trial began. Mr. Stewart confirmed that he had passed handwritten notes to Mr. Streisfield during the trial, which he estimated to be two or three at most. He confirmed that he was also present during the entirety of prior proceedings, and was seated at the counsel table with Mr. Streisfield at an earlier hearing before the Deputy Director of Titles and during a previous trial in the Superior Court of Justice. During this trial he has been seated at counsel table behind Mr. Streisfield throughout. He confirmed that he sometimes suggests questions to Mr. Streisfield to be put to witnesses, even lay witnesses, or suggests exhibits to be relied upon during questioning. During the trial it has been apparent that he has had a familiarity with the location and content of various documents and exhibits equal to that of Mr. Streisfield’s, and has assisted counsel in that regard. When asked to give his response to the opinion evidence of Bailey’s expert, Mr. Brubacher, his response was to state unequivocally that Mr. Brubacher’s opinions were wrong, and he was left wondering “if it was artifice or incompetence, and whether he has an understanding of Lake Huron at all.” He went on to state that there were errors in Mr. Brubacher’s statistical analysis of water levels, and that Mr. Brubacher had no understanding of what statistics are all about. He concluded his initial comments with the conclusion that Mr. Brubacher’s evidence “was not helpful”. During that same testimony he described the role of the surveyor to be that of a “quasi-judicial function”, in that the opinions given had to be based upon evidence and case law precedent. When asked during cross-examination whether he thought that Bailey had no right to the Part 2 lands in question in this proceeding, his answer was that he had seen no evidence of use or right to possession other than use of a roadway, during all of the time that he has been involved in this matter. His expertise is not, of course, in the area of adverse possession or any other legal doctrine, but restricted to determinations of property boundaries and description.
 Over Mr. Streisfield’s objections, on May 27, this Court ordered that the emails in question and the notes, if available, were to be brought to court on the day for argument of the motion. Mr. Stewart was ordered to resend all of the emails of his communications with Mr. Streisfield from March 4 to May 27 inclusive, without further communication while he remained under cross-examination. A timetable was set for exchange of the motion, evidence and facta, and provision was made in that endorsement to permit Barbour to call viva voce evidence in reply to the motion.
 It is a trite principle of trial procedure that an expert witness should provide independent assistance to the court and should never assume the role of advocate. This is an easy principle to articulate, but the inherent conflict that experts are in as a result of their unique position has historically created tension within the litigation arena. Experts are sought out and paid because they are able to generate evidence and reach conclusions that support the interests of the party who retains them. And yet, as stated by Lord Wilberforce in The Ikarian Reefer (1993), 2 Lloyds Reports 68, “It is necessary that expert evidence presented to the court should be and should be seen to be the independent product of the expert uninfluenced as to form or content by the exigencies of litigation”.
 The most important thing for an expert to retain throughout the litigation process is a position of distance from the interests of the party who engages them, in order that his or her impartiality remains intact. By contrast, the worst thing for an expert to devolve into is advocating for his client’s view, or to become a champion for his client’s cause. It is only where the expert can reliably be seen by the Court to have reached his opinions through an objective and neutral lens that his evidence can have potential value to the Court. The evidence of an expert who advocates for a client’s position, simply because it is his client’s position, loses considerable value and will ultimately be a waste of the Court’s time if rejected outright due to partisanship.
 In order to make the role of the expert more clear than it may have been in the past, Rule 4.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194 came into effect on January 1, 2010, which sets out the duty of the expert witness in the following terms:
DUTY OF EXPERT
4.1.01 (1) It is the duty of every expert engaged by or on behalf of a party to provide evidence in relation to a proceeding under these rules,
to provide opinion evidence that is fair, objective and non-partisan;
to provide opinion evidence that is related only to matters that are within the expert’s area of expertise; and
to provide such additional assistance as the court may reasonably require to determine a matter in issue.
(2) Duty Prevails – The duty in subrule (1) prevails over any obligation owed by the expert to the party by whom or on whose behalf he or she is engaged.
 This rule lays to rest any debate over the priority of the expert witness’ duty to the court that may have existed prior to its enactment. As a further safeguard, experts are required to sign an acknowledgment of expert’s duty, and include such acknowledgement in any report prepared by him pursuant to Rule 53.03(2.1).
 Accordingly, the issue of an expert’s objectivity or lack thereof is an important one for a court to fully appreciate. Experts increasingly provide the very foundation for a party’s case, and therefore the court must know all of the bases upon which opinion evidence has been formed, including potential bias created by becoming the ‘expert advocate’.
 The emails that this Court has reviewed and permitted to be entered into evidence reveal that Mr. Stewart does not understand his duty to the Court, even though he has signed a Form 53, and that he has radically departed from the arena of impartial professional. He has become an advocate for Barbour’s cause.
 What to do in relation to Mr. Stewart’s evidence is something that the Court will have to grapple with in reaching a decision in this case, and now is not the time to do it. The determination of the extent of Mr. Stewart’s bias, and whether it is sufficient to affect only weight as opposed to admissibility, should not be made without considering all of Mr. Stewart’s evidence in the context of the totality of the evidence given at trial by all witnesses.
 To the above observations can be added the following:
i) Mr. Stewart made notes of the lay witnesses who testified during this trial[xl].
ii) Mr. Stewart prepared written questions to put to Angela Bailey during her cross-examination[xli], such as: “Because you didn’t get an up-to-date survey, so you decided to sue Gerry to take his property”; “You want Gerry to hand over his land to you because you did not retain a surveyor prior to closing”; and “She claims to have always understood “Part 2” to be her property... but that is not Gerry’s problem – her recourse is not to take Gerry’s land; her recourse is against her lawyer who advised her not to get a survey”.
iii) In those same notes Mr. Stewart makes the very serious allegation that Mr. de Rijcke has counselled Mrs. Bailey to fabricate evidence. His note reads: “IdR told her to say that she always believed that she owned Part 2, even if she was mistaken...”. On cross-examination he confirmed that the initials “IdR” stood for Isaak de Rijcke.
iv) Within the email correspondence between Mr. Stewart and Mr. Streisfield[xlii], Mr. Stewart has written, in respect of the expert opinion report of Mr. Brubacher, that it is “a load of BS”, and he writes “My guess is that he has never given expert evidence in court before, and Isaak has not told him that he cannot protect him from cross-examination. He thinks that he can get away with this crap.” In that same email string, he goes on to speak of litigation strategy with respect to Mr. Brubacher’s report, asking Mr. Streisfield whether there is a negative implication in “fighting it”, and if so, he suggests that “perhaps we could sit down and think whether we can actually make hay with Brubacher before we try to block it. Not that I think he really has much to contribute…”.
v) Also within that correspondence, he again engages in strategic discussions with Mr. Streisfield, by writing comments such as “Also, I note that neither his CV nor his Acknowledgment indicate that, even though he is an OLS, he is not qualified to speak to boundary issues. In my view, under the circumstances, this may well be an issue for complaint to the AOLS. He is essentially commenting on boundary issues (already res judicata), but he is not qualified to do so. I have no problem with him talking about statistical analysis (his analysis is nonsense, in my view, by the way), but he went too far in giving an opinion about “slow and imperceptible”. In any event, such comments should be removed from his report”.
vi) Mr. Stewart’s explanations for not interviewing relevant individuals do not ring true. He testified that he did not interview the Baileys because they had only been occupants since 1988. He did not bother to interview Nancy Rice because she was located to the north of Mr. Barbour and her evidence was “not relevant”, and he stated that it was only recently that he realized that she was one of Dr. Kynoch’s daughters. Given his involvement in this matter since 2001, and the fact that he sat through the entirety of both tribunal hearings, this evidence is not credible. He chose not to speak to either of the Kynoch sisters because he had reviewed their statutory declarations and “had their evidence”, even though he had no information from them in respect of any significance that they or their parents attached to the Cavana Plan.
 Based on the overwhelming evidence of Mr. Stewart’s lack of impartiality with respect to the issues before this court, his clearly stated view that Mrs. Bailey’s possessory claims are without merit (despite this going well outside the scope of his expertise), and his strategizing in the litigation, the evidence satisfies me that Mr. Stewart was functioning at this trial as an advocate in concert with Mr. Streisfield. Other hallmarks of his bias are his demonstrated disrespect for differing views, as shown in relation to Mr. Brubacher’s evidence, and his failure to acknowledge the limits of his professional expertise, which I will elaborate on below. I consider it of grave seriousness that Mr. Streisfield, being aware as he was of all of this, still proffered Mr. Stewart to the court as an expert witness. It should go without saying that lawyers have a duty to the court to not seek to elicit expert testimony from a witness who they know to be unable to provide an objective, unbiased opinion in relation to matters within his expertise.
 Ultimately, I have determined that this bias is so clear that I should reject his testimony outright, and do so. The case law makes clear that expert evidence may be excluded where its probative value is tainted by bias or impartibility: Carmen Alfano Family Trust (Trustee of) v. Piersanti, 2012 ONCA 297 (CanLII) at para. 111 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal refused  S.C.C.A. No. 309 (S.C.C.). Although Mrs. Bailey initially did not object to the admissibility of Mr. Stewart’s testimony, that was prior to the full evidence of his bias being revealed during the course of the trial. The party tendering expert evidence must establish its admissibility on balance of probabilities: S. Casey Hill et al., McWilliams’ Canadian Criminal Evidence, 4th ed, looseleaf (Aurora, Ontario: Canada Law Book, 2009), at para. 12:30:10. After R. v. Mohan, 1994 CanLII 80 (SCC),  2 S.C.R. 9, trial judges are to perform a principled assessment of the potential value of the evidence to the trial process weighed against the potential harm to that process arising from admission. In this case the harm is done; preparation and trial time wasted by the receipt of evidence on which this court cannot possibly place any reliance. So while it is too late for exclusion, I assign no weight to Mr. Stewart’s testimony. For a recent review of the law on the admissibility of expert testimony, see Abbott and Haliburton Co. Ltd. v. White Burgess Langille Inman, 2013 NSCA 66 (CanLII), leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada granted November 21, 2013,  S.C.C.A. No. 326.
 Had I not ultimately reached the conclusion to disregard Mr. Stewart’s evidence on the grounds of bias, I would nonetheless have found it to be of little use in deciding the issues in this case, for the reasons that follow.
 Mr. Stewart provided the court with an extensive search of the title history of the lands in question, which is in accordance with that conducted by Mr. Hiley and is without criticism. However, despite testifying that it is the duty of the cadastral surveyor to look at all of the evidence when determining boundaries, Mr. Stewart did not try to speak with Betty Van Aller or Nancy Rice or any of their children at the time that he prepared his survey and report for the Boundaries Act hearing. He did not speak with any of the Baileys. The only personal narrative collected by him came from Mr. Barbour. Yet he clung to the notion that the water level data was historically consistent with the boundaries of water’s edge of Pats 1 and 2, and that there was never a 10 year period in which the isthmus was not covered by water.
 There is evidence calling into question the accuracy of such a finding, if Mr. Stewart had had the inclination to consider it. For example, according to Mr. Stewart’s chart of the monthly mean water levels, pre-dating the purchase of the island by Mrs. Bailey, water has covered the isthmus from April 1969 to August 1988, with the exception of eight months, intermittently. This is inconsistent with the evidence of Chris Van Aller, who spent considerable time at the island. It is inconsistent with the evidence of Heidi Lauridsen. It is inconsistent with the evidence of Nancy Rice and Betty Van Aller, both in their statutory declarations and in Mrs. Rice’s testimony. It is even partially inconsistent with the evidence of Neil Lackie, who testified that he believed that it was in the 1950s that the island was separated from the mainland by water, and that even in the 1960s there was some water between the island and the point. The chart shows many years in the 1950s and 1960s where this was not the case. Another example is that the Cavana field notes from his work done for Mr. Lackie show the peninsula as a topographical feature as of May 12, 1947. According to the chart, the peninsula was covered in May, 1947. Further, he failed to gather from any of these individuals their robust information about how the island has been accessed.
 In addition to the chart of water levels, Mr. Stewart relies heavily on the mapping prepared from the 1988 aerial photographs. Mr. Stewart did not perform this work himself, and it is outside of his area of expertise. He testified that he has never prepared a photogrammetric drawing, and he agreed that it was the technician operating the photogrammetric equipment who was best qualified to do so. Mr. Stewart testified that he himself cannot operate the software used by the technician. It was this technician who interpreted the features on the aerial photographs, who oriented the photographs, who interpreted the water’s edge, and produced the drawing. This individual was not called to testify both to his interpretation of the photographs, and as to whether the map is an accurate portrayal of the true situation on the ground, or simply a model. This map is the evidence presented by Mr. Barbour which purports to show that the entirety of Part 2 was covered by water, and so having the proper foundation for this evidence would have been essential. One only has to view the aerial photographs to understand that having testimony from the person who is said to have examined them in detail is of significant importance to determining the weight to be attached to them – what after all, do they actually depict? Did this technician simply interpret the presence of water or water’s edge based on the colour of the ground? The court is left with very little sense of the method or equipment used to create this mapping, and is just being asked by Mr. Stewart to accept that it is reliable and accurate. Based upon the complete lack of evidentiary foundation for the exhibit in question[xliii], it could have been given no weight.
 Similarly, the sketches prepared by Mr. Stewart that purport to show inundation of Part 2[xliv], which were also based on the 2002 topographic plan prepared by Mr. Nicholson, could have been given no weight. This is because he has prepared them using data described as “annual maximum monthly means”, describing that to be the highest monthly mean for each year. Such terminology or approach is unknown to Mr. Brubacher. Mr. Stewart’s evidence is all the more dubious when the evidence of Mr. Brubacher is taken into account, whose findings show that water level data collected at other sites on the Bay could not be used as a reliable predictor of the water level at Tiny Island, and that the annual or monthly water levels used by Mr. Stewart throughout his work are mathematically calculated averages over those broad periods of time. Mr. Stewart described these graphs as being in the way of an experiment, “just to see what it would look like” when he plotted the water levels, based on the annual maximum monthly means, onto the Nicholson topography. He agreed that eyewitness accounts would be better, “if we had pictures”. This again suggests that he was not interested in gathering the eyewitness accounts from those who may have had evidence that undermined the position that he was advocating on behalf of Mr. Barbour. Additionally, Mr. Stewart’s evidence at no time took into account the bathometry of the Bay around and in front of Tiny Island, the buffering effect of the island itself on wind, the movement of water and sand, or the effect of ice, movement of sand and wind on the dry areas of Part 2. He acknowledged that the topography will change every year, but this concession was not taken into account in his preparation of the eight graphs relied upon him to show the water coverage on Part 2 between 1991 and 1998, based on the elevations in Nicholson’s 2002 survey. He did not measure any elevations even at the time of preparing these drawings, to test the extent to which the topography of the shoreline and sand beach may have changed over time, which may have altered his conclusions about the reliability of 2002 measurements to denote coverage of Part 2 in other years. Also, he agreed on cross-examination that the elevation of the isthmus was an important factor, but nowhere does this arise as a consideration in his charting or his conclusions. He agreed that the only recorded level of the isthmus was done by Nicholson in 2002. And again, the graphs do not always accord with the water level chart. According to the chart, annual average water levels for 1991 fell below the 176.5 marker, and yet for that year Mr. Stewart demonstrates that Tiny Island is an island in fact. Finally, Mr. Stewart testified that he felt that it was important to produce such sketches to show that Part 2 was under water because it was a potential weakness in Mr. Barbour’s case for the court to conclude otherwise.
 Although Mr. Stewart relies heavily on the monthly water level data, he did not engage in the type of analysis done by Mr. Brubacher, and so his evidence is based on the assumption that water levels at Tiny Island can be determined on the basis of data collected elsewhere in the Bay. The data used by him in his monthly chart is actually a compilation of data taken at various gauges in Lake Michigan and Lake Huron, from as far away as Sarnia and Little Current. Again, Mr. Brubacher’s evidence shows empirically how the water levels at these stations may bear little relevance to what is occurring at Tiny Island at any given time. Mr. Stewart could not refute the evidence of Mr. Brubacher, because he has never undertaken such an analysis himself; it was only as of preparing his report of May 12, 2013 that he first considered the stability of the lake levels in relation to Part 2. Although he testified that he had calculated standard deviation between data sets from Collingwood and Parry Sound, there is no evidence that he has done so in any report prepared, and his evidence did not ring true in this regard.
 Another of his main criticisms of Mr. Brubacher’s evidence was that Mr. Brubacher failed to check his analysis against photographs, or against the shoreline itself. Mr. Stewart used photographs taken by local residents to support his conclusions as to water levels, and in some instances, to reach those conclusions. In doing so, he disregarded the testimony of those witnesses who have lived at and visited or accessed Tiny Island over the years. For the reasons explained in the following section, these photographs should not be relied on to reach any substantive conclusions as to the historic water level in the area of the isthmus.
 Mr. Streisfield placed emphasis in this trial on photographs, presumably primarily for the purpose of showing the existence of water between the island and the mainland at various times. Other than Neil Lackie, who was uncertain that he was the photographer for all but one of the photographs put to him, none of the individuals who took the photographs relied on by Mr. Streisfield were called to provide evidence in relation to them. The photographs that derive from Judith Grant[xlv] were marked as exhibits on consent without formal proof at the first trial, and the identification dates were accepted. Beyond the date and the description, no other evidence was given in relation to the “canoe photos”. Similarly, the genesis of the photographs showing the work on the isthmus and island in 2002 and 2003, which the Baileys testified in relation to, remains unknown. Other photographs, the photographer unidentified, seem to have been placed in the record for the purpose of illustrating, primarily for Mr. Barbour’s purposes, the locations of chairs, boat storage, and general use of the land in question.
 It is fundamental for the party submitting the photographic evidence to lay an appropriate and adequate foundation for the evidence. Particularly in a case such as this, where dates are important, it is key to have information not only about the time and date of the creation of the photograph, but also the conditions under which the photograph was taken, and the purpose for which it is being entered into evidence. Without sufficient evidence of these important foundational facts, they may be of little assistance: Hansen v. Moir,  O.J. No. 2502 (Ont. S.C. Small Claims Ct.); Mrakus (c.o.b. as Fairlawn Painting) v. BLT Construction Services Inc. (2006), 146 A.C.W.S. (3d) 830,  O.J. No. 1120 (Ont. S.C.).
 The common problems with photographic evidence discussed in the case law include:
1) the perspective shown by the photograph;
2) the conditions under which the photograph was taken;
3) distortions, including variation in lenses, camera angles and lighting conditions;
4) the photograph lacks a proper foundation;
5) the photograph is reconstructed;
6) the photograph has been manipulated.
 To the extent that the photographs purport to show water existing between the mainland and the island, they add nothing to the evidence given by the parties in this case. All witnesses have testified that water levels change due to weather and storms, and that the water level in the Bay has changed throughout the years. It is agreed that at times the isthmus has been covered, even during the time of the Baileys’ ownership.
 I have found none of these photographs to be of particular assistance in this case. In addition to the lack of formal proof in some instances, the law confirms what this court has telegraphed to Mr. Streisfield from an early point in this trial: those photographs purporting to depict scenes in the area of Tiny Island are to be approached with caution. In some cases, such as the “sunset photo”[xlvi] or the “canoe photos” themselves,[xlvii] it stretches the bounds of the imagination to try to accept that photographs taken in such light, or from such a distance or angle, could provide a definitive illustration of the water levels on Part 2 and/or over the isthmus.
 Digital photographs, as opposed to traditional, analog photographs pose unique challenges, the most serious of which is undetectable manipulation. No evidence was received by this court as to whether the photographs produced were of one variety or the other, and, again, the photographers themselves were not called to give assurance that the photograph had not been reconstructed or manipulated.
 That problem aside, perspective, variation in lenses, camera angles and lighting conditions can all have an effect on the results seen in the photograph: Pompeo v. Huron Construction Co.,  O.J. No. 301 (Ont. Ct Gen. Div.); R. v. Palmer, 2009 ONCJ 23 (CanLII),  O.J. No. 474 (Ont. C.J.); Berthiaume et al. v. The City of Ottawa (1946), 1946 CanLII 86 (ON CA), 4 D.L.R. 770,  O.J. No. 625 (Ont. C.A.); Phillips (Next friend of) v. Canadian National Railways (1975), 61 D.L.R. (3d) 253,  B.C.J. No. 2 (B.C.C.A.); R. v. Iliev (2008), 76 W.B.C. (2d) 397,  O.J. No. 405 (Ont. S.C.). See also Elliott Goldstein, Visual Evidence, A Practitioner’s Manual, vol. 1 (Toronto: Carswell, 1991).
 The above-noted difficulties were highlighted by the cross-examination of Mr. Stanton, when he was presented with photographs and was asked to draw the high water mark shown in each:[xlviii]
Q: So let’s assume you’re looking at Tiny Island. Can you draw the high water mark in each of those instances?
A: Well for one thing, these are two-dimensional photos. I’m certainly not an expert in photography, and high water mark is a three-dimensional thing that you wouldn’t be able to pull out of a photograph taken at an angle like that. An aerial photo, analyzed by the proper equipment, it would be a different story, but something like that, no.
 Further, where the subject being photographed may be in constant flux, photographs may not accurately capture the reality of the situation: Ramara (Township) v. Mullen, 2012 ONSC 220. All of the Baileys, Heidi Lauridsen, Christopher Van Aller, Neil Lackie, and Charlene Lowes testified that the water level would change due to storm events or wind. Water being in constant movement, other than in completely calm weather, the photos may not reliably depict water levels in Nottawasaga Bay from one time of day to the next, or one day to the next.
 Similarly, Mr. Hiley testified as follows[xlix]:
Q: There’s no doubt in your mind that based on all the physical evidence that you’ve seen, they were buying an island in fact, right?
A: In 1988, it was an island in fact, yes.
Q: Thank you.
A: At least at the time of the photograph. (emphasis added)
 His evidence highlights that, in circumstances where there is evidence that water levels and coverage are in flux in this Bay, changing at times within a given day, it must be kept in mind that the photographs show the water levels existing as of the moment the photograph was taken. They are not necessarily an accurate representation of what the situation on the ground was later that day, or the next day, month, or year. Mr. Brubacher’s evidence explains why this may be the case.
 As earlier indicated, other witnesses were asked to comment on several photographs in and around Tiny Island. To the extent that the photographs contained the individual testifying, or people or items that were known or identifiable to the person testifying, such as the island itself, vehicles, boats, stakes, sandbags, tents, chairs and similar objects, I accept that the picture depicts what the person testifying has identified that object to be and where it may have been located, if the person testifying was able to locate that object within the land in question. This is so in particular for the group of photographs taken by Mr. Bailey, which he identified as having been taken by him, and for which the proper evidentiary foundation was laid. In this regard I follow the precedent of Farris, C.J.S.C. in Army & Navy Department Store Western Ltd. v. Retail, Wholesale & Department Store Union, Local No. 535 et al., (1950) 97 C.C.C. 258,  D.L.R. 850 (B.C. Sup. Ct.), where he refused to allow pictures to be introduced as proof of the matter sought to be proved thereby, but did admit them solely for the purpose of clarifying the verbal testimony given.
 However, where a photograph purports to show the depth of water or extent of its coverage, I am unable to give it much, if any, weight. A review of the record will show that most of these photographs were taken from a considerable distance from the isthmus or the Part 2 lands. One in particular is taken into the setting sun and showing only a part of the island, and one in what appears to be moonlight. The photographers did not provide evidence to permit the court to evaluate whether the reflection or absorption of light, or lens, angle of view, distance or perspective, resulted in a true depiction of the scene being photographed, and most importantly, whether what is seen in the photo is what was occurring in “real life”. In order for properly verified photographic evidence to have a high probative value assigned to it by a court, the photograph must reproduce a view of the scene that constitutes an irrefutable demonstration of physical facts: B. MacFarlane, “Photographic evidence: Its Probative Value at Trial and the Judicial Discretion to Exclude it From Evidence" (1973-74) 16 Crim. L.Q. 149 at 176. In all of these circumstances, I am unable to assign any significant evidentiary value to the photographs showing water coverage.
 Finally, some of the testimony of the experts was based on their interpretation of aerial photographs, particularly those from May 1988 and June 1989 which are argued as showing water around the entirety of the island. I am unwilling to accept any testimony that purports to interpret the presence of water from a distance of hundreds of feet away, based simply on the colour of the ground. While those experts may have provided the most obvious interpretation of the photographs, it is not necessarily the most accurate, given the testimony of the Baileys and Neil Lackie that the water level in front of the island can include ponding and shallow levels, and that there is a rocky and pebbly area on Part 1 and part of Part 2. Under these circumstances, I find that it is problematic to conclude from photographs taken from such a distance that the feature appearing to be an unbroken ring of water surrounding the entirety of the island is in fact what it appears to be. Even Mr. Stewart testified that one could not tell, with the naked eye, where the sand was wet or dry on these photographs.
 I have already dealt with the photogrammetric evidence presented by Mr. Stewart and my reasons for rejecting same.
Findings of Fact
 In addition to the findings referred to in the part of these Reasons which addresses the assessment of all witnesses, I make the following additional findings of fact based on the evidence that I accept:
1. Depending on water levels, Tiny Island in the last century has been both a topographic island and a peninsula of land attached to the mainland by an isthmus, the isthmus being a constant feature even when covered by varying levels of water;
2. The last year that water was high enough to cover the isthmus was 1998;
3. Water has never inundated all of Part 2 in the time that Mrs. Bailey has owned Tiny Island, other than a once-occurring storm event mentioned by her;
4. There is no evidence that water has ever covered all of Part 2 during the time of ownership by Kynoch or Van Aller;
5. The nature of Nottawasaga Bay and the shoreline on Part 2 are such that observable changes in water level occur on a frequent basis, sometimes within the course of a few hours. These sudden changes in depth, and hence, coverage, on both Parts 1 and 2 have been observable. Accordingly, these fluctuations are not slow and imperceptible;
6. There is no solid expert evidence that accretion accounts for the exposure of additional dry lands since the Cavana Plan was completed. The additional land is most likely accounted for by the lowering annual water levels. Land uncovered by a gradual subsidence of water is not an accretion, but rather is a reliction (See: Volcanic Oil and s Co. v. Chaplin (1912), 6 D.L.R. 284,  O.J. No. 3 at para 16 (QL); also, Robillard, W. (2012). Clark on Surveying and Boundaries. (7 ed., §25.11). Danver, Mass.: LexisNexis.);
7. Since the registration of the BA Plan, additional land along the beachfront and isthmus has become dry land due to lowering water levels;
8. There has never been an interruption in use of some of Part 2 because of high water, and water has never prevented access to the island by driving or wading;
9. At times when the isthmus has been inundated with water it was necessary for Van Aller to wade to the island or row her rowboat, but there is more evidence than not that the level of water coverage on the isthmus has not been an issue preventing access to the island;
10. The contents of the statutory declarations of Rice and Van Aller are accurate and true;
11. Since at least 1935, access to the island has consistently and regularly been obtained by coming down the Cut and across a roadway that passed over Part 2 to the connecting isthmus and out to the island;
12. It is most probable that the Brunelle brothers accessed the island by the same route from the time of their acquisition in 1915, since Nancy Rice testified that she could not recall them using their dory other than for their fishing operation;
13. Vehicles have used the roadway to get to the island for all manner of purposes since at least 1938, as indicated in Nancy Rice’s statutory declaration;
14. The route has altered slightly from time to time based on changes in the topography of the beach, but the roadway is and has always been essentially that shown on the Cavana survey, following a path across the hard-packed sand and avoiding rocks;
15. The fact that Erwin and Harvey do not reference a road is not determinative, as neither was commissioned to survey the island or the roadway leading to it;
16. Wheel tracks on the right-of-way would have been obliterated from time to time by snow, ice, wind, sand and water;
17. The Cavana survey was the first survey of the island that attempted to illustrate the ownership limits of the island;
18. The Cavana survey was prepared to facilitate the sale of Tiny Island to Kynoch;
19. The mutual right-of-way shown on the Cavana Plan recorded the route that had been travelled by first, the Brunelles, and then the Kynochs as seasonal tenants and later owners, to reach Tiny Island. There is no evidence that either of them used boats of any nature for water transportation to the island;
20. The Cavana Plan was a schedule to the purchase agreement between Van Aller and Mrs. Bailey, which made clear what survey was being relied upon to depict the property that was the subject matter of the transaction;
21. The Cavana survey was passed from Kynoch to his daughters and ultimately to Bailey, and was relied on by each of them as showing the location and area of lands owned by them;
22. All deeds between 1943 and 1988 referencing the Cavana Plan were registered on title to Lot 21;
23. Evidence of the right-of-way over Part 2 to the island from the Cut has been registered on title since the 1943 deed from Brunelle to Kynoch;
24. The Kynochs, Van Allers and the Baileys used the Part 2 lands for all manner of recreational activities and pastimes that are associated with cottage life, extended by the Baileys to include all four seasons;
25. They all used the Part 2 lands in this manner because they believed that they owned the land;
26. There have been times when the owners of Tiny Island have not been able to use all of Part 2 because it has been partially covered with water;
27. The Baileys crossed Part 2 when viewing the island before its purchase, and Betty Van Aller confirmed that access to the island was across Part 2;
28. The isthmus was not covered with water at the time of the Baileys’ first viewings in 1988, or at the time they took occupancy later that year. At most there was a mixture of wet sand, puddles of water, and areas where the water coverage was minimal, insufficient to even require removal of shoes;
29. The Baileys have used the roadway more frequently than their predecessors in title, and have been more inclined to keep their vehicles parked at the island than were the Van Allers or the Kynochs;
30. Water levels have never prevented the Baileys from driving to or accessing the island;
31. The Baileys asserted ownership of Part 2 by placing stakes to mark the travelled roadway, keeping it cleared of snow, placing a no-trespassing sign, placing deck chairs and a sun tent all on Part 2, and requesting trespassers to move along;
32. It is understandable that none of the owners of Tiny Island would erect fences or posts on beachfront property to demarcate land believed to be owned by them, and the fact that they did not does not weigh against them given the nature of the land;
33. Based on the location of his residence, being almost directly behind Tiny Island, Mr. Barbour had an unobstructed view of the island and the Part 2 lands from 1949 onward. After becoming a fulltime resident in 1976, he had increased opportunity to observe activities carried out by the Baileys, and he spent time sitting on beach chairs or under a shade tent in front of the treeline;
34. The use of the waterfront and dry land on Part 2 for recreational activities by the Kynochs, Van Allers or Baileys was never questioned or challenged at any time;
35. Repairs to the roadway on the isthmus and Part 2 in 1992 and 1993 by the Baileys was never questioned or challenged at any time;
36. The use of the beach for travel from the Cut to access the isthmus and the island by the Kynochs, Van Allers or Baileys was never questioned or challenged in any manner until September 1995 when Mr. Barbour placed the note on the Baileys’ door;
37. The content of the note gives rise to the inference, which I draw, that Mr. Barbour believed that he was the owner of the lands across which the Baileys were driving, from which I draw the further inference that he believed that he owned to the water’s edge;
38. That finding prevents this case from being one that can be characterized as a case of “mutual mistake”. Instead, I find that it is one of innocent unilateral mistake on the part of Mrs. Bailey;
39. After the objection in 1995 from Mr. Barbour, the Baileys’ use of Part 2 for recreation and to access the island has never changed;
40. Van Aller’s declaration that she and her family had the use and possession of the property shown on the Cavana Plan for over forty years, and that she was not aware of any disputes as to the boundaries of it or any claims to the land, reflects the reality that no one ever challenged the boundaries of the property during the period 1948 to 1988;
41. Mr. Barbour’s 1995 letter came approximately 1 year after Rowntree Beach was released, but there is insufficient evidence to conclude that this is what encouraged him to assert ownership of Part 2;
42. Mr. Barbour’s use of Part 2 was minimal. There was only one occasion during the Baileys’ ownership that he came and sat on a beach chair on the north beach, and this was after the Boundaries Act decision. Prior to 1988, there is evidence that he walked the beach over Part 2, he may have practiced golfing there, and he may have swum at north beach or launched his watercraft from the north beach. However his use is no greater than that of any member of the Addison Beach or Pennorth Beach Association at that time, who all felt, prior to Rowntree Beach, that they could have liberal use of the waterfront. In the time of the Baileys’ ownership, there is evidence that he has accessed the south beach only for swimming, recreation, and his water supply;
43. Mr. Barbour planted trees and erected birdhouses along the tree line in front of his residence, east of Part 2, and placed sandbags along the tree line east of Part 2. His shade tent was also located east of Part 2.
 The Real Property Limitations Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. L. 15, establishes a ten year limitation period within which time an owner must bring an action to recover possession once dispossessed:
4. No person shall make an entry or distress, or bring an action to recover any land or rent, but within 10 years next after the time at which the right to make such entry or distress, or to bring such action, first accrued to some person through whom the person making or bringing it claims, or if the right did not accrue to any person through whom that person claims, then within 10 years next after the time at which the right to make such entry or distress, or to bring such action, first accrued to the person making or bringing it.
15. At the determination of the period limited by this Act, to any person for making an entry or distress or bringing any action, the right and title of such person to the land or rent, for the recovery whereof such entry, distress or action, respectively, might have been made or brought within such period, is extinguished.
 These sections provide that the title of the owner is extinguished, and he is barred from making any attempt at recovery, if he has not attempted to recover the land within 10 years after the right to bring an action or make entry or distress accrued.
 As a result of s. 51 of the Land Titles Act, after Part 2 was converted to the Land Titles System on September 10, 2001, it was no longer possible to acquire a possessory title, subject to “grandfathering” of previously established claims. Accordingly, any possessory claim to be proven by the applicant must be shown to have been acquired prior to 2001.
 The parties agree that the test for adverse possession is set out in the leading authority in Ontario, Masidon Investments Ltd. v. Ham (1984), 1984 CanLII 1877 (ON CA), 45 O.R. (2d) 563 (Ont. C.A.) (“Masidon”). In Masidon Blair J.A. summarized the conditions for a successful claim as follows:
Whether a prescriptive title has been acquired is a question of fact which must be determined in the light of the circumstances of each case. The legal principles which govern this determination were recently restated in this Court by Wilson J.A. inKeefer v. Arillotta (1976), 1976 CanLII 571 (ON CA), 13 O.R. (2d) 680 at 692, 72 D.L.R. (3d) 182 and in Fletcher v. Storoschuk (1981), 1981 CanLII 1724 (ON CA), 35 O.R. (2d) 722, 128 D.L.R. (3d) 59, 22 R.P.R. 75 where she said at paragraph 10:
‘...a person claiming a possessory title as against the legal owner must not only establish actual possession for the statutory period but he must establish that such possession was with the intention of excluding the true owner and that the true owner's possession was effectively excluded for the statutory period.’
It is clear that a claimant to a possessory title throughout the statutory period must have:
(1) had actual possession;
(2) had the intention of excluding the true owner from possession, and
(3) effectively excluded the true owner from possession.
 A claim will fail unless the possessory claimant meets each of these three tests and time will begin to run against the owner only from the last date when all of them are satisfied.
 Mr. Streisfield has argued that the 10 year period could not begin to run until the true boundary of Mr. Barbour’s land was ascertained, which did not occur until the decision of Deputy Director Keat was made in 2001. He argues that this is because possession could not be asserted against the actual owner of the lands on the east side of the boundary determined by that hearing until the BA Plan was accepted. He relies on Nicholson v. Halliday, supra, at para. 71, where the court stated that “only once the boundary is set can any issue arise about adverse possession.”
 I agree with Mr. Streisfield on the law but not on the facts. As more fully explained later in these Reasons, the Deputy Director actually found that the boundary between Tiny Island and the mainland was created 88 years previously, as a result of the 1913 deed from Emery Brunelle to the Addisons. It was this conveyance and the reservation within it that created the original boundary of Tiny Island. The parties likewise agreed to this fact in their Agreed Statement of Fact. The fact that that boundary was the circumambient water’s edge, that has since altered in location, is a different issue that will be dealt with later.
 The possession must be "open, notorious, constant, continuous, peaceful and exclusive of the right of the true owner" for the full term of the statutory period: see Fletcher v. Storoschuk, supra, at para. 7; Ledyard v. Chase, 57 O.L.R. 268,  3 D.L.R. 794, per Riddell J. at pp. 269-70.;Mueller v. Lee (2007), 59 R.P.R. (4th) 199, 2007 CarswellOnt 4194 (S.C.J.) at para. 15.
 Actual possession can be established by use, and it is not necessary to build improvements or enclose lands by a fence or barrier: Mueller, supra, at para. 17, citing Laing v. Moran (1952), 1951 CanLII 74 (ON CA), 2 D.L.R. 468, 1952 CarswellOnt 41 (Ont. C.A.) and Teis v. Ancaster (Town)(1997), 1997 CanLII 1688 (ON CA), 35 O.R. (3d) 216, 1997 CarswellOnt 2970 (Ont. C.A.).
 Laskin J.A. articulated the rationale behind the requirement of open and notorious possession in the case of Teis:
First, open possession shows that the claimant is using the property as an owner might. Second, open possession puts the true owner on notice that the statutory period has begun to run. Because the doctrine of adverse possession is based on the true owner’s failure to take action within the limitation period, time should not run unless the delay can fairly be held against the owner.
 It is also clear that the nature of the land must be taken into consideration when determining the sufficiency of the use to establish actual possession. In Stevens v. Pilon,  O.J. No. 935 (Ont. Div. Ct.) at para. 18, Lack, J. quoted from Kirby v. Chowdry,  A.C. 599 (Privy Council)[l] regarding what will constitute a sufficient degree of possession for actual possession:
...the character and value of the property, the suitable and natural mode of using it, the course of conduct which the proprietor might reasonably be expected to follow with a due regard to his own interest; all these things, greatly varying as they must under various conditions, are to be taken into account in determining the sufficiency of possession.
 Beachfront and seasonal properties can entail different considerations than other properties, such that seasonal use or use consistent with recreational property may be sufficient to establish possession consistent with a claim to ownership: Nattress v. Goodchild (1914), 6 O.W.N. 156 (Ont. H.C.J.); Walker v. Russell, 1965 CanLII 250 (ON SC),  1 O.R. 197 (Ont. H.C.J.); Chandler v. LeBlanc, 2008 NBQB 345 (CanLII).
 Mr. Streisfield relies upon Sherren v. Pearson (1887), 1887 CanLII 39 (SCC), 14 S.C.R. 581, at page 595 for the proposition that if the property is of a nature that cannot easily be protected against intrusions, mere acts of user by trespassers will not establish a right. Factually, Sherren is distinguishable from the present case due to the nature of the lands in question and the acts of use by the possessory claimant, summed up by the Court in the following passage:
The mere acts of going on wilderness land from time to time in the absence of the owner, and cutting logs or poles, are not such acts, in themselves, as would deprive the owner of his possession. Such acts are merely trespasses on the land against the true owner, whoever he may be, which any other might commit. There was no occupation of lot by the defendant; there was nothing sufficiently notorious and open to give the true owner notice of the hostile possession begun.
 The Supreme Court of Canada in Sherren at page 595 set out the same principle repeated by the Privy Council years later in Kirby v. Chowdry:
The effect to be given to repeated entries upon the land, or acts of user or possession, depend largely upon the nature of the property. What might be sufficient evidence in the case of cultivated lands to go to a jury would not constitute any evidence in those of wilderness lands. If the property is of a nature that cannot easily be protested against intrusions, mere acts of user by trespassers will not establish a right.
 Mr. Streisfield also relies upon Sherren for the notion that the acts of possession must literally be over every inch of the land to which the party claims possession. This assertion derives from the judgment of Henry, J., adopted by Rosenberg, J.A. in Leichner v. A.G. Canada (1997), 31 O.R. (3d) 700, 1997 CanLII 3081 (Ont. C.A.) at p.12 in a discussion of the requirements of actual possession. For certainty, I will set out the partial passage from Sherren below:
In all the provinces the law is well settled that acts of trespass cannot amount to what the law requires to give title under the statute of limitations, that is, the ouster of the true owner. An act of trespass in going on the property amounts to a disseisin for a time, but it is not an ouster; what the law requires is an ouster of the owner for twenty years. Numerous acts of trespass only amount to so many acts of disseisin; when a man trespasses on the land the true owner ceases to have full possession for the time being; but the moment the trespass is at an end the trespasser's disseisin is at an end and the complete possession is again in the actual owner. It is therefore required that the party should not only take possession, not only disseise the owner, but that he should continue that disseisin so as to amount to an ouster, and that ouster maintained for the statutory period. That can only be done by some act of possession not merely by a temporary disseisin, and it must be over every inch of the land of which the party claims possession. [emphasis added]
 In Sherren the issue was whether isolated acts of trespass in a wooded area for the purpose of cutting trees was evidence of possession under the statute. In Leichner, which involved a claim of adverse possession to federal Crown land that required a period of continuous and exclusive possession of 60 years, the issue was whether the claimants had established adverse possession of a sixty-six foot strip of land along the shoreline, being a section of the Federal Crown Reserve. The outcome in both cases does not hinge in any way on an analysis of whether the claimants’ use covered each and every inch of the disputed lands. In both cases the claim failed because the claimants were only able to show intermittent and isolated acts of a nature insufficient to constitute possession of the kind required to bar the true owner. That being the case, I conclude that the use of the phrase “over every inch of the land” should not be taken literally, and that the law does not require such an unattainably high level of proof.
Intention to Exclude True Owners
 The second condition described by Blair J.A. in Masidon, the intention to exclude the true owner from possession, or animus possidendi, is necessary on the part of the possessory claimant to exclude the true owner from possession. Intention may be presumed by the nature of possession. As stated in Beaudoin v. Aubin (1981), 1981 CanLII 1758 (ON SC), 33 O.R. (2d) 604 (Ont. H.C.J.) at para. 47:
…where there is possession with the intention of holding for one’s benefit, excluding all others, the possession is sufficient and animus is presumed. If it were necessary to say so, one could say of such a situation that the intention ipso facto included the intention to exclude the true owner even if his rights were unknown to the person in possession.
 Accordingly, the requirement for inconsistent use does not apply where land is occupied not knowing that it belongs to someone else. Where a possessor actually believes that he or she owns the land in question, their intention to exclude the true owner is inferred by their conduct. This principle was set out in Cunningham v. Zebarth Estate,  O.J. No. 2027 (Ont. H.C.J.) at para. 54, in which Aitken J. held that Masidon,Beaudoin, and that line of cases do not apply where the person seeking to establish adverse possession is not a trespasser, but rather operating under the belief that he or she is the true owner. In the latter circumstance, where occupancy of disputed land is justified by colour of right or mistake as to title or boundaries, an inference may be drawn that the occupier is in possession of the land with the intention of excluding all others, which would include the legal owner. Aitken J. repeated these observations in Arnprior (Town) v. Coady (2001), 42 R.P.R. (3d) 188,  O.J. No. 1131(Ont. S.C.) at para. 49.
 As stated in Cantera v. Eller (2007) 46 R.P.R. (4th) 39 (Ont. S.C.), at para. 45, a claim to adverse possession may be established by inadvertent or mistaken conduct:
In my view, having reviewed the authorities submitted by the parties, the plaintiff is correct in asserting that a claim to adverse possession may be established by inadvertent or mistaken conduct. The underlying policy rationale makes good sense. The law of adverse possession should not favour a deliberate trespasser over an innocent or mistaken one by recognizing title acquired by the former but not the latter.
Effective Exclusion of True Owner
 In Masidon the Court of Appeal rephrased the third element of the test to refer to “effective exclusion” rather than discontinuance of possession. This third element looks at the conduct of the titled owner, showing that he has been ousted or put out of possession: Mueller at paras. 24 and 25.
 Laing v. Moran, supra, provides that the true owner has constructive possession and therefore non-use by the true owner does not, by itself, end the owner’s possession. However, the true owner’s lack of objection to the use or occupation by the possessory claimant may be evidence that the true owner has been dispossessed: Laing v. Moran, at para. 53; Mueller at para. 25.
 Even in cases where there is no mutual mistake, but only a unilateral mistake on the part of the claimant, such a finding may diminish the burden on a claimant seeking to obtain a possessory title. This was the case in Bradford Investments (1963) v. Fama (2005), 2005 CanLII 27322 (ON SC), 77 O.R. (3d) 127, 2005 CarswellOnt 3356 (Ont. S.C.), where the true owner was not mistaken about who owned the disputed lands, but the claimants reasonably, but erroneously, believed that they owned all of their fenced backyards. The true owner, however, had little to do with the lands in question and did nothing to assert ownership or disabuse the claimants from their mistaken belief. Possessory title was found to have been established in those circumstances.
 Bradford Investments has been followed in Murray Township Farms Ltd. v. Quinte West (City) (2006), 50 R.P.R. (4th) 266, 2006 CarswellOnt 7349 (Ont. S.C.) and Lang v. Tran (2006), 45 R.P.R. (4th) 95, 2006 CarswellOnt 3815 (Ont. S.C.). In Laurier Homes (27) Ltd. v. Brett (2005), 25 T.L.W.D. 2534-018, 2005 CanLII 44817 (ON SC), 2005 CanLII 44817 (Ont. S.C.), at para 58, Perell J. agreed that in the circumstances outlined by Cullity J. in Bradford it would be appropriate to allow a claim for adverse possession.
 Bradford Investments was described by Tulloch, J. in Marotta v. Creative Investments Ltd. (2008), 69 R.P.R. (4th) 44, 2008 CarswellOnt 2048 (Ont. S.C.) at para. 33 as providing a third alternative to mutual mistake or trespass. After a thorough review of the law involving cases of “honest unilateral mistake”, Tulloch J. concluded at para. 73:
The inconsistent use test remains the law in Ontario, despite Cullity J.'s "diffidence" about it (Laurier at para. 30). However, considering that Bradford has not been appealed and the subsequent commentary in the case law, the case law currently recognizes another scenario apart from mutual mistake where the inconsistent use test does not apply: honest unilateral mistake in specific situations involving contiguous land, a bona fide belief on the part of the adverse possessor that he or she owned the disputed lands, and no claim by or physical contact of the owner in relation to the disputed lands.
Has Mrs. Bailey met and satisfied the test of adverse possession?
 The starting point to this analysis is to ask: what lands comprise the subject of the purchase by Mrs. Bailey? While I do not propose to resolve this question, which has already been answered by Deputy Director of Titles Keat, it is key to try to appreciate what the Brunelles thought that they owned, and what Dr. Kynoch believed that he was acquiring, followed by his successors in title. The evidence makes clear that Dr. Kynoch was of the belief that he owned a portion of the mainland east of Tiny Island, as such belief was passed on to his daughters. It is important to consider whether such a belief was objectively reasonable based on all of the facts.
 There are two lines of interpretation of the historical documents, one pointing to the conclusion that it was reasonable for the Brunelles and Kynochs to make the assumption that they owned the entirety of the “whale”, and one leading to the opposite conclusion.
 The latter view is more straight-forward, and is the one accepted by Deputy Director Keat. It was his conclusion that the wording of the October 1913 deed from Emery Brunelle to the Addisons was clear and unambiguous, and it was this conveyance and reservation that created the original boundary of Tiny Island. By insertion of the words that reserved from the conveyance “...the parcel thereof detached from the Main Land, known locally as Tiny Island”, the deed made clear that Brunelle was retaining a topographical island unconnected to the mainland. As of 1913, its natural boundary was the circumambient water’s edge. Deputy Keat reached this conclusion notwithstanding his acknowledgement that the evidence submitted to him showed the island to be attached, rather than detached, more frequently from the mainland. In his Reasons he noted that the testimony of both Mr. Barbour and Mrs. Rice was consistent that the topographic island situation has existed only 3 or 4 times since 1935. Deputy Director Keat also found that the Crown patent of 1915 did not create or set any new boundaries. The area noted on the patent of “about 2 acres more or less” appeared to him to have come from a communication from the Indian agent, Mr. Picotte, in a letter of February 8, 1912, but there was no evidence that Mr. Picotte ever surveyed the island.
 The alternative line of interpretation favours Tiny Island being comprised of a parcel of land attached to the mainland by an isthmus that, infrequently, has been inundated with water. First to be considered is an exchange of correspondence in 1912 on behalf of Brunelle and another individual interested in purchasing Tiny Island, with the Department of Indian Affairs and the Department of Lands and Forests, all for the purpose of clarifying ownership of Tiny Island. In what appears to be the culminating letter of June 29, 1914, J.A. Currie of Indian Affairs enclosed a “rough sketch of what the Parliament Buildings here shows...”. Two sketches appear to have been included; one mislabels Tiny Island, but both show the entity now known as Tiny Island as being attached to the mainland as part of Lot 21.[li] The Crown grant to Emery and Alexander Brunelle follows the next year, again confirming that the island contains land area of approximately 2 acres. Although the parties agree that this grant is redundant, the description of the land is important because it became the foundation for the Cavana Plan, as referenced in his field notes.
 Intervening in the three years between the above events, the conveyance from Emery Brunelle to the Addisons occurred in 1913, with no accompanying survey. In 1914, the McMullen Plan is made, when the Addisons were subdividing Lot 21. There is an island shown immediately to the west of Lot 10 and labelled “island”, with concentric lines around it. The total acreage on the subdivision plan is approximately 20 acres, which does not include the large beach area in front of Tiny Island. In 1939, the Erwin survey showed the island as being joined to the mainland, showing it as part of broken lot 21. Then, in 1942, the island was surveyed by Cavana, indicating an area of 2.1 acres. When William Kynoch took title to Tiny Island as shown on the Cavana Plan, the owner of the mainland parcel could only, by legislation, own to the high water mark and not to the water’s edge.
 This second line of interpretation, then, hinges on the Cavana survey and its interpretation of the Crown grant and the total land area contained therein. It is based on the fact that the express grant of a right-of-way over the disputed lands was granted when Mr. Barbour could not own any of Part 2 because of the legislation then in force. All of the conveyances were registered on title and constitute deemed notice to Mr. Barbour of the extent of the lands owned by the Brunelles, and the express grant of right-of-way from Tiny Island at the time of his purchase in 1949. Subsequently, when the remaining portion of Tiny Island was sold to Dr. Kynoch in 1961, it established what was considered to be his ownership of the whole of the Part 2 lands, by virtue of the attached Cavana Plan and the omission of the description of the right-of-way in the metes and bounds description. The subsequent conveyances to Betty Van Aller, and then Angelina Bailey, are consistent with and perpetuate that understanding.
 As previously stated, it is not the mandate of this court to determine which interpretation creates the legal boundaries, as those have already been established. However, the point of setting out the second line of interpretation is to demonstrate that there is ample basis upon which the owners of Tiny Island, from the Brunelles to its present owner, could reasonably conclude that they owned the Part 2 lands. No one ever challenged the Cavana Plan until, informally, Mr. Barbour’s letter to the Baileys in 1995, and formally, no opposing survey was prepared for the island until Mr. Stewart prepared his plan for the Boundaries Act hearing. Although it is asserted that Emery Brunelle knew that he was transferring all interest in the mainland in 1913, this stands in opposition to the information available to him at the time that his lands were comprised of approximately 2 acres. The Cavana Plan, in that case, would accurately reflect his understanding of what he owned. Further, given the opposing evidence available between 1911 and 1914 that the isthmus may have been both exposed and inundated with water, a competing interpretation of the 1913 conveyance is that it was simply documenting the state of the water level in 1913, but was not meant to be a literal interpretation of the boundaries of Tiny Island.
 In summary, this is not the sort of case where an owner neglected to conduct a registry search, or ignored information found there; Dr. Kynoch had good reason to believe that title to Tiny Island was as shown on the Cavana Plan.
 With that background in mind, I find that it is objectively reasonable for the Brunelles and their successors in title to believe that they owned the Part 2 lands, and that this belief has informed the use made by them of those lands from 1943 until the land was placed under the Land Titles system in 2001. Betty Van Aller must have felt full confidence in agreeing to provide, and then providing, a declaration of possession with respect to Tiny Island as shown on the Cavana Plan, which confirmed her family’s use and possession of that land and the mutual right-of-way by her and her family for forty years prior to her declaration, for both pedestrian and vehicular access to Tiny Island. Similarly, this belief is demonstrated by Nancy Rice providing statutory declarations confirming access over Part 2 by the Kynochs and Van Allers. It is often the practice in real estate transactions that a purchaser will rely upon an existing survey, provided that she receives from the owner a declaration of possession of land shown on that survey, and confirming that there are no boundary disputes or claims as occurred in this case at the time of Mrs. Bailey’s purchase.
 Given this analysis, this is a case to which the doctrine of constructive possession applies. As set out in Leichner at p. 9, this doctrine eases the burden of proof of the three elements required for adverse possession. The court, citing Harris v. Mudie (1882), 7 O.A.R. 414 (Ont. C.A.) at p. 427, stated that the doctrine of constructive possession applies where the claimant relies upon a deed or other instrument that purports to include the lands owned by the claimant along with the lands of the true owner. In such a case, the court went on to direct, the actual possession of one part of the lands described in the instrument is “extended by construction to all the lands within the boundaries of the deed” (Wood v. LeBlanc (1904), 34 S.C.R. 627 at p. 635).
 Leichner stands for the proposition that it is not sufficient that the claimants believe in good faith that they have title to the disputed lands. The belief must be based on some instrument. That is exactly the situation in this case. The Brunelles, Kynoch, Van Aller and Mrs. Bailey were all led to believe as a result of the Crown grant, and the survey based upon it, that the island contained land area of approximately 2 acres extending onto the mainland. All of the conveyances relating to the island and the right-of-way perpetuate this same belief. The statutory declarations and declarations of possession are written evidence of the belief shared by all predecessors in title, passed on to Mrs. Bailey, of their title to the disputed land. In all of these circumstances, it is reasonable that Mrs. Bailey did not obtain a survey in 1988.
 On the facts as found, there is little doubt that Mrs. Bailey has proven her claim to adverse possession. Mrs. Bailey thought that she owned to the tree line at the east side of the beach, leading to an expansive view of the property purchased by her. She has established on the evidence of use that she and her family have possessed and enjoyed “every inch of” the land comprised in Part 2 for year-round recreational use since 1988, including the use of the yellow roadway that crosses Part 2. The evidence provided by Mrs. Bailey from those who were familiar with or who lived at the island establishes that Mrs. Bailey’s predecessors in title likewise possessed the land shown on the Cavana Plan by travelling on it and using it for seasonal enjoyment. This possession has been open, notorious, constant, continuous, peaceful, and has literally occurred under the very eye of the true owner from 1949 onward.
 Based on the case law reviewed, this is a situation where the test of inconsistent use does not apply, as Mrs. Bailey and her predecessors in title held an honest but mistaken belief regarding their ownership. Under the circumstances of this case and on the facts as determined, the inference may be drawn that the owners of Tiny Island occupied what is now all of Part 2 with the intention of excluding all others, which would include the legal owner, in the same manner that a true owner would seek to assert ownership of an area of wide open beachfront.
 Finally, their possession acted to the effective exclusion of the true owner. Accepting, as this court has, that Mr. Barbour’s actions in 1995 are evidence that he believed that he owned to the water’s edge, he did nothing between 1949 and 1995 to alert the parties who were using and occupying it to his ownership. Even after 1995, he took no further affirmative steps until letters were sent from his lawyer in 2000. Any use that he made of the land in question was no more than any other cottager in the area; that is, to walk on the beach and occasionally swim or boat from the north beach, and there is no evidence of when he last did so.
 All three of the elements of adverse possession have been satisfied from at least 1961, being 10 years after the repeal of the amendment to the Beds of Navigable Waters Act that resulted in Mr. Barbour’s title to the water’s edge becoming effective. From 1961 to 1995, a period of 34 years, Mr. Barbour did nothing to end the exclusivity of possession of the Kynochs, Van Allers or the Baileys.
Can adverse possession be established for riparian properties?
 Mr. de Rijcke and Mr. Fairley argue that the adverse possession (or, in the alternative, prescription) over all of Part 2 by Mrs. Bailey's predecessors in title is not interrupted by occasional partial inundation by water. Rather, the riparian character of the title and the unique physical features of this waterfront property mean that a possessor only needs to possess and occupy in the same manner as would a person who owns the paper title.
 Mr. Streisfield argues that, factually and legally, it is impossible to establish possessory title to riparian properties because of the ambulatory nature of the boundaries. The evidence establishes that the isthmus has been covered and uncovered at various points in history, which, among other facts, proves that the water’s edge boundary of what is shown on the Cavana Plan, or Part 2 on the Hiley Plan, is ever-moving. In the result, a declaration of ownership may not be given for Part 2, because Part 2 did not always exist as it did at the time it was surveyed by Hiley, and does not exist today as shown on the Hiley Plan because the water has receded and further area has been added to the westerly boundary of Part 2 through accretion.
 This argument is not correct at law (see paragraph 398 below), but also flies in the face of the very plan that has set the boundaries. The BA Plan shows the water’s edge at March 18, 2002, yet notes that “the ambulatory water’s edge of Lake Huron constitutes the natural boundaries subject hereon”. By the time that the BA Plan was confirmed on October 5, 2004, the natural boundary is sure to have moved given the dynamic nature of the beach discussed throughout the testimony. Would Mr. Barbour argue that he could no longer determine the natural boundary of his land once that occurred? In the same manner, possessory title cannot be thwarted by the fact that a boundary along water’s edge changes constantly.
 Mr. Streisfield also submitted that, factually and legally, the adverse possession claim must fail because there was never a 10 year period during which Part 2 was not covered with water, and that any extent of coverage meant that ownership of that area of Part 2 (or the entirety of Part 2, as he argues did occur) meant that the inundated portions were owned by the Crown pursuant to the Beds of Navigable Waters Act. That being the case, they were not owned by Mr. Barbour, and so an interruption occurred in the running of the limitation period whenever some or all of Part 2 was under water. He argues that there was never a 10 year period when Part 2 was all above water, and the claimant and her predecessor in title has acknowledged that they could only possess and occupy the lands when they have been above water.
 Mr. Streisfield did not present any cases supporting this argument. It is noted that the cases that he relied on before Deputy Director Rosenstein to make the same argument were rejected by her because they dealt with situations where land abutting a navigable waterway had gradually eroded, and the courts held that the part then under water as a result of the erosion belonged to the Crown. Such is not the factual situation that was before her, or that is before this court.
 I disagree that Mrs. Bailey has not proven a 10 year period during which the isthmus existed and some or all of Part 2 was above water. We have the evidence of Mrs. Rice, who at the time of her testimony before the Boundaries Act tribunal had been at Tiny Island or her own cottage from the time of Dr. Kynoch’s purchase in 1949 until the time of her testimony in 2001. Her testimony is that she had only twice seen the island completely surrounded by water. Based on the testimony of the lay witnesses, this occurred sometime in the 1960s or 1970s when water levels permitted waterskiing and boat traffic between the island and mainland, and in the late 1980s and early 1990s as agreed on by the parties. From 1949 to 1960 is a period of 11 years. The “dry” period is likely to have extended as far back as 1942, to the time of the Cavana survey, making a period of 18 years in which there was dry land connecting the island to the mainland.
 Despite where the two water’s edge limits of Part 2 have been historically, resulting in an isthmus or a true island, there has never been an interruption in use because of high water. Even where Chris Van Aller testified that his mother was hesitant to drive her vehicle across high water, he testified that she should not likely have been nervous, leading to the conclusion that it was her nature, rather than the height of the water, that was the impediment. All owners continued to use Part 2 and to make it to the island by passing over Part 2, regardless of the height of the water.
 Mr. de Rijcke argues that the estate acquired by adverse possession is of the same nature as the land prior to the expiration of the limitation period. Just as with a mortgage registered against title to riparian property, the mortgage does not need to be amended or modified each time the natural boundary moves horizontally. In the case of a leasehold interest, the tenancy also moves in and out along with the horizontal displacement of the water. In the case of adverse possession, the person claiming possession would have his or her title alter just as the paper title holder of a riparian parcel could claim ownership of the whole of the uncovered parcel if the movement takes place in a slow, gradual and imperceptible manner.
 Mrs. Baileys’ counsel have provided two cases that assist with the proposition that inundation by water does not change the character of the lands toward which possessory ownership is asserted. In Frank v. Harwich (1889), 18 O.R. 344,  O.J. No. 109 (O.H.C.J. – Ch. Div), a trespass road operating as a common law public highway along private property was found to be established. At times water from Lake Erie inundated the highway to the point that it was not usable by the public, occurring almost annually. Sometimes the route driven had to be shifted somewhat to accommodate the water. Other than these temporary interruptions, the occupation and use by the public was constant and unchallenged by the private landowner. The Divisional Court determined that this interruption in use by inundation of water did not interrupt the user of the beachfront strip, and the land in question formed a public highway owned by the Township.
 In Campbell v. Thomson,  B.C.J. No. 1374 (B.C.S.C.) the terminus of a road as it crossed a beach to the shore of the Pacific Ocean shifted with wave action and tidal flow, changing the configuration of the beach. It was noted that the road end at tidal water varied from month to month or year to year, which the trial judge referred to as “the transient nature of the route where it touches upon tidewater”. The route travelled as a public highway changed as the configuration of the beach changed. Nonetheless, the trial judge found that there was no interruption in the continuity of use required to establish a public highway.
 Frank v. Harwich, being an Ontario case, must by inference also assert the proposition that occasional inundation of riparian lands does not interrupt the running of the limitation period due to a change in ownership. Given the nature of water and the ambulatory nature of water boundaries, this makes good common sense. Were it otherwise, Mr. Streisfield’s assertion could mean that no possessory claims could ever be asserted for properties bounded by water; each time the land area was covered due to natural forces there would be an interruption in the running of the limitation period. In a jurisdiction such as Ontario, with so much land being bounded by navigable water, such a proposition would unduly complicate possessory claims, substantially revise the law of adverse possession, and cause unjustifiable prejudice to those asserting title to land that they are otherwise possessing to the exclusion of the true owner. There is no rational basis for treating adverse possession claims of riparian parcels differently from landlocked parcels.
 Such a view was articulated in Black v. Norris and Registrar General of Land Titles, 2012 NBQB 346 (CanLII), where at para. 340 the court stated:
To give rise to an accretion, the change must take place gradually and imperceptibly. The same is true of an erosion. Imperceptible means imperceptible in its progress, not imperceptible at the end of a period of time. A piece of accreted or eroded land may be quite extensive and so perceptible in that sense, but it may be impossible from hour to hour or day to day to perceive its development, and so it is imperceptible in that sense. The key word is “gradual”. Thus accretion must be distinguished from sudden change in the course of a stream or the level of the sea or other water resulting in the creation of new areas of dry land or in the encroachment of water on what was formerly terra firm. In such a case, the boundary does not change, but remains as it was before. This applies where the boundary is the median line of a river as well as where the boundary is at the edge of water. Land so swallowed up, even by the sea, continues to belong to the owner, however long it may remain covered, so long as it can be ascertained by reasonable marks or the quantity can be known, though perhaps after a great length of time it may be considered as abandoned. Accordingly the owner may take steps to reclaim the land, or if it later naturally becomes dry land it belongs to him or her. [emphasis added].
 It has been proven in this case that changes in the boundary of Part 2 alters frequently as water levels in the area of Tiny Island rise and fall due to wind, storms and natural conditions; in effect the shoreline is very dynamic. Yet the isthmus has been exposed since 1998, and the Baileys testified that it has grown in size as the water levels in Georgian Bay have reduced. They agreed that there is now more exposed land on the isthmus than there was at the time of the Boundaries Act hearing. This change could not have been perceptible. Yet the doctrine of accretion or reliction has no particular application to the case before me. The boundary between Part 1 and Part 2 has been set, and the respective owners of each have ownership of the dry land portions on either side of Part 1 and Part 2. Given that I have found that Mrs. Bailey is the owner by adverse possession of both Parts 1 and 2, such considerations are now moot in respect of this case.
 Alternatively, had I not found that Mrs. Bailey has established possessory title to Part 2, the evidence establishes that she has acquired a prescriptive easement over Part 2 pursuant to s. 31 of the Real Properties Limitation Act, which provides:
31. No claim that may be made lawfully at the common law, by custom, prescription or grant, to any way or other easement, or to any water course, or the use of any water to be enjoyed, or derived upon, over or from any land or water of the Crown or being the property of any person, when the way or other matter as herein last before-mentioned has been actually enjoyed by any person claiming right thereto without interruption for the full period of twenty years shall be defeated or destroyed by showing only that the way or other matter was first enjoyed at any time prior to the period of twenty years, but, nevertheless the claim may be defeated in any other way by which it is now liable to be defeated, and where the way or other matter as herein last before-mentioned has been so enjoyed for the full period of forty years, the right thereto shall be deemed absolute and indefeasible, unless it appears that it was enjoyed by some consent or agreement expressly given or made for that purpose by deed or writing.
32. Each of the respective periods of years mentioned in sections 30 and 31 shall be deemed and taken to be the period next before some action wherein the claim or matter to which such period relates was or is brought into question, and no act or other matter shall be deemed an interruption within the meaning of those sections, unless the same has been submitted to or acquiesced in for one year after the person interrupted has had notice thereof, and of the person making or authorizing the same to be made.
 The parties agree that the statutory period for a prescriptive easement is 20 years and that, like the claim for possessory title, it ceased to be available following September 10, 2001, subject to "grandfathering" of previously established claims. Accordingly, any 20 year period must run prior to September 10, 2001. Further, the claimant’s use must be established to run for 20 years immediately before Mr. Barbour’s objection to Mrs. Bailey’s application was filed in 2001.
 To acquire an easement by prescription, the claimant must demonstrate a use and enjoyment of the easement under a claim of right that is continuous, uninterrupted, open and peaceful, for a period of 20 years: Henderson v. Volk (1982), 1982 CanLII 1744 (ON CA), 35 O.R. (2d) 379 (C.A.) at p.383; 1043 Bloor Inc. v. 1714104 Ontario Inc., 2013 ONCA 91 (CanLII) at para. 57; Mason v. Morrow, 1998 CanLII 1663 (ON CA), 1998 CanLII 1663 (ONCA) at para 5.
 As the preponderance of evidence shows, Mrs. Bailey and her predecessors in title exercised and enjoyed a right-of-way over Part 2, which was not limited to only the yellow roadway first recorded on the Cavana Plan. Enjoyment of the right of access has been open and peaceful, since Mr. Barbour never disputed their use of the land in the manners testified to during this trial until 1995 and this use never changed even after 1995 or after the Boundaries Act application was made. The evidence established that as the water’s edge limits changed, sometimes the route varied to accommodate that fact. Their use has been continuous and uninterrupted, as described previously. Luloff v. Kaiser, 2002 CanLII 44992 (ON CA), 2002 CanLII 44992 (ONCA) makes clear that any prescriptive right must be confined to land used by the claimant continuously during the period in question. In this case, as earlier described, all of Part 2 has been in use when above water and the roadway connecting the island to the Cut has been used continuously since 1942 or possibly earlier.
 To the extent that the parcel was accessed and enjoyed by its owners in the past by crossing dry land on the shore, an easement of necessity existed or arose by operation of law immediately after the merger of title by Dr. Kynoch in 1961. While the shore of Nottawasaga Bay is accessible to the owners of Tiny Island through the extension of Part 6 on the Hiley Plan (“the Cut”) to the water’s edge, Mrs. Bailey’s predecessors in title never relied exclusively on boat access to reach the island, and Mrs. Bailey did not bargain to buy a “boat access only” island.
 Given the nature of the use, which has included delivery trucks, service vehicles, heavy equipment, construction-related vehicles, snowploughs, four-by-four vehicles used by the owners of the island, their guests and family members, and even bicycles, all occurring within eyesight of Mr Barbour’s property since 1949, there can be little argument that he acquiesced as the owner of the servient tenement.
 As earlier found, the statutory period began to run in 1961 at the latest, and by 1981 any rights that Mr. Barbour could have asserted were lost. As the use continued beyond 2001, the requirements of the 20 year period have been met.
 For the same reasons set out in the preceding section, there is no reason why prescriptive easements would not be available for riparian properties.
Doctrine of Lost Modern Grant
 Alternatively, if the doctrine of lost modern grant is applicable, any twenty years of use may be applied.
 The leading Ontario case is Henderson v. Volk, supra, in which case the Court of Appeal held, at p. 382:
The doctrine [of lost modern grant] indicates that where there has been upwards of 20 years uninterrupted enjoyment of an easement and such enjoyment has all the necessary qualities to fulfill the requirements of prescription, then the law will adopt that legal fiction that such a grant was made despite the absence of any direct evidence that it was in fact made.
 Recently, in 1043 Bloor Inc. v. 1714104 Ontario Inc., supra, the Ontario Court of Appeal confirmed that this doctrine continues to exist. While in that case the Court cautioned that the doctrine is to be applied with reservation so as not to permit a neighbourly accommodation from ripening into a legal right as against the true owner, the continuous passage over the lands to which Mr. Barbour acquiesced goes well beyond what could be characterized as “neighbourly accommodation”. Nor is this a case of sporadic use, with vague supporting evidence, as in the case of Stoddart v. Kubiak, 2009 CanLII 12124 (ON SC), 2009 CanLII 12124 (S.C.J.), relied on by Mr. Streisfield.
 This is a set of circumstances to which the doctrine of modern lost grant should also apply to give ownership of the right-of-way to Mrs. Bailey.
 “Proprietary Estoppel” is a term used to describe estoppel by encouragement or acquiescence. It is a doctrine that has been endorsed on numerous occasions throughout Canada; see for example Zelmer v. Victor Projects Ltd., 1997 CanLII 4068 (BC CA), 1997 CanLII 4068 (B.C.C.A.);Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Carling O’Keefe Breweries of Canada Ltd. (1986), 68 N.R. 226, 10 C.P.R. (3d) 433 (F.C.A.); and Schwark v. Cutting, 2010 ONCA 61 (CanLII).
 Most recently, in Schwark the Court of Appeal concluded at para. 16 as follows:
The law with respect to proprietary estoppel is well-settled. This court has accepted that Snell’s equity properly disclose the elements necessary to establish proprietary estoppel as:
i. Encouragement of the plaintiffs by the defendant owner;
ii. Detrimental reliance by the plaintiffs to the knowledge of the defendant owner; and
iii. The defendant owner now seeks to take unconscionable advantage of the plaintiff by reneging on an earlier promise.
 The doctrine of proprietary estoppel can be rooted in acquiescence as well as encouragement. It can also be used as the basis for a claim. InCowderoy v. Sorkos Estate, 2012 ONSC 1921 (CanLII), 2012 ONSC 1921 (Ont. S.C.), the court reviewed the development of this doctrine and wrote, at para. 68:
The modern doctrine of proprietary estoppel has its roots in two types of cases: encouragement and acquiescence. In the first, the party encourages the other in the expenditure of money or in doing something to their detriment in anticipation of having a right over certain land. In the second, one party, who knows the true situation, stands by while the other spends money on land over which the latter mistakenly believes to have a right...
 Schwark makes clear, at para. 29, that unconscionability can only be established by meeting the five-part test laid out in Willmott v. Barber (1880), 15 Ch.D. 96 (Eng. Ch. Div.), known as the “five probanda” required to establish the fraudulent conduct for a finding of proprietary estoppel. They are:
1. The plaintiff must have made a mistake as to his legal title;
2. The plaintiff must have expended some money or must have done some act (not necessarily on the defendant’s land) on the faith of his mistaken belief;
3. The defendant must know of the existence of his own right which is inconsistent with the right claimed by the plaintiff;
4. The defendant must know of the plaintiff’s mistaken belief of his rights; and
5. The defendant must have encouraged the plaintiff in his expenditure of money or other acts, either directly or by abstaining from asserting his legal right.
 The facts of this case are not that the Baileys have improved Mr. Barbour’s land. They repaired the roadway on Part 2 and have paid taxes on Part 2, to their own financial detriment. However, they made expensive improvements to their own property. For the reasons indicated earlier, Mr. Barbour could not have missed noticing the flurry of activity in the 1988/89/90 period, and thereafter, when the Baileys were improving the property. Having found that Mr. Barbour knew that he owned the Part 2 lands, and the conduct of the Baileys making it clear that they believed they had every right to travel over and to use Part 2, I find that this doctrine would also apply to prevent the unconscionable outcome of permitting Mr. Barbour to now rely on a strict application of his legal title.
 One of the questions put to the court by the parties is whether any or all of the claims of Mrs. Bailey are statute barred or otherwise barred by reason of the equitable doctrine of estoppel, or laches.
 Mr. Barbour’s counsel’s argument is difficult to follow in this regard, given that it was not outlined in any detail in his brief of law or stated with any clarity in closing argument. As I understand it, he asserts, as set out in his Notice of Appearance, that “the Applicants herein acquired title to Tiny Island in December 1988 and thereafter sat on any claims they had or thought they had to an interest in Barbour’s property until the LT Plus notice of application was filed in June 2004, with further claims asserted to an interest in Barbour’s lands in 2007, 2010 and 2013”.
 Mr. Streisfield refers to the 10 year limitation period in s. 4 of the Real Property Limitations Act in his brief of law. The application of this provision to Mr. Barbour was previously explained in para. 349 above, and runs as against Mr. Barbour.
 To the extent that it might apply against Mrs. Bailey, I find that any rights that she might assert, and has asserted, did not accrue until theBoundaries Act decision was released on August 8, 2003, when she became aware for the first time that she did not hold title to Part 2. At all time prior to that, she was of the belief that she owned Part 2. Given the facts as this court has found them, it would not make sense for her to be asserting claims against Mr. Barbour prior to that date. Any claims made against Mr. Barbour were made by February 27, 2013, at the latest, when the Notice of Application was amended, being within the 10 year statutory limitation.
 The doctrine of laches would likewise not apply to disentitle Mrs. Bailey from making the claims herein, as she at no time has “sat on her rights” from August, 2003 forward.
 For the foregoing reasons, this court adjudges and declares that:
1. The Objection of Gerald Barbour is dismissed.
2. Angelina Bailey is the owner in fee simple of Part 2 on the Hiley Plan.
3. The local Land Titles Registrar for Simcoe County at Barrie shall make all necessary entries and corrections to the PINs for the parcels of land owned by Angelina Bailey and Gerald Barbour that have been at issue in this proceeding to reflect the results and order of this court.
4. The parties may, if necessary, schedule an appointment before me through the office of the trial co-ordinator to speak to the issue of costs of this proceeding, and potentially the proceedings below that have not yet been the subject of a final cost order. Such an appointment may also be made if there is any disagreement between counsel about the wording of the judgment to issue.
Date: November 29, 2013
COURT FILE NO.: CV-10-249
AND IN THE MATTER OF a Notice of Application by Angelina Bailey.
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE - ONTARIO
RE: ANGELINA BAILEY, Possessory Claimant
GERALD HARRY BARBOUR, Objector
BEFORE: THE HON. MADAM JUSTICE S.E. HEALEY
COUNSEL: R. Fenn and I. De Rijcke, for the Possessory Claimant
S. Dewart, for the Jeffrey Streisfield, Counsel
HEARD: May 15, 2014
 The trial judgment in this matter was released by this Court on November 29, 2013 (Bailey v. Barbour, 2013 ONSC 7397 (CanLII)), and by order dated March 19, 2014 the argument regarding costs was bifurcated. The first hearing, which took place on April 9, 2014, was to determine entitlement and quantum of costs. By costs endorsement released on April 14, 2014, this Court ordered:
1. Angelina Bailey shall be paid costs of the two proceedings fixed in the amount of $490,000 on a substantial indemnity basis, inclusive of HST.
2. Post-judgment interest shall not begin to run until the release of the additional decision regarding liability for payment of such costs, on or after May 15, 2014.
3. The payor of these costs shall be determined on or after May 15, 2014.
 This endorsement relates to the final paragraph in the costs endorsement, and deals with the question of whether Mr. Barbour’s counsel should personally be ordered to pay costs pursuant to Rule 57.07 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
 This hearing was initiated by the Court, as opposed to the successful party Mrs. Bailey, by letter to counsel dated March 10, 2014, reproduced below:
RE: Bailey v. Barbour – Court File No.: CV-10-249 & 10-1309
As an appointment has been scheduled before this Court on April 9, 2014 for the purpose of fixing costs of these proceedings, this correspondence is being sent to alert Mr. Streisfield to the fact that the Court will be considering that this may be an appropriate case for invoking rule 57.07, due to costs wasted by Mr. Streisfield as a result of Mr. Stewart’s involvement. Mr. Streisfield should ensure that he is in a position to address that issue and to make submissions through counsel as necessary.
 Mrs. Bailey subsequently took the position that she is also seeking costs against Mr. Streisfield personally.
 Prior to argument of the substantive portion of the hearing, Mr. Streisfield’s counsel requested that I recuse myself on the basis of reasonable apprehension of bias. Following argument, this Court ruled that the request for recusal was denied, for reasons to be provided in writing. These reasons are given below.
Reasonable Apprehension of Bias
 Costs of a trial are always determined by the trial judge, absent special circumstances. This is because the trial judge has the advantage and insight beyond any other judicial officer in being able to assess all factors that impact on a determination of costs, having observed the conduct of the trial him or herself. For the same reason, the trial judge is in the best position to determine costs under Rule 57.07(1) because only he or she can fully appreciate the basis for considering an award of costs against the solicitor in question. The request that a judge recuse herself while in the middle of determining the costs of a trial is both unusual and procedurally problematic.
 Rule 57.07 provides:
57.07 (1) Where a lawyer for a party has caused costs to be incurred without reasonable cause or to be wasted by undue delay, negligence or other default, the court may make an order,
(a) disallowing costs between the lawyer and client or directing the lawyer to repay to the client money paid on account of costs;
(b) directing the lawyer to reimburse the client for any costs that the client has been ordered to pay to any other party; and
(c) requiring the lawyer personally to pay the costs of any party.
(2) An order under subrule (1) may be made by the court on its own initiative or on the motion of any party to the proceeding, but no such order shall be made unless the lawyer is given a reasonable opportunity to make representations to the court.
(3) The court may direct that notice of an order against a lawyer under subrule (1) be given to the client in the manner specified in the order.
 As set out in subrule 57.07(2), the Court may initiate the inquiry into whether there are grounds for considering an award of costs against a solicitor. That rule inherently places a judge who initiates such a hearing into a position of perceived conflict. Since cost orders against lawyers are never to be lightly entertained, before doing so a judge is likely to already have in his or her mind good reason to consider invoking the rule. Bearing in mind that the threshold test requires, at a minimum, a lawyer for a party to have caused costs to be incurred without reasonable cause or to be wasted by undue delay, negligence or other default, any Court taking such initiative must necessarily have made at least a preliminary assessment that there have been costs wasted by the type of conduct that may warrant a personal costs order against a solicitor. Accordingly, such judge is never approaching the issue with a completely unfettered mind, but rather only after carefully considering whether there is a prima facie case made out with respect to the threshold issue.
 The tension created by this rule is well described in the journal article authored by Evans, H., “The Wasted Costs Jurisdiction” (2001) 65 MLR 51 at p. 56:
...But the greatest injustice is to the respondent lawyer. The same judge will both initiate the enquiry and come to a conclusion at the end of it. No other tribunal would be allowed to be prosecutor, witness and judge, and it is in principle wrong that our courts should be forced to act in way which is arguably in breach of natural justice. It may also be in breach of Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, now enshrined in English law by the Human Rights Act 1998. These problems appear in a lesser way if the Court suggests the making of an enquiry. Even if the enquiry is wholly driven by the applicant, the judge may still be a witness. The law requires that the judge who dealt with the underlying action should also hear the wasted costs application. The reason behind this rule is the laudable aim of saving costs, and because the judge will be in the best position to assess the lawyers conduct, but the result is that the hearing does not appear to be as impartial as it otherwise would be. [footnotes omitted]
 There is agreement between counsel that the correct test to apply on the issue of judicial bias is that confirmed in Wewaykum Indian Band v. Canada, 2003 SCC 45 (CanLII),  2 S.C.R. 259 [“Wewaykum”] at para. 60:
What would an informed, reasonable and right-minded person, viewing the matter realistically and practically, and having thought the matter through, conclude? Would he or she think it more likely than not that the judge, whether consciously or unconsciously, would not decide fairly?
Also see Committee for Justice and Liberty v. Canada (National Energy Board), 1976 CanLII 2 (SCC),  1 S.C.R. 369 at 394; R. v. S (R.D.),1997 CanLII 324 (SCC),  3 S.C.R. 484 at para. 31; and Bailey v. Barbour, 2012 ONCA 325 (CanLII) at para. 16.
 The burden is on the party arguing for disqualification to establish that the circumstances justify a finding that the judge must be disqualified. There is a strong presumption of judicial impartiality, which is key to the judicial process. Accordingly, the apprehension of bias must be based on serious grounds. Each case must be examined on its own facts and in light of the entire context: Wewaykum, at paras. 59 and 76.
 It is paramount to not have the integrity of the justice system eroded by the perception of judicial bias. Even the possibility of unconscious bias must be looked at through the lens of the reasonable person in order that no one be left with the impression that irrelevant considerations are acting on the judicial mind. Such considerations underlie the oft-heard words from The King v. Sussex Justices, Ex parte McCarthy,  1 K.B. 256, “It is not merely of some importance but of fundamental importance that justice should not only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done”.
 The applicable law was summarized recently by the Ontario Court of Appeal in Bailey v. Barbour, 2012 ONCA 325 (CanLII) at paras. 16-21, as follows:
16. The inquiry into whether a conflict exists sufficient to prompt a decision-maker to recuse him or herself must be fact-specific. As his short oral ruling demonstrates, the trial judge correctly identified the test to be applied for determining whether there exists a reasonable apprehension of bias: What would an informed, reasonable and right-minded person, viewing the matter realistically and practically, and having thought the matter through, conclude? Would he or she think it is more likely than not that the judge, whether consciously or unconsciously, would not decide fairly?
17. This test was first articulated by Grandpré J. in his dissenting reasons in Committee for Justice and Liberty v. National Energy Board, 1976 CanLII 2 (SCC),  1 S.C.R. 369, at p. 394. Ever since, the Supreme Court of Canada has consistently endorsed the standard, including the case referred to by the trial judge, Wewaykum Indian Band, although the court has also sought from time to time to clarify and develop it.
18. Thus, for example, in his reasons in R. v. S. (R.D.), 1997 CanLII 324 (SCC),  3 S.C.R. 484, Cory J. explained, at para. 111, that the test set down by Grandpré J. contains a “two-fold objective element”: not only must the person considering the alleged bias be reasonable, but “the apprehension of bias itself must also be reasonable in the circumstances of the case.” Cory J. added, at para. 113, that:
[T]he threshold for a finding of real or perceived bias is high. It is a finding that must be carefully considered since it calls into question an element of judicial integrity. Indeed an allegation of reasonable apprehension of bias calls into question not simply the personal integrity of the judge, but the integrity of the entire administration of justice.
19. In addition to this “high” threshold set out by Cory J., the Supreme Court has made clear that, in those cases where a party seeks the recusal or disqualification of a judge, allegations of judicial bias will have to overcome the strong presumption of judicial impartiality. Moreover, “in any case where the impartiality of the judge is in question, the appearance of the matter is just as important as the reality”: R. v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate and others, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No. 2),  1 All E.R. 577 (H.L.), at p. 592.
20. In Metropolitan Properties Co. (F.G.C.) Ltd. v. Lannon,  3 All E.R. 304 (C.A.), at p. 310, Lord Denning M.R. stressed the importance of the appearance of judicial impartiality. He put the matter this way:
[I]n considering whether there was a real likelihood of bias, the court does not look at the mind of the justice himself… It does not look to see if there was a real likelihood that he would, or did, in fact favour one side at the expense of the other. The court looks at the impression which would be given to other people. Even if he was as impartial as could be, nevertheless, if right-minded persons would think that, in the circumstances, there was a real likelihood of bias on his part, then he should not sit. And if he does sit, his decision cannot stand.
21. This passage from Lord Denning M.R. in Metropolitan Properties Co. was cited with approval by Major J. in his dissenting reasons in S. (R.D.), at para. 11, and by this court in Benedict v. Ontario (2000), 2000 CanLII 16884 (ON CA), 51 O.R. (3d) 147 (C.A.). In Benedict, the court also noted, at para. 20, that while Lord Denning M.R. used the phrase “real likelihood”, variations in the expression such as “reasonable apprehension”, “reasonable likelihood”, and “reasonable suspicion” should not be regarded as involving any substantive difference in the approach to be taken, and indeed amount to the same standard.
 There are two bases underlying Mr. Dewart’s request for recusal. First, he submitted that there had been a predetermination made by this Court of matters that should have been left for this Rule 57.07 hearing. Without opportunity to address those matters with the assistance of independent counsel, this hearing became inherently procedurally unfair. Second, he submitted that the tenor of the Court’s previous costs endorsement released on April 14, 2014 is unfairly critically of Mr. Streisfield, laying open the question of whether this judge can consider submissions made on his behalf with a fair and objective mind.
 Counsel points first to the endorsement released on July 12, 2013, as containing a pre-determination of the issue of Mr. Stewart’s bias. The endorsement arises from a mid-trial motion brought by Mrs. Bailey, seeking the rare order of production of copies of all email communications exchanged between Mr. Barbour’s expert, Mr. Stewart, and Mr. Streisfield, during the course of the trial. As stated in that endorsement, the decision to allow such a mid-trial motion to be heard was based upon the fact that Mr. Stewart’s initial evidence under cross-examination conveyed an involvement in the proceeding beyond that expected of an expert witness, and necessitated further exploration of his role in the litigation in order that the Court be in a position to properly evaluate his evidence.
 A voir dire was conducted on the emails produced, and Mr. Stewart gave evidence concerning the emails in question. The entire thrust of the exercise was to give Mr. Barbour’s counsel and his expert witness an opportunity to explain/rationalize/put into context the emails as they may relate to the issues in the litigation. The allegation of expert bias, raised by Ms. Bailey, was front and centre of her motion. Every opportunity was given to Mr. Streisfield on that voir dire to provide any evidence that he felt necessary, and to make full submissions with respect to the communications.
 Written reasons were provided in order to permit the Court to explain why a review was conducted on communications to which privilege might attach, and why such an unusual mid-trial order was made for their full production (Bailey v. Barbour, 2013 ONSC 4731 (CanLII)). Such an order could only be justified on the basis that the communications revealed a reasonable apprehension of bias on the part of Mr. Stewart. In my view, the Court was required to reach such a finding in order to rationalize the order made. To state that Mr. Stewart had “radically departed from the arena of impartial professional” and had “become an advocate for Mr. Barbour’s cause”, are necessary and logical findings to make on such a voir dire given the content of the emails reviewed, the lack of additional evidence presented on behalf of Mr. Barbour on the voir dire, and the arguments of counsel.
 However, any decision about the extent of the bias and its effect on the final determinations to be made following trial were left to when the totality of the trial evidence could be assessed. At paragraph 23 of that endorsement, this Court wrote:
What to do in relation to Mr. Stewart’s evidence is something that the court will have to grapple with in reaching a decision in this case, and now is not the time to do it. The determination of the extent of Mr. Stewart’s bias, and whether it is sufficient to affect only weight as opposed to admissibility, should not be made without considering all of the Mr. Stewart’s evidence in the context of the totality of the evidence given at trial by all witnesses.
Further, there were no findings made at that time with respect to Mr. Streisfield’s participation in the communications, other than to note that he was the recipient of some of them.
 In summary, while the endorsement identifies bias on the part of Mr. Stewart, such a finding was procedurally necessary and was a finding open to the trial judge on a voir dire of this nature. Given all of the above considerations, the informed, reasonable and right-minded person could not conclude that the endorsement logically points to an inability of the Court to decide the Rule 57.07 costs question fairly.
 Counsel for Mr. Streisfield next points to this Court’s Reasons for Judgment dated November 29, 2013, and in particular paragraphs 317 to 324 containing this Court’s determinations regarding the treatment of Mr. Stewart’s evidence, and reasons therefore. It was argued by Mr. Dewart that the findings made therein result in the appearance that this judge has closed her mind to persuasion with respect to the constituent elements of a Rule 57.07costs order. Two findings are of particular concern to Mr. Dewart. The first is that a finding was made that Mr. Stewart was a biased witness and had wasted costs; the second was that Mr. Streisfield participated in that waste of costs by calling an expert who he knew, or should have known, was not impartial. As will be discussed later, in my view the facts compel the inevitable conclusion that Mr. Streisfield was aware of Mr. Stewart’s lack of objectivity.
 Counsel for Mr. Streisfield did not assert that the foregoing procedural steps and determinations gave rise to the need for disqualification on the basis of perceived bias prior to or during the hearing on May 9, 2014. Even though an assessment of the quantum of costs would clearly require a consideration of wasted costs, no objection was made on the grounds of perceived bias at that stage. This is so even though the Reasons for Judgment telegraphed that waste of trial time was front and centre in the Court’s mind. This Court was clear in stating that the time taken up by Mr. Stewart’s testimony was a waste of resources. Paragraph 324 of the Reasons state:
…In this case the harm is done; preparation and trial time wasted by the receipt of evidence on which this Court cannot possibly place any reliance…
 The question is whether, having made such a finding, the test in Wewaykum is met and the reasonable and objective person would believe that these findings would taint the mind of the decision-maker who initiates the R. 57.07 hearing, such that he or she would be unable to hold a fair hearing.
 In my view, the test is not met. As earlier stated, there must be some initial assessment by the judge that factors exist to justify invoking Rule 57.07. The reasonable person, being aware of the law, would know that there is not a straight line between such determinations and an order for costs under Rule 57.07(1). The law requires that the judge must consider all evidence and the submissions made during the Rule 57.07 hearing, and examine, holistically, the lawyer’s conduct. Accordingly, the reasonable person can expect that the judge, who is presumed to be impartial, will follow that law, and consider fully all arguments as to whether the conduct in question satisfies the test set out in the Rule and the case law, and in particular the leading case of Galganov v. Russell (Township), 2012 ONCA 410 (CanLII) [“Galganov”]. In all of the circumstances of this case, an apprehension of judicial bias is not reasonable.
 In this case the findings in the Reasons for Judgment, that Mr. Stewart was a biased witness and that Mr. Streisfield proffered him to the court when he knew or should have known of his bias, were the types of findings necessary to compel the court to initiate the Rule 57.07 hearing. As noted in the Reasons for Judgment, significant time was spent in this proceeding addressing issues related to the bias and lack of objectivity of Mr. Stewart. Instead of providing impartial and unbiased evidence, Mr. Stewart was not impartial; he was a biased expert and effectively acted as co-counsel and advocate with Mr. Streisfield for Mr. Barbour throughout this proceeding.
 The time to fully reflect upon the evidence, in this case Mr. Stewart’s, and to consider the full repercussions of all evidence bearing upon how his evidence was placed before this Court, was during deliberations made following trial. That process, including consideration of the full evidentiary record and a determination with respect to the effect of his bias, are all within the proper purview of the trial judge.
 It bears keeping in mind that the issue of Mr. Stewart’s bias could have been fully argued by Mr. Streisfield during closing submissions, but was not adequately addressed. Although the affidavits of Mr. Streisfield and Mr. Stewart filed in support of this hearing now contain argument relating to the finding of bias, those arguments were not advanced during closing argument.
 Last, counsel argues that the endorsement on costs released on April 14, 2014 at paras. 26 to 30 contains determinations regarding both Mr. Stewart’s and Mr. Streisfield’s conduct that give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias on the part of the trier. It is argued that the costs endorsement is highly critical of Mr. Streisfield in a number of ways that are entirely unrelated to Mr. Stewart, and which were not raised by Mrs. Bailey in her costs submissions.
 These observations and findings were made within the context of evaluating subrule 57.01(1)(e), being the conduct of any party that tended to shorten or lengthen unnecessarily the duration of the proceeding. With respect to Mr. Streisfield, this Court noted at paragraph 30 that “there were other issues raised by Mr. Barbour and/or his counsel that were in my view unnecessary and improper, and which wasted trial time and that of Mrs. Bailey’s counsel”.
 At para. 54 of his factum Mr. Dewart has listed specific incidents of conduct referenced in that earlier costs endorsement. These were addressed within the context of the Rule 57.07(1)(e) analysis, as other instances where Mr. Barbour and/or his counsel took unnecessary and improper steps, and wasted trial time. It is faulty to anticipate that the conduct set out therein will attract costs under Rule 57.07. While there is judicial disagreement in the case law as to what conduct should attract such an award, it should be clear that much, if not all, of the conduct noted is not so egregious that it would warrant such an order.
 Wide discretion rests in the Court to determine the costs of a proceeding. In exercising its discretion, however, Rule 57.01 outlines the various factors that may be considered by the Court in exercising its discretion under s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C. 43. This Court was not restricted to considering only the issue of Mr. Stewart’s involvement at that step in the assessment of costs. In setting out the additional ways in which costs were wasted, the Court made no definitive finding that Mr. Streisfield was responsible for such steps, as was indicated in the phrasing at paragraph 30 of the costs endorsement, that “…there were many other issues raised by Mr. Barbour and/or his counsel that were in my view unnecessary and improper…”. With the Court carrying out its mandate to assess costs and to consider the factors in Rule 57.01, under such circumstances an apprehension of judicial bias is unreasonable. Further, the reasonable person, being apprised of the law, would understand that the conduct identified in paragraph 30 of the costs endorsement is not of a gravity that would attract costs against a lawyer personally.
 For all of the foregoing reasons, the test set out in Wewaykum was not met by Mr. Streisfield and therefore the request for recusal, made while the proceeding is in its final stages, was denied.
 Having found there to be no basis in fact or law to warrant the requested recusal, I now turn to a determination of the hearing on the merits.
 Rule 57.07(2) provides that no order shall be made unless the lawyer has been given a reasonable opportunity to make representations to the Court.
 Mr. Streisfield has now had that opportunity. He has independent representation. He has filed a fulsome affidavit that addresses, within the constraints imposed by the solicitor and client relationship, his view of the litigation. I have carefully reviewed that affidavit, as well as the affidavit of Mr. Stewart. No time constraints were placed on his counsel’s submissions, nor do I deem any of the affidavit evidence to be inadmissible.
 As earlier stated, the legal test for when costs may be awarded against a solicitor personally was outlined by the Ontario Court of Appeal inGalganov, supra. In Galganov the Court outlined a two-step process or inquiry as to whether costs should be awarded against a solicitor personally, at paras. 13-14:
(1) The first inquiry is whether the lawyer’s conduct falls within Rule 57.07(1) in the sense of causing costs to be incurred unnecessarily; and
(2) The second step is to consider, as a matter of discretion (and applying the extreme caution principle), whether in the circumstances of the particular case, the imposition of costs against the lawyer personally is warranted.
 The first part of the test requires a “holistic” examination of the lawyer’s conduct, however a general observation about the conduct of the litigation is not sufficient to identify the conduct that contributed to delay and unnecessary cost. The Court must also consider specific incidents of conduct to determine whether the conduct caused unreasonable costs to be incurred and thus, falls within the rule: Galganov, at paras. 20-12; Carleton v. Beaverton Hotel,  O.J. No. 2409 (Div. Ct.), at para. 20.
 The second part of the test is discretionary but, as explained by the Supreme Court of Canada in Young v. Young, 1993 CanLII 34 (SCC),  4 S.C.R. 3 at para. 254, the court must exercise this discretion with “extreme caution”. Rule 57.07 is concerned with compensating parties for costs unreasonably incurred, and not with regulating lawyers at the instance of the judge or of their client’s litigation adversaries; Carleton v. Beaverton Hotel, at para. 24, Young v. Young, at para. 254; Galganov, at para. 14. Even where the parties deserve compensation for costs incurred, the Court’s discretion to awards costs against a lawyer personally must be exercised “with the utmost care and only in the clearest of cases”. An order for costs against a solicitor “must only be made sparingly, with care and discretion, … and not simply because the impugned conduct may appear to fall within the circumstances described in Rule 57.07(1)”: Belanger v. McGrade Estate, 2003 CanLII 49390 (ON SC),  O.J. No. 2853; 65 O.R. (3d) 829 (S.C.J.) at para. 25.
 As the case authorities discuss, the need for extreme caution in awarding costs against lawyers is necessary to ensure that lawyers’ conduct is not scrutinized and sanctioned as they carry out their duties to their clients and fulfill their obligations under Rule 4.01(1) of the Rules of Professional Conduct, to assist a client’s case within all reasonable means. If the evidence is unclear who was responsible for the pursuit of litigation, “any doubt should be resolved in favour of the solicitor”: Byers v. Pentex Print Master, 2002 CanLII 49474 (ON SC),  O.J. No. 1403, 59 O.R. (3d) 409 (S.C.J.) at para. 17.
 However, a lawyer may not rely on a client’s instructions as a defence if the lawyer has acted in a manner inconsistent with the goals of the justice system: Schreiver v. Mulroney  O.J. No. 3191 (S.C.J.) leave to appeal to refused 161 ACWS (3d) 698 (Div. Ct.). This principle is particularly germane to this case because of the genesis of the wasted trial time spent on the evidence of Mr. Stewart, all rejected on the basis of bias. During submissions there was much debate about whether the Court could go beyond the content of the March 10, 2014 correspondence to counsel, and take into account other conduct as set out in the Reasons for Judgment or the costs endorsement of April 15, 2014. Mr. Dewart urged that the Court should not consider matters other than Mr. Stewart’s involvement in the trial, as this was the only matter about which his client received notice. Further, in a letter from Mrs. Bailey’s counsel dated March 20, 2014, it was confirmed in writing that Mrs. Bailey was also seeking costs against Mr. Streisfield pursuant to Rule 57.07, and would be “essentially relying on the same grounds as indicated in the letter from Madam Justice Healey to all counsel and obviously includes her Reasons for Judgment”. The letter went on to confirm that counsel would advise Mr. Dewart in advance if there would be any other grounds being argued.
 I find that it is unnecessary to resolve this issue, as the calling of Mr. Stewart as an expert witness is enough to attract the consequences of Rule 57.07. Whether there may or may not be additional grounds, or whether there was sufficient notice given of those grounds, is moot. Similarly, any consideration of the Rules of Professional Conduct or the Principles of Civility for Advocates is unnecessary, as Rule 57.07 is concerned with costs unreasonably incurred or wasted and is not concerned with unprofessional conduct generally: Carleton v. Beaverton Hotel, at para. 18.
 Turing to the two-step analysis set out in Galganov, the first issue is whether Mr. Streisfield wasted the parties’ resources within the meaning of R. 57.07(1). There is no question that having Mr. Stewart testify wasted trial time; the question is whether Mr. Streisfield caused those wasted costs to be incurred.
 Mr. Streisfield’s affidavit filed in response to this hearing addresses the involvement of Mr. Stewart in this proceeding. That affidavit provides, in part, that Mr. Streisfield had no indication that Mr. Stewart was not prepared to consider all of the evidence or argument that was contrary to that he had taken into account. He describes that he has constantly found Mr. Stewart to be “fiercely independent owing in part to his extensive research and analysis”.
4.1.01 (1) It is the duty of every expert engaged by or on behalf of a party to provide evidence in relation to a proceeding under these rules,
(a) to provide opinion evidence that is fair, objective and non-partisan;
(b) to provide opinion evidence that is related only to matters that are within the expert’s area of expertise; and
(c) to provide such additional assistance as the court may reasonably require to determine a matter in issue.
(2) The duty in subrule (1) prevails over any obligation owed by the expert to the party by whom or on whose behalf he or she is engaged.
 It defies reason that Mr. Streisfield could fail to question Mr. Stewart’s objectivity when one considers the evidence reviewed in paragraph 322 of the Reasons for Judgment, in particular. It is difficult to understand, for example, how the note passed from Mr. Stewart to Mr. Streisfield during the cross-examination of Mrs. Bailey, which reads “she claims to have always understood ‘part 2’ to be her property…but that is not Gerry’s problem – her recourse is not to take Gerry’s land; her recourse is against her lawyer who advised her not to get a survey”, could not suggest to a lawyer that the expert was involved in the file in partisan way. How does such a question, formulated by an expert witness, bear upon his professional expertise or advance the issues upon which he was qualified to opine? In what way does it conform to the duties outlined in Rule 4.1.01?
 Similarly, it defies common sense and reason to accept that a lawyer who receives an email from his expert that refers to another expert’s report as a “load of bs”, and further states that “my guess is that he is never given expert evidence in court before, and Izaak has not told him that he cannot protect him from cross-examination. He thinks that he can get away with this crap”, could fail to recognize that the expert was too personally involved to objectively comment upon the other expert’s methodology and conclusions. These comments being directed at Mr. Streisfield, as well as other like comments, the Court can reach no conclusion other than that he was aware, or should have been, that Mr. Stewart had taken on a role beyond that of an expert witness.
 There is no evidence from Mr. Barbour with respect to instructions that he may have given Mr. Streisfield about Mr. Stewart. In some circumstances, the absence of such evidence would decide the matter in favour of the lawyer. However, the decision to provide the Court with expert testimony is part of the role of the lawyer having carriage of the matter, and his or her professional expertise should include an understanding that it undermines the integrity of the justice system to direct a biased expert to step into the witness box. In other words, even if Mr. Barbour asked that he do it, Mr. Streisfield cannot shield himself from costs where he has acted in a manner that is contrary to the administration of justice. Accordingly, I must find that it is Mr. Streisfield who caused the unnecessary waste of costs.
 At the second step of the inquiry the Court is to consider the principles set out in Young v. Young. Marchand (Litigation Guardian of) v. Public General Hospital Society of Chatham,  16 C.P.C. (4th) 201 (Gen. Div.), which was cited with approval in Galganov, held that mere negligence can attract costs consequences, as well as acts that fall short of negligence, and that evidence of bad faith is not required. In this regard, the Court is entitled to take into account factors that demonstrate that a lawyer was derelict in his duties as an officer of the Court.
 There was overwhelming evidence of Mr. Stewart’s lack of impartiality with respect to the issues before this Court. Even though there was such evidence, Mr. Streisfield continued to utilize the services of Mr. Stewart and he proffered him to the Court as though he was an impartial witness as contemplated by Rule 4.1. As previously stated, this was an obvious and evident bias – it should not have required a judge to point it out.
 In these circumstances, this is a case where there is no benefit of any doubt that can be given to the lawyer. The evidence is plain and obvious that Mr. Streisfield breached his obligation to the Court in using Mr. Stewart, and in doing so he acted in bad faith and was directly responsible for wasting costs. A costs order against him personally is warranted.
 It was argued by Mr. Fenn that Mr. Barbour must have known that Mr. Stewart was biased, as he was in Court throughout the trial, and accordingly must have known of the issue of bias. I am not satisfied that this is true, as there is some evidence suggesting that Mr. Barbour was not kept fully engaged in this litigation in the way one might expect. I refer to the fact that Mr. Stewart testified on the voir dire that he had not rendered a single account to Mr. Barbour, whether directly or through Mr. Streisfield, for the trial in question. This information leads me to infer that there are likely other aspects of Mr. Stewart’s involvement about which Mr. Barbour was not kept fully apprised. There is no indication, for example, that Mr. Barbour was included in the offending emails that passed between Mr. Stewart and Mr. Streisfield. In his affidavit, Mr. Streisfield explains why he disagrees with the Court’s finding that Mr. Stewart was biased. It stands to reason that this issue was never canvassed with Mr. Barbour. Based on this additional evidence, I believe that it would be erroneous to infer that Mr. Barbour was advised of the problems with Mr. Stewart’s testimony, but instructed Mr. Streisfield to proceed nonetheless. Given these facts, it is unlikely that Mr. Barbour was fully informed of any possible risks and consequences of Mr. Stewart’s continuing involvement. Accordingly, Mr. Barbour should not be responsible for the costs thrown away by trial time spent on Mr. Stewart. For that reason, I decline to order that costs be payable on a joint and several basis.
 Counsel for Mrs. Bailey has included a breakdown of the percentage of trial time that was wasted in the proceedings before both Justice McIsaac and myself. He estimated that trial time taken up by Mr. Stewart in the proceeding before Justice McIsaac was approximately 3 days out of 19, and 4.5 to 5 days out of 13 days in the second trial. The time spent at trial is, of course, only a portion of the work involved. It is very difficult to estimate with any exactness the proportion of total costs that were related to Mr. Stewart’s involvement. Given the pivotal role that he played in Mr. Barbour’s case, the time spent on his testimony was significant, as can be seen by the amount of trial time expended. Estimating very conservatively, I place that figure as being equivalent to 20% of the total costs incurred by Mrs. Bailey, or 20% of her costs award of $490,000.
 This court orders:
1. Gerald Barbour shall pay costs to Angelina Bailey fixed in the amount of $490,000 inclusive of disbursements and HST;
2. Jeffrey Streisfield shall reimburse Gerald Barbour for a portion of the above costs, being 20% of the total award, such that Jeffrey Streisfield shall pay to Gerald Barbour the amount of $98,000 inclusive of disbursements and HST;
3. Jeffrey Streisfield shall pay Angelina Bailey her costs of the hearing on May 15, 2014 fixed in the amount of $7,500 inclusive;
4. Notice of this order shall be given to Mr. Barbour by mailing a copy of this endorsement and order by ordinary mail, and proof of service of same shall be filed by counsel for Mr. Streisfield with this Court within 15 days; and
5. All costs plus interest owing to Angelina Bailey, including the order for costs made by the Court of Appeal, shall be paid to her within thirty (30) days from the date of this order.
Date: June 18, 2014